Self‐ratings in Training Programs: An Examination of Level of Performance and the Effects of Feedback

The level of agreement (mean differences and correlations) between self, peer and training staff ratings were examined in this study. The sample consisted of 545 participants who were undertaking a Royal Australian Airforce officer training program. Consistent with previous research there was strong agreement between training staff and peers and weak agreement between self‐ratings and ratings by others (training staff and peers). Accuracy of ratings was examined by (a) comparing the mean ratings of outstanding, average and below‐average performers; and (b) correlating difference scores with a measure of performance. The findings showed that below‐average performers have a less accurate view of themselves compared to outstanding performers. Finally, we examined the effects of negative feedback on self‐perceptions. The analyses indicated that after receiving negative feedback, average performers adjusted their self‐ratings. Various explanations were proposed together with practical implications for training.     

What’s wrong with the evolutionary argument against naturalism?

Alvin Plantinga has argued that evolutionary naturalism (the idea that God does not tinker with evolution) undermines its own rationality. Natural selection is concerned with survival and reproduction, and false beliefs conjoined with complementary motivational drives could serve the same aims as true beliefs. Thus, argues Plantinga, if we believe we evolved naturally, we should not think our beliefs are, on average, likely to be true, including our beliefs in evolution and naturalism. I argue herein that our cognitive faculties are less reliable than we often take them to be, that it is theism which has difficulty explaining the nature of our cognition, that much of our knowledge is not passed through biological evolution but learned and transferred through culture, and that the unreliability of our cognition helps explain the usefulness of science.     

On the interpretation of removable interactions: A survey of the field 33 years after Loftus

In a classic 1978 Memory & Cognition article, Geoff Loftus explained why noncrossover interactions are removable. These removable interactions are tied to the scale of measurement for the dependent variable and therefore do not allow unambiguous conclusions about latent psychological processes. In the present article, we present concrete examples of how this insight helps prevent experimental psychologists from drawing incorrect conclusions about the effects of forgetting and aging. In addition, we extend the Loftus classification scheme for interactions to include those on the cusp between removable and nonremovable. Finally, we use various methods (i.e., a study of citation histories, a questionnaire for psychology students and faculty members, an analysis of statistical textbooks, and a review of articles published in the 2008 issue of Psychology and Aging) to show that experimental psychologists have remained generally unaware of the concept of removable interactions. We conclude that there is more to interactions in a 2 × 2 design than meets the eye.     

What's in a name? access to information from people's names

Abstract

The processing of people's names is contrasted with face recognition and word recognition. The effects of the familiarity of initial and surnames and frequency of surnames (the number of people with the same surname) were investigated in several tasks. It was found that the effects of name familiarity and surname frequency were analogous to the effects of word frequency in tasks which did not require access to memory for individuals (a nationality decision and naming latency). In tasks which do require access to memory for individuals (familiarity decision and a semantic classification), the effect of surname frequency was analogous to the effect of distinctive-ness in face recognition. The results are discussed in terms of a functional model of name processing in which name recognition units mediate between the output of word recognition units and access to identity-specific semantics.     

Mental Practice or Spontaneous Play? Examining Which Types of Imagery Constitute Deliberate Practice in Sport

Imagery use was examined within the deliberate practice framework (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993 Ericsson, K., Krampe, R. and Tesch-Römer, C. 1993. The role of deliberate practice in the acquisition of expert performance. Psychological Review, 100: 363–406. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Athletes (N = 150) from three competitive levels (recreational, intermediate, and elite) completed an adapted version of the Sport Imagery Questionnaire (SIQ; Hall, Mack, Paivio, & Hausenblas, 1998 Hall, C., Mack, D., Paivio, A. and Hausenblas, H. 1998. Imagery use by athletes: Development of the sport imagery questionnaire. International Journal of Sport Psychology, 29: 73–89. [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Each SIQ item was scored for frequency, deliberation, relevance, concentration, and enjoyment. Eight SIQ items were deemed to be deliberate practice: five cognitive-specific images, two cognitive-general images, and one motivational general-mastery image. Motivational-specific imagery instead resembled deliberate play (Côté, Baker, & Abernethy, 2003 Côté, J., Baker, J. and Abernethy, B. 2003. “From play to practice: A developmental framework for the acquisition of expertise in team sports”. In Expert performance in sports: Advances in research on sport expertise, Edited by: Starkes, J. L. and Ericsson, K. A. 89–114. Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.  [Google Scholar]). Elite and intermediate athletes used imagery more frequently and deliberately and perceived imagery to be more relevant and requiring more concentration than recreational athletes. Differences also existed regarding how deliberately the athletes engaged in various imagery types. The findings may inform applied practitioners regarding differences in imagery use between competitive levels and differences in the characteristics of imagery types.     

On the (non)persuasive power of a brain image

The persuasive power of brain images has captivated scholars in many disciplines. Like others, we too were intrigued by the finding that a brain image makes accompanying information more credible (McCabe & Castel in Cognition 107:343-352, 2008). But when our attempts to build on this effect failed, we instead ran a series of systematic replications of the original study—comprising 10 experiments and nearly 2,000 subjects. When we combined the original data with ours in a meta-analysis, we arrived at a more precise estimate of the effect, determining that a brain image exerted little to no influence. The persistent meme of the influential brain image should be viewed with a critical eye.     

Is social inhibition of return due to action co-representation?

When two individuals alternate reaching responses to visual targets presented on a shared workspace, one individual is slower to respond to targets occupying the same position as their partner’s previous response. This phenomenon is thought to be due to processes that inhibit the initiation of a movement to a location recently acted upon. However, two distinct forms of the inhibition account have been posited, one based on inhibition of an action, the other based on inhibition of an action and location. Furthermore, an additional recent explanation suggests the phenomenon is due to mechanisms that give rise to action congruency effects. Thus the three different theories differ in the degree to which action co-representation plays a role in the effect. The aim of the present work was to examine these competing accounts. Three experiments demonstrated that when identical actions are made, the effect is modulated by the configuration of the visual stimuli acted upon and the perceptual demands of the task. In addition, when the co-actors perform different actions to the same target, the effect is still observed. These findings support the hypothesis that this particular joint action phenomenon is generated via social cues that induce location-based inhibition of return rather than being due to shared motor co-representations.     

Proneness to hallucinations and delusions in a non‐clinical sample: Exploring associations with metacognition and negative affect

Commonly, individuals prone to hallucinations and delusions hold dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and report higher levels of negative affect, yet, these associations have not been clearly investigated in non‐clinical samples due to the failure to control for high intercorrelations between variables. The aim of the current study was to investigate how hallucination and delusion proneness are associated with dysfunctional metacognitions and negative affect. A cross‐sectional sample of 715 students free from psychiatric diagnoses (M_age = 28.1 years, SD = 10.9, range 18–65) completed the Launay‐Slade Hallucination Scale (LSHS‐R); Peters et al. Delusion Inventory (PDI‐21); Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (DASS‐21); and the Metacognition Questionnaire (MCQ‐30). Findings that participants who were prone to both hallucinations and delusions reported elevated levels of negative affect support the need for targeted mental health treatment for individuals who experience psychological distress related to their hallucinatory and delusional experiences. While metacognition beliefs of need to control thoughts and cognitive self‐consciousness, along with the anxiety and stress DASS‐21 subscales appeared as significant cross‐sectional predictors of proneness to hallucinations and delusions, only metacognitions demonstrated any notable predictive value for delusion proneness. This finding questions the role of metacognitions in determining hallucination and delusion proneness in non‐clinical samples.     

Reaction Time,Age, and Cognitive Ability: Longitudinal Findings from Age 16 to 63 Years in Representative Population Samples

Reaction time variables are used widely in studies of human cognitive ageing and in research on the information processing foundations of psychometric intelligence. The research is largely based on biased population samples. In the present study, large (500+), representative samples of the population of the West of Scotland were tested at ages 16, 36 and 56 years on simple and choice reaction time. Participants were re-tested eight years later, at which time they also took the Paced Auditory Serial Addition Test (PASAT). We report simple and choice reaction time means and their variabilities, their stability across 8 years, and their correlations with the PASAT. Simple and choice reaction times become slower and more variable with age. Women from age 36 to 63 show more variability in choice reaction times than men, an effect which remains after controlling for mean reaction time. Reaction time differences largely account for age differences, but not sex differences, in PASAT scores.     

Biological maturation and physical activity in adolescent British females: The roles of physical self-concept and perceived parental support

ObjectivesThis study examined the mediating and moderating effects of physical self-concept and parental support, respectively, on relations between maturation and physical activity (PA) in British adolescent females.DesignCross-sectional field based study.MethodsBiological maturity status, physical self-concept, perceived parental support for PA, and self-reported PA were assessed in 244 female British year 7–9 pupils (M age = 12.8 years, SD = .9).ResultsStructural equation modelling, employing maximum likelihood estimation and boot-strapping procedures supported the contention that physical self-concept mediated an inverse relation between maturation and PA. A regression model examining the main and interactive effects of maturation and parental support on PA provided evidence of a main effect for parental support, but no interactive effect.ConclusionsThe results suggest that physical self-concept partially mediates an inverse relation between maturity and physical activity in adolescent females. Accordingly, how adolescent females interpret or perceive the changes associated with maturation may be more important than maturation itself. Encouraging adolescent females to view puberty as a natural and attractive aspect of the process of ‘growing up’ may help mitigate any negative health consequences associated with early maturation. Parental support for PA does not appear to moderate relations between maturation and PA.