I Talked to a Genius and All I Got was Knowledge

Bryan Frances’s recent argument is for the epistemic position called Live Skepticism. The Live Skepticism Argument (LSA) attempts to establish a restricted set of skeptical conclusions. The LSA’s “skeptical hypotheses” are scientific and philosophical positions that are “live actual possibilities” in an intellectual community. In order to “rule out” live hypotheses, an expert must know them to be false. However, since these are live hypotheses in this expert’s intellectual community—endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding—this expert is unable to rule them out. Consistent with the LSA is the outcome that people not exposed to these live hypotheses can know what these experts cannot. However, in this paper, I defeat the LSA by developing and defending a counterexample that focuses on the phenomenon of genius testimony. Everyone, including the LSA’s proponent, can and should allow that expertise comes in degrees. While in many cases a person’s intelligence, understanding, and knowledge are parallel to others in the field, there are some who are extraordinary in their intelligence, understanding, and knowledge (geniuses). If an expert meets with a genius, it is possible that the genius provides this individual with beliefs that can rule out a skeptical hypothesis. Therefore, an expert can have knowledge, even if the skeptical hypothesis is live and endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding. After providing this counterexample, I present three potential objections, and show how people can know global warming exists and that smoking does not give someone cancer. I conclude by defending this counterexample from a likely reply by proponents of the LSA involving luck and knowledge.     

Practice with anxiety improves performance,but only when anxious: evidence for the specificity of practice hypothesis

We investigated for the first time whether the principles of specificity could be extended to the psychological construct of anxiety and whether any benefits of practicing with anxiety are dependent on the amount of exposure and timing of that exposure in relation to where in learning the exposure occurs. In Experiment 1, novices practiced a discrete golf-putting task in one of four groups: all practice trials under anxiety (anxiety), non-anxiety (control), or a combination of these two (i.e., the first half of practice under anxiety before changing to non-anxiety conditions, anxiety-control, or the reverse of this, control-anxiety). Following acquisition, all groups were transferred to an anxiety condition. Results revealed a significant acquisition-to-transfer decrement in performance between acquisition and transfer for the control group only. In Experiment 2, novices practiced a complex rock climbing task in one of the four groups detailed above, before being transferred to both a high-anxiety condition and a low-anxiety condition (the ordering of these was counterbalanced across participants). Performance in anxiety transfer was greater following practice with anxiety compared to practice without anxiety. However, these benefits were influenced by the timing of anxiety exposure since performance was greatest when exposure to anxiety occurred in the latter half of acquisition. In the low-anxiety transfer test, performance was lowest for those who had practiced with anxiety only, thus providing support for the specificity of practice hypothesis. Results demonstrate that the specificity of learning principle can be extended to include the psychological construct of anxiety. Furthermore, the specificity advantage appears dependent on its timing in the learning process.     

COVID-19 Adaptations for Health Service Psychology Internship Training in a Medical School

Health service psychology internship directors confronted a myriad of training challenges in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, internship training directors were tasked with ensuring that interns received appropriate training in each of the nine profession-wide competency (PWCs) areas while also ensuring the physical and emotional well-being of staff and trainees. The purpose of this paper is to describe one internship’s approach to adapting the nine PWCs during COVID-19 in the context of an academic medical setting. Successes and challenges associated with training adaptations in the context of each of the nine PWCs will be shared along with considerations for improving academic medical training programs’ ability to support interns’ educational goals and training requirements throughout and following the COVID-19 pandemic.

     

Constant or variable practice: recreating the especial skill effect

An especial skill occurs when performance of a single action from within a class of actions produces an advantage in performance. This advantage in a single action over others in the class is presumed to result from large amounts of practice performing the specific action (Keetch, Schmidt, Lee, & Young, 2005). In an experiment involving the learning of a basketball set shot, practice was manipulated to identify whether an especial skill effect emerges at the free-throw line as a result of constant practice conditions in novice performers. After a pretest, which involved set shots across five distances, participants were randomly assigned to one of two intervention groups. A constant practice group (n=10) performed 300 trials of the set shot at the 15 ft free throw line only, whereas a variable practice group (n=10) performed 300 trials across five distances. Shot accuracy increased for both groups as a result of practice at the 15' distance. However, on the posttest, a significant difference was reported between actual and expected scores for the constant practice group only. This finding provided evidence that an effect similar to that seen for especial skills emerges as a result of constant practice. Although an especial skill effect could result from massive amounts of practice, we show it can emerge as a result of short term repetitive practice, indicating that the type, rather than amount, of practice is important.     

Investigating the Factor Structure of the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale in Community and Clinical Samples of the Australian Population

The Kessler 10 Psychological Distress Scale (K10) is a brief dimensional scale designed to measure and monitor trends of psychological distress. Recently the scale has been utilised by general practitioners and clinicians to screen for common mental disorders and measure treatment outcomes. Despite the K10 demonstrating a sound one dimensional structure in the general population, the scale??s structure has yet to be comprehensively tested in clinical samples. The current study aimed to use confirmatory factor analysis to test three theoretical structure models of the K10 and one model for the K6 (a six item variant) in a sample from a tertiary referral clinic for mood and anxiety disorders and compare those results with a population sample from the Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing. The results demonstrated that a two factor model with correlated latent factors representing depression and anxiety fit the clinical sample the best whilst a one factor model with correlated errors between several items fit the population sample the best. The results are discussed further in relation to scoring and interpreting the Kessler scales.