Which processes are involved in cognitive procedural learning?

Procedural memory is characterised by a relative resistance to pathology, making its assessment of the utmost importance. However, few studies have looked at the cognitive processes involved in cognitive procedural learning. In an initial experiment, we studied the role of different cognitive functions in massed cognitive procedural learning. Our results confirmed the existence of three separate learning phases and, for the first time, demonstrated the involvement of episodic memory and executive functions in the first learning phase. In a second experiment, we studied the effect of distributed learning conditions on the dynamics of procedural learning. This second study confirmed our results but showed that these conditions slow down the process of cognitive procedural learning. Our overall findings call into question the status of functionally autonomous memory system that is currently allotted to procedural memory, and suggest that the role of nonprocedural cognitive components should be taken into account in patient rehabilitation.     

A defense of the subordinate-level expertise account for the N170 component

A recent paper in this journal reports two event-related potential (ERP) experiments interpreted as supporting the domain specificity of the visual mechanisms implicated in processing faces (Cognition 83 (2002) 1). The authors argue that because a large neurophysiological response to faces (N170) is less influenced by the task than the response to objects, and because the response for human faces extends to ape faces (for which we are not expert), we should reject the hypothesis that the face-sensitivity reflected by the N170 can be accounted for by the subordinate-level expertise model of object recognition (Nature Neuroscience 3 (2000) 764). In this commentary, we question this conclusion based on some of our own ERP work on expert object recognition as well as the work of others.     

The development of interindividual sharing of knowledge and beliefs in 5- to 9-year-old children

The authors studied the evolution of interindividual intentionality in children and showed that the sharing of knowledge and beliefs requires more complex operations than those involved in usual false-belief tasks. The authors conducted 3 experiments on 380 children (aged 5 years, 0 months to 9 years, 6 months). They assessed the children's ability to attribute to a character an intended action that was compatible with the belief held by another character interacting with that character. The observed lag in performances is explained both in terms of information processing and at the Piagetian concrete operational level.     

Conscious recollection in autobiographical memory: an investigation in schizophrenia

Whether or not conscious recollection in autobiographical memory is affected in schizophrenia is unknown. The aim of this study was to address this issue using an experiential approach. An autobiographical memory enquiry was used in combination with the Remember/Know procedure. Twenty-two patients with schizophrenia and 22 normal subjects were asked to recall specific autobiographical memories from four lifetime periods and to indicate the subjective states of awareness associated with the recall of what happened, when and where. They gave Remember, Know or Guess responses according to whether they recalled these aspects of the event on the basis of conscious recollection, simply knowing, or guessing. Results showed that the frequency and consistency of Remember responses was significantly lower in patients than in comparison subjects. In contrast, the frequency of Know responses was not significantly different, whereas the frequency of patients' Guess responses was significantly enhanced. It is concluded that the frequency and consistency of conscious recollection in autobiographical memory is reduced in patients with schizophrenia.     

Perceived self-efficacy and pain control: opioid and nonopioid mechanisms

In this experiment, we tested for opioid and nonopioid mechanisms of pain control through cognitive means and the relation of opioid involvement to perceived coping efficacy. Subjects were taught cognitive methods of pain control, were administered a placebo, or received no intervention. Their pain tolerance was then measured at periodic intervals after they were administered either a saline solution or naloxone, an opiate antagonist that blocks the effects of endogenous opiates. Training in cognitive control strengthened perceived self-efficacy both to withstand and to reduce pain; placebo medication enhanced perceived efficacy to withstand pain but not reductive efficacy; and neither form of perceived self-efficacy changed without any intervention. Regardless of condition, the stronger the perceived self-efficacy to withstand pain, the longer subjects endured mounting pain stimulation. The findings provide evidence that attenuation of the impact of pain stimulation through cognitive control is mediated by both opioid and nonopioid mechanisms. Cognitive copers administered naloxone were less able to tolerate pain stimulation than were their saline counterparts. The stronger the perceived self-efficacy to reduce pain, the greater was the opioid activation. Cognitive copers were also able to achieve some increase in pain tolerance even when opioid mechanisms were blocked by naloxone, which is in keeping with a nonopioid component in cognitive pain control. We found suggestive evidence that placebo medication may also activate some opioid involvement. Because placebos do not impart pain reduction skills, it was perceived self-efficacy to endure pain that predicted degree of opioid activation.