Positive intelligence illusions: on the relation between intellectual self-enhancement and psychological adjustment

The relation between self‐enhancement and psychological adjustment has been debated for over 2 decades. This controversy is partly due to the variety of approaches implicated in the assessment of mainly self‐enhancement but also psychological adjustment. We adopted a face‐valid approach by statistically removing actual intellectual ability variance from self‐rated intellectual ability variance. Study 1 (N = 2,048), a concurrent Internet investigation, provided initial insight into the relation between intellectual self‐enhancement and psychological adjustment. Study 2 (N = 238), a longitudinal round‐robin investigation, allowed a closer examination of the dynamic processes underlying this relation. Self‐enhancement was positively linked to multiple indicators of intrapersonal and interpersonal adjustment, and predicted rank‐order increases in adjustment over time. The links between intellectual self‐enhancement and intrapersonal adjustment were mediated by self‐esteem. Finally, the interpersonal costs and benefits of self‐enhancement systematically varied depending on methodology.     

The role of listening in interpersonal influence

Using informant reports on working professionals, we explored the role of listening in interpersonal influence and how listening may account for at least some of the relationship between personality and influence. The results extended prior work which has suggested that listening is positively related to influence for informational and relational reasons. As predicted, we found that: (1) listening had a positive effect on influence beyond the impact of verbal expression, (2) listening interacted with verbal expression to predict influence (such that the relationship between listening and influence was stronger among those more expressive), and (3) listening partly mediated the positive relationships between each of the Big Five dimensions of agreeableness and openness and influence.     

Men don’t just get mad; they get even: Revenge but not anger mediates gender differences in physical aggression

Past research indicates that men are more physically aggressive than women, but very little research has examined mediators of this gender difference. Indeed, the only established finding to date is that one plausible mediator - namely trait anger - shows no reliable gender difference whatsoever. Drawing on sexual selection theory and social-learning theories, we predicted that revenge may mediate this gender difference even though anger does not. Three studies using both personality questionnaires (Studies 1 and 2) and objective laboratory measures of aggression (Study 3) provided support for this contention. The results provide some of the first evidence for a reliable mediator of gender difference in physical aggression.     

Responsibility for Testimonial Belief

According to so-called “credit views of knowledge,” knowledge is an achievement of an epistemic agent, something for which an agent is creditable or responsible. One influential criticism of the credit view of knowledge holds that the credit view has difficulty making sense of knowledge acquired from testimony. As Jennifer Lackey has argued, in many ordinary cases of the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, if anyone deserves credit for the truth of the audience’s belief it is the testimonial speaker rather than the audience, and so it isn’t clear that testimonial knowers are appropriately creditable for the truth of their beliefs. I argue that the credit view of knowledge can be saved from Lackey’s objection by focusing on the way in which testimonial knowledge is the result of an essentially social epistemic ability. While there is indeed a sense in which a testimonial knower is only partially epistemically responsible for her testimonial belief, this is consistent with the truth of her belief being creditable to her in another sense. The truth of her belief is most saliently explained by, and hence is fully creditable to, an essentially social epistemic ability, an ability that is only partially seated in the knowing subject.     

Foreign Language Exposure,Cultural Threat,and Opposition to Immigration

In the present article, we extend the notion of cultural threat posed by immigrants beyond its current conceptualization as symbolic, collective‐level threats to American culture and identity. Instead, we argue that routine encounters with non‐English‐speaking immigrants cause many individuals to feel threatened because of real barriers to interpersonal communication and exchange. We draw upon survey and experimental data to demonstrate that local contact with immigrants who speak little to no English, as well as incidental exposure to the Spanish language, heighten feelings of cultural threat, which increases anti‐immigrant sentiment and policy preferences.     

Kant on Duty in the Groundwork

Barbara Herman offers an interpretation of Kant??s Groundwork on which an action has moral worth if the primary motive for the action is the motive of duty. She offers this approach in place of Richard Henson??s sufficiency-based interpretation, according to which an action has moral worth when the motive of duty is sufficient by itself to generate the action. Noa Latham criticizes Herman??s account and argues that we cannot make sense of the position that an agent can hold multiple motives for action and yet be motivated by only one of them, concluding that we must accept a face-value interpretation of the Groundwork where morally worthy actions obtain only when the agent??s sole motive is the motive of duty. This paper has two goals, one broad and one more constrained. The broader objective is to argue that interpretations of moral worth, as it is presented in the Groundwork, depend on interpretations of Kant??s theory of freedom. I show that whether we can make sense of the inclusion of nonmoral motives in morally worthy actions depends on whether the ??always causal framework?? is consistent with Kant??s theory of freedom. The narrow goal is to show that if we adopt an ??always causal?? framework for moral motivation, then Herman??s position and her critique of the sufficiency-based approach fail. Furthermore, within this framework I will specify a criterion for judging whether an action is determined by the motive of duty, even in the presence of nonmoral motives. Thus, I argue Latham??s conclusion that we must accept a face-value interpretation is incorrect.     

Collaborative learning: the effects of trust and open and closed dynamics on consensus and efficacy

The current study compared the effects of open versus closed group dynamics on perceived consensus, objective consensus, and perceived efficacy of collaborative learning in participants high and low in dispositional trust in the context of an Interactive Management (IM) session. Interactive management is a computer-mediated collaborative tool designed to enhance group problem-solving by facilitating cooperative inquiry and consensus. In the current study, two groups of 15 undergraduate psychology students (N = 30) came together to structure the interdependencies between positive and negative aspects of social media. After screening for trust scores, participants high and low on dispositional trust were randomly assigned to either an open or closed voting condition. The closed voting group were not permitted to discuss the problem relations, but consensus votes were recorded by the group design facilitator. The open group were allowed to discuss the relations before voting. Results indicated that those in the open-voting group, and those in the high dispositional trust group, scored significantly higher on perceived consensus and perceived efficacy of the tool itself. Results are discussed in light of theory and research on collaborative learning.     

Sex differences in in-group cooperation vary dynamically with competitive conditions and outcomes

Men's but not women's investment in a public goods game varied dynamically with the presence or absence of a perceived out-group. Three hundred fifty-four (167 male) young adults participated in multiple iterations of a public goods game under intergroup and individual competition conditions. Participants received feedback about whether their investments in the group were sufficient to earn a bonus to be shared among all in-group members. Results for the first trial confirm previous research in which men's but not women's investments were higher when there was a competing out-group. We extended these findings by showing that men's investment in the in-group varied dynamically by condition depending on the outcome of the previous trial: In the group condition, men, but not women, decreased spending following a win (i.e., earning an in-group bonus). In the individual condition, men, but not women, increased spending following a win. We hypothesize that these patterns reflect a male bias to calibrate their level of in-group investment such that they sacrifice only what is necessary for their group to successfully compete against a rival group.     

Affective forecasting and self-rated symptoms of depression, anxiety, and hypomania: evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias

Emerging research has examined individual differences in affective forecasting; however, we are aware of no published study to date linking psychopathology symptoms to affective forecasting problems. Pitting cognitive theory against depressive realism theory, we examined whether dysphoria was associated with negatively biased affective forecasts or greater accuracy. Participants (n=325) supplied predicted and actual emotional reactions for three days surrounding an emotionally evocative relational event, Valentine's Day. Predictions were made a month prior to the holiday. Consistent with cognitive theory, we found evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias-the tendency of individuals in dysphoric states to overpredict negative emotional reactions to future events. The dysphoric forecasting bias was robust across ratings of positive and negative affect, forecasts for pleasant and unpleasant scenarios, continuous and categorical operationalisations of dysphoria, and three time points of observation. Similar biases were not observed in analyses examining the independent effects of anxiety and hypomania. Findings provide empirical evidence for the long-assumed influence of depressive symptoms on future expectations. The present investigation has implications for affective forecasting studies examining information-processing constructs, decision making, and broader domains of psychopathology.