Toward a Process Analysis of Emotions: The Case of Surprise

Based on an earlier model of the processes elicited by surprising events, the present studies provide evidence for one of these processes, the evaluation of the surprising event's relevance for ongoing activities (action-relevance check). The central prediction tested was that, if unexpected events elicit among other processes an action-relevance check, then response delay on a concurrent task will be more pronounced in a condition where this process is more elaborate and hence takes more time. In accord with this prediction, Experiment 1 found that an unexpected appearance change of the imperative stimulus in a choice reaction time (RT) task caused greater response delay than an equivalent appearance change of a distractor stimulus. Experiment 2 replicated this finding and tested several additional predictions that concerned the effects on response delay of a second appearance change of either the imperative or the distractor stimuli. These predictions, which were also mostly confirmed, were derived by combining the logic underlying the first study with the assumption that once made, appraisals of unexpected events are stored as part of the situational schema and are reused when the same or similar events reoccur leading to an abbreviation of appraisal processes. Experiment 3 once more replicated the basic finding of the previous studies and ruled out a possible alternative explanation. It is suggested that the proposed RT method of process verification may be of broader interest as a tool to study appraisal processes in emotion.     

“This project is mad”: Descartes,Derrida, and the notion of philosophical crisis

In “Cogito and the History of Madness,” Derrida maintains that crisis is endemic to philosophy rather than being, as Husserl forcefully argued, a temporary condition that can and must be overcome through the resources of reason. A reflection on the place of madness in Descartes's Meditations serves as the point of departure for demonstrating that Derrida has done an injustice to philosophy; and a comparison of Derrida's views with the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, and Nietzsche reveals that Derrida's position in “Cogito and the History of Madness” entails a sacrifice of the notion of responsibility that lies at the center of meaningful historical action.     

Ethics, theism and metaphysics: An analysis of the theocentric ethics of James Gustafson

Modern ethics has been shaped by two dominant philosophical assumptions: (1) that there can be no theoretical knowledge of God, i.e., denial of metaphysics, and (2) that moral claims can be redeemed independently of theistic affirmations, i.e., morality does not require theism. These assumptions have influenced much of modern theological ethics. Yet, insofar as theological ethics accepts that morality does not require any explicit or implicit religious beliefs, it affirms that a secularistic morality is possible. But this affirmation is directly at odds with the essence of theism, namely, that God is the source and end of all things, including the moral life. By accepting the dominant consensus, therefore, theological ethics undermines its fundamental theistic claim. Focusing on James Gustafson's theocentric ethics, I seek to show the price that theological ethics pays for subscribing to the dominant consensus. I argue that: (1) Gustafson embraces an inconsistent self-understanding, which undermines his theocentric claim, (2) this is due to his dismissal of metaphysics, and (3) his theocentric ethic would be more compelling if formulated in terms of Whitehead's process metaphysics.     

Item-specific interference caused by cue-dependent forgetting

Memory for A-B word pairs (e.g.,child-apple) was tested by a cued recall test (e.g.,child-app__). Showing an A-C “relative” (e.g.,child-bicycle) reduced recall, especially if it was shown recently and was highly accessible (Experiments 1 and 2). In Experiment 3, a relative facilitated recall if it was semantically similar to the target (A-B′:child-cookies) but interfered if it was semantically dissimilar (A-C:child-fever). The best explanation for these results is that the relative primed features that affected the functional retrieval cue, and that interference occurred if the cue did not match the trace for the target (Martin, 1972). In other words, the interference effects are an example of cue-dependent forgetting. Neither blocking nor a discrimination process can account for these findings, although some evidence for a discrimination process has been found with other materials     

Differential Diagnosis in Older Adults: Dementia,Depression, and Delirium

Research shows that misdiagnosis can have particularly damaging consequences in older adults. It is frequently difficult, however, to determine whether observed symptoms are due to aging or to a medical condition. The author examines three common disorders that can be particularly challenging to diagnose in older adults: dementia, depression, and delirium. Three general questions are discussed for each: What are the age-related differences in the disorder's presentation? What medical issues need to be ruled out? What assessment methods are particularly useful in the diagnostic process?     

A DEVELOPMENTAL DEFICIT IN LOCALIZING OBJECTS FROM VISION

Abstract— We describe a college student, A. H., with a developmental deficit in determining the location of objects from vision. The deficit is selective in that (a) localization from auditory or tactile information is intact, (b) A H reports the identity of mislocalized objects accurately, (c) visual localization errors preserve certain parameters of the target location, and (d) visual localization is severely impaired under certain stimulus conditions, but nearly intact under other conditions. These results bear on the representation and processing of location information in the visual system, and also have implications for understanding developmental dyslexia.     

Aspects of preschoolers' comprehension of indoor and outdoor gender-typed toys

Forty-nine 44- to 81-month-old predominantly white children's classification of and clustering in recall of gender-typed indoor and outdoor toys, and their gender schematicity, were assessed. Consistent with predictions, children high in gender schematicity demonstrated significantly greater clustering in their recall by gender type than children low in schematicity. As expected, all children demonstrated more accurate classification of same-sex than other-sex gender-typed toys in general. However, boys and girls showed distinctively different patterns in their abilities to accurately classify same-sex and other-sex indoor and outdoor gender-typed toys. Results are discussed in terms of the different social and play contexts inhabited by preschool boys and girls.Completion of this project was facilitated by funds received when the author was a National Institute of Mental Health Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Denver; Grant 5T32 MH 15780-09, in addition to an Academic Challenge Award from the University of Toledo. This support is gratefully acknowledged. Special thanks to Maryjo Jones for her data collection efforts and to the faculty, children, and parents of Iliff Preschool of Denver, Colorado, and especially to Director Jean True for assisting in the completion of this research. Thanks also to Joan M. Barth, Narina N. Nightingale, Kathy A. Park, and Peg Hull-Smith for their comments on earlier versions of this article. A shorter version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Human Development, Richmond, Virginia, March 1990.To whom reprint requests should be addressed at Department of Psychology, University of Wyoming, P.O. Box 3415, Room 135 Biological Sciences Building, Laramie, WY 82071-3415.