The closing of the theory of mind: A critique of perspective-taking

Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others and is often said to be one of the cornerstones of efficient social interaction. In recent years, a number of authors have suggested that one particular ToM process occurs spontaneously in that it is rapid and outside of conscious control. This work has argued that humans efficiently compute the visual perspective of other individuals. In this article, we present a critique of this notion both on empirical and theoretical grounds. We argue that the experiments and paradigms that purportedly demonstrate spontaneous perspective-taking have not as yet convincingly demonstrated the existence of such a phenomenon. We also suggest that it is not possible to represent the percept of another person, spontaneous or otherwise. Indeed, the perspective-taking field has suggested that humans can represent the visual experience of others. That is, going beyond assuming that we can represent another’s viewpoint in anything other than symbolic form. In this sense, the field suffers from the same problem that afflicted the “pictorial” theory in the mental imagery debate. In the last section we present a number of experiments designed to provide a more thorough assessment of whether humans can indeed represent the visual experience of others.

     

Connecting to belonging: a cross-disciplinary inquiry into rural Australian Anglican Church engagements with people from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds

People from diverse backgrounds enrich the rural, regional, and remote communities where they relocate and settle. Research about rural diversity tends to focus on demographics (age, gender, country of origin) while ignoring personal narratives of integration, for example, engagements with religious institutions (such as the local Christian church). This article presents the research themes from an investigation using co-operative inquiry into rural diversity and the Anglican Church, with specific reference to the Australian experience. It is a cross-disciplinary dialogic exchange between social workers and theologians. Positive narratives about connection, welcome, participation, and belonging are shared.     

Estimating the average need of semantic knowledge from distributional semantic models

Continuous bag of words (CBOW) and skip-gram are two recently developed models of lexical semantics (Mikolov, Chen, Corrado, & Dean, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 26, 3111–3119, 2013). Each has been demonstrated to perform markedly better at capturing human judgments about semantic relatedness than competing models (e.g., latent semantic analysis; Landauer & Dumais, Psychological Review, 104(2), 1997 211; hyperspace analogue to language; Lund & Burgess, Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 28(2), 203–208, 1996). The new models were largely developed to address practical problems of meaning representation in natural language processing. Consequently, very little attention has been paid to the psychological implications of the performance of these models. We describe the relationship between the learning algorithms employed by these models and Anderson’s rational theory of memory (J. R. Anderson & Milson, Psychological Review, 96(4), 703, 1989) and argue that CBOW is learning word meanings according to Anderson’s concept of needs probability. We also demonstrate that CBOW can account for nearly all of the variation in lexical access measures typically attributable to word frequency and contextual diversity—two measures that are conceptually related to needs probability. These results suggest two conclusions: One, CBOW is a psychologically plausible model of lexical semantics. Two, word frequency and contextual diversity do not capture learning effects but rather memory retrieval effects.     

The Effectiveness of the MMPI-2-RF in Detecting Feigned Mental Disorders and Cognitive Deficits: a Meta-Analysis

A cornerstone of forensic assessments involves the assessment of response styles, including feigning and malingering. As a forensic relevant instrument (FRI), the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2-Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF) contains embedded overreporting scales that cover the three major domains: feigned mental disorders (i.e., F-r and Fp-r), feigned cognitive impairment (RBS and FBS-r), and feigned medical complaints (Fs). This meta-analytic review of 30 studies examined the effectiveness of various detection strategies and cut scores for the MMPI-2-RF. As an important clinical concern, several feigning scales (F-r, FBS-r, and RBS) exhibited marked elevations (Ms > 80 T) for genuine responders diagnosed with major depressive or somatoform disorders. However, the Fp-r—a true rare-symptoms detection strategy—proved highly effective for discriminating feigned from genuine psychopathology (ds > .90). For feigned cognitive impairment, the FBS-r produced very large effect sizes with feigned TBI (M d = 1.41); however, its cut scores were more indicative of general feigning than feigned cognitive impairment. Finally, Fs yielded a large effect size (d = 1.23) for feigned medical complaints, but its cut scores were more likely to identify examinees feigning mental disorders (M sensitivity = .74) than medical complaints (M sensitivity = .43). These findings are discussed within the context of clinical forensic evaluations.     

“One Size Fits All”: An Existential-Constructivist Perspective on the Crisis Intervention Approach with Suicidal Individuals

The empirical data on the relationship between suicide and suicide attempts are interpreted as suggesting that the contemporary assessment and intervention approaches to suicidal individuals are, by and large, ineffective. In support of our argument, we focus on the crisis intervention model as one example and suggest that the crisis intervention approach to responding to suicidal individuals is at best, ineffective and, at worst, can be viewed as exacerbating suicidal risk through its distancing, marginalizing, and stigmatizing effects. Additionally, we hypothesize that the mechanics of the crisis intervention model contribute to the societal message that a meaning and contextual-based discussion of suicidality is taboo and that this message tends to continue into more long-term psychotherapeutic approaches. Along these lines, we present an alternative to the crisis intervention model grounded in an existential-constructivist theory of suicidal behavior and the principles of therapeutic and feminist assessment philosophies as an heuristic intended to stimulate the development of new and innovative approaches to working with suicidal individuals.     

Reform of statistical inference in psychology: the case of memory & cognition.

Geoffrey Loftus, Editor of Memory & Cognition from 1994 to 1997, strongly encouraged presentation of figures with error bars and avoidance of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). The authors examined 696 Memory & Cognition articles published before, during, and after the Loftus editorship. Use of figures with bars increased to 47% under Loftus's editorship and then declined. Bars were rarely used for interpretation, and NHST remained almost universal. Analysis of 309 articles in other psychology journals confirmed that Loftus's influence was most evident in the articles he accepted for publication, but was otherwise limited. An e-mail survey of authors of papers accepted by Loftus revealed some support for his policy, but allegiance to traditional practices as well. Reform of psychologists' statistical practices would require more than editorial encouragement.     

Effectiveness of the MMPI-2-RF Validity Scales for Feigned Mental Disorders and Cognitive Impairment: A Known-Groups Study

The MMPI and MMPI-2 validity scales have long been accepted as standard tools in the assessment of feigned mental disorders (FMD) based on their extensive empirical validation. Studies are now examining MMPI-2-RF with modified validity scales plus the new Infrequent Somatic Responses Scale (F_S) and the recently-adapted Response Bias Scale (RBS). The current investigation used a known-groups design to examine the effectiveness of the MMPI-2-RF for differentiating FMD and feigned cognitive impairment (FCI) from patients with genuine disorders for a large civil forensic sample. Criterion measures included the Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms-2 (SIRS-2) for the FMD group, and below-chance performances on the Victoria Symptom Validity Test (VSVT) and the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM) for the FCI group. For FMD, both F-r and F_P-r produced very large effect sizes (ds > 2.00). Moreover, the absence of severe elevations (≥80 T) on F-r proved effective at ruling-out most FMD. For the current study, a F_P-r cut score ≥90 T for FMD produced virtually no false-positives (0.01) and only a moderate level of false-alarms. As predicted by its detection strategies, most MMPI-2-RF validity scales have limited effectiveness with the FCI group. However, FBS-r and RBS may be useful in conjunction with other clinical data for ruling out FCI for genuine neuropsychological consults. An entirely separate concern is whether certain diagnostic groups, such as major depression, will have marked elevations on MMPI-2-RF scales thereby increasing the likelihood of false-positives. On this point, F_P-r performed exceptionally well with unelevated scores (Ms < 55 T) consistently across diagnostic categories.     

Paranormal belief and the conjunction fallacy: Controlling for temporal relatedness and potential surprise differentials in component events

Recent research suggests paranormal believers are especially prone to the ‘conjunction fallacy’. The current study extends this work by presenting believers and non‐believers with eight paranormal plus eight non‐paranormal scenarios. Participants were given either a paranormal or virtually identical non‐paranormal version of each scenario. Of these, half incorporated component events which were (virtually) co‐occurring with half including components which were temporally disjointed. Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA; controlling for gender and maths/stats/psychology qualifications) found believers made more conjunction errors than non‐believers. Neither event type (paranormal vs. non‐paranormal) nor components' temporal relationship (co‐occurring vs. disjointed) had a significant effect on conjunction biases. Believers' tendency to produce larger conjunctive estimates was unrelated to group differences in component probability estimates (surprise values) and further, could not be attributed to group differences in the perceived functional relationship between component and conjunctive events. Possible explanations are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.