Units of analysis and item statistics for environmental assessment scales

Choice of units of analysis is a critical problem in evaluating environmental assessment items. The “Ecological Fallacy” involves interpreting results based on ecological entities, such as environmental settings, as applying to individuals. A less familiar error, the “Individual Differences Fallacy,” involves interpreting results based on individuals as applying to settings. Although this second error has been ubiquitous, little is known about the empirical consequences of using different units of analysis in item analysis. This study examined this issue when the units were (1) individuals, (2) observed settings, or (3) “artificial” or random settings. Neither item validities based on individuals nor item validities based on settings yielded unequivocal results. However, a measure developed specifically for environmental research, the Split-Sample Correlation, appeared useful for identifying environmental items. Researchers constructing environmental assessment scales should select items with both high Split-Sample Correlations and high setting-level item validities.     

Solutions to some problems in the implementation of conjoint analysis

Methodological problems encountered in implementing conjoint analysis include (1) the impractically large set of multiattribute choice alternatives created by the factorial combination of more than a few attributes, (2) the hypothetical nature of the alternatives in the choice set, and (3) the assumption that each individual’s preferences can be described by the same composition rule. The techniques of tailoring, belief matching, and axiom testing are suggested as solutions to these problems, and their use is demonstrated in a conjoint analysis study of individuals’ contraceptive preferences. It is noted that tailoring and belief matching can also be used as methodological enhancements in functional measurement studies.     

Intelligibility and comprehension of time compressed sign language narratives

A method of time compressing visual displays was devised to assess the effects of compression on the comprehension of American sign language (ASL). Two ASL narratives were visually presented to three groups of deaf ASL users. A compression group was presented narratives compressed to 50% of the duration of the normal rates. A no-compression group was presented narratives signed at normal rates. A pause group was presented compressed narratives with blank pauses inserted so that the total time per narrative was equal to that of the no-compression versions. Following each narrative, subjects completed a written comprehension task. Comprehension in both compression and pause groups was significantly lower than in the no-compression group. Pauses did not significantly affect scores relative to compression. An additional group of deaf ASL users was presented an intelligibility task in which signs taken from the narratives were presented in isolation either with or without compression. The total number of signs correctly identified was significantly lower with compression. Decrements in comprehension were best explained as the result of cumulative decrements in sign intelligibility and not as the result of decrements in available processing time.     

The effects of a laughing versus a nonlaughing model on humor responses in preschool children

Three groups of preschool children, 2–4 years old, were observed individually as they listened to a humorous tape recording either alone (Group 1), or after they had observed a nonlaughing (Group 2) or laughing peer model (Group 3) listen to the tape and then leave. There was a significant difference between the laughing model group and the nonlaughing model group in time spent smiling as well as significant differences in time spent laughing among the no model group, the nonlaughing model group, and the laughing model group. It was concluded that imitation learning plays a role in determining whether or not children will laugh or smile in a humorous situation.     

A theory of careers encounters sex: Reply to Holland (1976)

This paper is the third in a series beginning with a report (by the authors) of research on the application of Holland's theory of careers to women and men. Holland's response, “The Virtues of the SDS …” is considered, in particular, research he cites on the effect of the Self-Directed Search (SDS) on counselees and his advocacy of raw score reports of personality patterns. The widely divergent career options suggested to men and women by SDS raw scores are noted and misunderstandings concerning the implications of Holland's assessment procedures for his theory are discussed. Holland's defense of raw score reports of personality characteristics is found wanting, especially in light of the support provided for his theory by normed scores.     

Validity of sex-balanced interest inventory scales

The purpose of this study was to examine the relative effectiveness of sex-balanced and sex-restrictive raw score interest scales in discriminating among vocational preference groups. Analyses were conducted separately for 502 males in six vocational preference groups and 878 females in five vocational preference groups. The degree and nature of the discrimination among groups were highly similar for the two types of scales for both males and females. Centour scores derived from sex-balanced and sex-restrictive raw scores resulted in essentially the same percentages of correct classifications of group membership. The results of this study suggest that the large sex differences traditionally found in interest inventory items may not be a necessary concomitant of validity. Hence, interest inventory reports that reflect these differences may unnecessarily restrict the career suggestions they provide to women and men.     

When unexpected behavior is attributed to the environment

Two experiments were conducted to investigate a modification of the Jones and Davis (1965) analysis of attribution. Subjects were confronted with a situation in which there were two possible causes for an event, and differential information about these causes was provided such that subjects were much more informed about the nature of one potential cause than the other. This information also imparted to the subjects a definite expectancy about the forthcoming event. When the event disconfirmed subjects' expectancies, responsibility was attributed to the cause about which least was known. This result was found in both experiments. In addition, Experiment II offered some suggestive evidence that a disconfirmed expectancy will lead the person to direct his attention toward potential causes about which he is uninformed.     

The perceptual basis of loudness ratio judgments

In Experiment 1, subjects were required to estimateloudness ratios for 45 pairs of tones. Ten 1,200-Hz tones, differing only in intensity, were used to generate the 45 distinct tone pairs. In Experiment 2, subjects were required to directly compare two pairs of tones (chosen from among the set of 45) and indicate which pair of tones had the greaterloudness ratio. In both Experiments 1 and 2, the subjects’ judgments were used to rank order the tone pairs with respect to their judged loudness ratios. Nonmetric analyses of these rank orders indicated that both magnitude estimates of loudness ratios and direct comparisons of loudness ratios were based on loudnessintervals ordifferences where loudness was a power function of sound pressure. These experiments, along with those on loudness difference judgments (Parker & Schneider, 1974; Schneider, Parker, & Stein, 1974), support Torgerson’s (1961) conjecture that there is but one comparative perceptual relationship for ioudnesses, and that differences in numerical estimates for loudness ratios as opposed to loudness intervals simply reflect different reporting strategies generated by the two sets of instructions.