Giving Voice to the Experiential Value of Natural Environments

People value natural environments in many different ways. In addition to the various tangible products and benefits that can be produced from a natural environment, people may also find value in their immediate experience of the environment while they are in it. This experiential value is an important aspect of quality of life for many people, but it is often not taken into account in making decisions about managing natural environments. In part, this is because the experiential value of the environment can be difficult for people to express in words. In this article, I explore how first-person methods from experiential and phenomenological psychology may help in giving voice to the ineffable experiential value of natural environments. Drawing on the work of Charles Lewis, Eugene Gendlin, and Kenneth Shapiro, I illustrate how an initially inarticulate, bodily felt sense of the experiential value of a natural environment can be explicated in a way that both expresses and carries forward the implicit sense of value. Such practices might serve as a basis for an environmental decision-making process that incorporates the hard-to-express experiential values of nature.     

Children's Eyewitness Identification as Implicit Moral Decision‐Making

Why are young children particularly prone to make false positive errors or false alarms when identifying a wrongdoer? In three studies, the problem was approached using a signal detection analysis, focusing on the moral costs of false alarms, as understood at different points in development. The findings are as follows: (i) decisional criteria became more conservative, indicating fewer false alarms, with age in three studies; (ii) children's beliefs about the seriousness of false alarms and misses changed from (a) a non‐moral concern to (b) a moral concern for misses to (c) a moral concern for false alarms. (iii) These findings were replicated in two demographically different communities. More critically, (iv) framing of the filmed event, for example, as a moral transgression (stealing) or a pro‐social (helping) act (Study 1) and as intentional with little damage or unintentional with major damage (Study 3), interacts with age in influencing decisional criteria. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Visual image retention does not contribute to modulation of event-related potentials by mental rotation

Rotation of a visual image in mind is associated with a slow posterior negative deflection of the event-related potential (ERP), termed rotation-related negativity (RRN). Retention of a visual image in short-term memory is also associated with a slow posterior negative ERP, termed negative slow wave (NSW). We tested whether short-term memory retention, indexed by the NSW, contributes to the RRN. ERPs were recorded in the same subjects in two tasks, a mental rotation task, eliciting the RRN, and a visual short-term memory task, eliciting the NSW. Over both right and left parietal scalp, no association was found between the NSW and the RRN amplitudes. Furthermore, adjusting for the effect of the NSW had no influence on a significant association between the RRN amplitude and response time, an index of mental rotation performance. Our data indicate that the RRN reflects manipulation of a visual image but not its retention in short-term memory.     

Nominalism and Idealism

The article considers, in a historical setting, the links between varieties of nominalism—the extreme nominalism of the Quine-Goodman variety and the trope nominalism current today—and types of idealism. In so doing arguments of various twentieth century figures, including Husserl, Bradley, Russell, and Sartre, as well as a contemporary attack on relations by Peter Simons are critically examined. The paper seeks to link the rejection of realism about universals with the rejection of a mind-independent “world”—in short, linking nominalism with idealism.     

Contributing to Discourse

For people to contribute to discourse, they must do more than utter the right sentence at the right time. The basic requirement is that they add to their common ground in an orderly way. To do this, we argue, they try to establish for each utterance the mutual belief that the addressees have understood what the speaker meant well enough for current purposes. This is accomplished by the collective actions of the current contributor and his or her partners, and these result in units of conversation called contributions. We present a model of contributions and show how it accounts for a variety of features of everyday conversations.