Chess & Schizophrenia: Murphy v Mr Endon, Beckett v Bion

This paper reconvenes Samuel Beckett's psychotherapy with Wilfred Bion during 1934-1936 during which time Beckett's conceived and began writing this second novel, Murphy. Based on Beckett's visits to the Bethlem & Maudsley Hospital and his observation of the male nurses, the climax of Murphy is a chess match between Mr Endon (a male schizophrenic patient) and Murphy (a male psychiatric nurse). The precise notation of the Endon v Murphy chess match tells us that the Beckett intended it to be an exemplar of an anti-match, perhaps a metaphor for the tragedy of being locked into madness. It is also argued that the match offers us insight into Beckett's experience of the process of psychotherapy with Bion. Based on new information from Beckett's nephew and Bion's widow, hypotheses about the long term impact of the Bion-Beckett analysis are advanced as a mutual experience which shaped the lives and later literary output of both men, producing conjoined career writings which continue to offer us stark and sublime condensations of depression, psychosis, and the challenges of therapy and recovery.     

The tail-elicited tail withdrawal reflex of Aplysia is mediated centrally at tail sensory-motor synapses and exhibits sensitization across multiple temporal domains

The defensive withdrawal reflexes of Aplysia californica have provided powerful behavioral systems for studying the cellular and molecular basis of memory formation. Among these reflexes the tail-elicited tail withdrawal reflex (T-TWR) has been especially useful. In vitro studies examining the monosynaptic circuit for the T-TWR, the tail sensory-motor (SN-MN) synapses, have identified the induction requirements and molecular basis of different temporal phases of synaptic facilitation that underlie sensitization in this system. They have also permitted more recent studies elucidating the role of synaptic and nuclear signaling during synaptic facilitation. Here we report the development of a novel, compartmentalized semi-intact T-TWR preparation that allows examination of the unique contributions of processing in the SN somatic compartment (the pleural ganglion) and the SN-MN synaptic compartment (the pedal ganglion) during the induction of sensitization. Using this preparation we find that the T-TWR is mediated entirely by central connections in the synaptic compartment. Moreover, the reflex is stably expressed for at least 24 h, and can be modified by tail shocks that induce sensitization across multiple temporal domains, as well as direct application of the modulatory neurotransmitter serotonin. This preparation now provides an experimentally powerful system in which to directly examine the unique and combined roles of synaptic and nuclear signaling in different temporal domains of memory formation.     

What is it like to be nonconscious? A defense of Julian Jaynes

I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is “ridiculous” to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being “ludicrous” that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I draw a distinction between the experience or “what-it-is-like” of nonhuman animals engaging with the environment and the “secret theater of speechless monologue” that is familiar to a linguistically competent human adult. This distinction grounds the argument that consciousness proper should be seen as learned rather than innate and shared with nonhuman animals. Upon establishing this claim, I defend the Jaynesian definition of consciousness as a social–linguistic construct learned in childhood, structured in terms of lexical metaphors and narrative practice. Finally, I employ the Jaynesian distinction between cognition and consciousness to bridge the explanatory gap and deflate the supposed “hard” problem of consciousness.