Acquisition of delayed matching in the pigeon

Pigeons were exposed to three successive matching-to-sample procedures. On a given trial, the sample (red, green or blue light) appeared on a center key; observing responses to this key produced the comparison stimuli on two side keys. Seven different experimental conditions could govern the temporal relations between the sample and comparison stimuli. In the "simultaneous" condition, the center key response was followed immediately by illumination of the side key comparison stimuli, with the center key remaining on. In "zero delay" the center key response simultaneously turned the side keys on and the center key off, while in the "variable delay" conditions, intervals of 1, 2, 4, 10, and 24 sec were interposed between the offset of the sample and the appearance of the comparison stimuli on the side keys. In all conditions, a response to the side key of matching hue produced reinforcement, while a response to the non-matching side key was followed by a blackout. In procedure I all seven experimental conditions were presented in randomly permutated order. After nine sessions of exposure (at 191 trials per session, for a total of 1719 trials) the birds gave no evidence of acquisition in any of the conditions. They were therefore transferred to Procedure II, which required them to match only in the "simultaneous" condition, with both the sample and comparison stimuli present at the same time. With the exception of one bird, all subjects acquired this performance to near 100% levels. Next, in Procedure III, they were once more exposed to presentation of all seven experimental conditions in random order. In contrast to Procedure I, they now acquired the delay performance, and were able to match effectively at delays of about 4 sec.     

Interpreting effect sizes: Toward a quantitative cumulative social psychology

Improved research practice is based on estimation of effect sizes rather than statistical significance. We discuss the challenging task of interpreting effect sizes in the research context, with particular attention to social psychological research. We emphasize the need to acknowledge the uncertainty in an effect size estimate, as signaled by the confidence interval. Interpretation must consider the independent variables, participants, measures, and other aspects of the research. Comparison with other results in the research field, and consideration of theoretical and practical implications are useful strategies. Researchers should consider the possible value of agreeing on benchmarks to help guide effect size interpretation, at least within focused research fields. More broadly, researchers should wherever possible think of experimental manipulations as well as results in quantitative terms. Doing so is fundamental for designing ingenious, informative experiments, understanding research results and their implications, developing theory, and building a quantitative cumulative social psychology. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Legal Necessity,Pareto Efficiency & Justified Killing in Autonomous Vehicle Collisions

Suppose a driverless car encounters a scenario where (i) harm to at least one person is unavoidable and (ii) a choice about how to distribute harms between different persons is required. How should the driverless car be programmed to behave in this situation? I call this the moral design problem. Santoni de Sio (Ethical Theory Moral Pract 20:411–429, 2017) defends a legal-philosophical approach to this problem, which aims to bring us to a consensus on the moral design problem despite our disagreements about which moral principles provide the correct account of justified harm. He then articulates an answer to the moral design problem based on the legal doctrine of necessity. In this paper, I argue that Santoni de Sio’s answer to the moral design problem does not achieve the aim of the legal-philosophical approach. This is because his answer relies on moral principles which, at least, utilitarians have reason to reject. I then articulate an alternative reading of the doctrine of necessity, and construct a partial answer to the moral design problem based on this. I argue that utilitarians, contractualists and deontologists can agree on this partial answer, even if they disagree about which moral principles offer the correct account of justified harm.     

How social is social inhibition of return?

A number of studies have shown that the motor actions of one individual can affect the attention of an observer. In one notable example, “social inhibition of return,” observers are relatively slow to initiate a response to a location where another individual has just responded. In the present article we examine the degree to which this phenomenon can be considered a social effect. We find that unlike the related social, or “joint,” Simon effect, social inhibition of return is not influenced by competitive versus cooperative interaction, nor by live versus recorded interaction. We do find however that co-actors need to turn-take in order for the effect to occur. Thus, so-called “social” inhibition of return only reaches a minimal threshold to be considered a social phenomenon.     

Incongruent imagery interferes with action initiation

It has been suggested that representing an action through observation and imagery share neural processes with action execution. In support of this view, motor-priming research has shown that observing an action can influence action initiation. However, there is little motor-priming research showing that imagining an action can modulate action initiation. The current study examined whether action imagery could prime subsequent execution of a reach and grasp action. Across two motion analysis tracking experiments, 40 participants grasped an object following congruent or incongruent action imagery. In Experiment 1, movement initiation was faster following congruent compared to incongruent imagery, demonstrating that imagery can prime the initiation of grasping. In Experiment 2, incongruent imagery resulted in slower movement initiation compared to a no-imagery control. These data show that imagining a different action to that which is performed can interfere with action production. We propose that the most likely neural correlates of this interference effect are brain regions that code imagined and executed actions. Further, we outline a plausible mechanistic account of how priming in these brain regions through imagery could play a role in action cognition.     

Brand switching and consumer identification with brands in the smartphones industry

Brand loyalty literature has mainly focused on how brands perform under normal market conditions. As the business environment grows more complex, globalised, and innovative, market disruptions become more prevalent. Taking a cognition‐based approach, this paper proposes that customers identify with brands to satisfy self‐definitional needs. A social constructivist perspective, using an inductive and case study strategy, was used. Data generation was based on purposeful sampling, and participants were chosen on the basis of their “lived” experience with the use of smartphones. Four major themes were identified in the purchase of smartphones: identity, satisfaction, brand loyalty, and brand switching. Participants' views suggested that this provides them with a sense of purpose and meaning, defining who they are and why they behave in specified ways in society, which increases their self‐esteem. Brand switching occurs when customers are motivated to review available alternatives in the marketplace due to a change in competitive activities. Socially, switching occurs when a customer's belief in a brand is externally influenced within the social setting. When the boundary between the “in‐group” and the “out‐group” is impermeable and changing, group membership is not realistic; social mobility is not a viable strategy to cope with identity threats.     

‘Sin is Rightly Called the Punishment of Sin’: Francis Turretin’s Reformed Doctrine of Sin

ABSTRACT

This article contextualizes Francis Turretin’s (1623–87) doctrine of sin, and in particular his understanding of sin as a punishment for sin. Specifically, it elaborates on the theological context into which Turretin speaks. Through analyzing Turretin’s historical situation, it progresses to the content of Turretin’s theology in light of his theological and political opponents. Utilizing Turretin’s Institutes of Elenctic Theology (1679–1685), St Augustine’s Contra Julianum, and John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion, amongst others, this article evaluates Turretin’s view of the doctrine of sin and its relation to medieval and early-modern European theology. Ultimately, it argues that Turretin’s view of sin as a punishment of sin is born from his understanding of God’s holiness being demonstrated through his ‘vindicatory justice’ and Turretin’s self-understanding as an ‘orthodox’ theologian in the grand tradition of Western theology extending back to the Church Fathers.