Strategies for verifying false autobiographical memories

This study examined the types of strategies people use to verify putative childhood memories and the degree to which their preferred strategies are restricted in typical memory implantation studies. We asked subjects to describe a situation in which they recalled a false childhood experience and a hypothetical situation in which they pretended to have developed a false memory after taking part in a memory implantation study. We also asked them how they did (or would) determine the source of the event. We found that subjects relied primarily on other people and cognitive strategies to verify their experiences. These results suggest that laboratory situations cultivate false memories in part because they prevent people from talking to others about the false event, which causes them to rely on less optimal strategies.     

Studies using single-subject designs in sport psychology: 30 years of research

A prominent feature of behavior-analytic research has been the use of single-subject designs. We examined sport psychology journals and behavioral journals published during the past 30 years, and located 40 studies using single-subject designs to assess interventions for enhancing the performance of athletes and coaches. In this paper, we summarize that body of research, discuss its strengths and limitations, and identify areas for future research.     

Disability and the family: Current status and future developments

Recent years have witnessed increased interest in the effects a disability or chronic illness has on both the nuclear and the extended family. Personal accounts by family members and landmark legislation has stimulated interest in this area of endeavour. Reports of marital and family disharmony has fuelled research investigating the sources of stress and coping in families with a member who has a disability (Seligman, 1991).     

Feedback and its effectiveness in a computer-aided personalized system of instruction course

In a computer-managed version of Keller's personalized system of instruction, students received frequent feedback from more advanced students within the course. Overall accuracy of student-provided feedback was 87%, and students complied with 61% of the feedback.     

Imagination inflation is a fact, not an artifact: A reply to Pezdek and Eddy

Pezdek and Eddy (2001) claim to prove that imagination inflation is a spurious effect caused by regression to the mean (RTM). They make four predictions about what patterns of data would demonstrate a genuine effect for imagination versus those that would be explainable by RTM. We review each of those predictions, and demonstrate significant problems with them. We conclude that imagination inflation is a genuine effect, and that Pezdek and Eddy’s work has contributed to the growing research showing that when people imagine fictitious events from long ago, they become more confident that those false events were genuine experiences.     

The Practice of Pre-Therapy

Pre-Therapy is a theory conceptualizing about psychological contact practiced with low-functioning persons. This category includes schizophrenic people, retarded people, and geriatric clients who are too isolated and withdrawn for regular psychotherapy. The techniques, known as Contact Reflections, are Situational, Facial, Word-for-Word, Bodily, and Reiterative Reflections. The therapist expresses a foundational belief in implicit selfhood as presented in episodes of lucidity. There is compassion for the effort at self-expression even at regressed levels. The therapist's reception of symptomatic expression conveys empathy. The case history illustrates the application of Contact Reflections with a catatonic client without the use of neuroleptics. This gives a clearer example of the psychological effects of Pre-Therapy.     

Igniting the Flicker of Freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt Scenario

This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for assigning morally responsibility.

Individual differences in working memory capacity affect false memories for missing aspects of events

Recently, Gerrie, Belcher, and Garry (2006) found that, when participants watch an event with parts missing, they falsely claim to have seen the missing parts--but they were more likely to claim they had seen less crucial parts than more crucial parts. Their results fit with a source-monitoring framework (SMF; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) explanation of false memories. In this paper we used individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) to examine the SMF explanation of false memories for missing aspects of events. An accumulating body of research suggests that WMC is strongly related to controlling attention, including the ability to distinguish between sources of information. The primary purpose of the present study was to examine whether people with larger WMC are better able to ward off false memories for missing information than those with a smaller WMC. We showed that higher WMC reduced false recognition of crucial information, but did not change false recognition of noncrucial information. Additionally, we found that WMC had little effect on participants' subjective experience of true and false recognition of events, regardless whether the information was crucial or not. These results provide further evidence that people's WMC is related to their source-monitoring ability.     

False memories for end-of-life decisions

OBJECTIVE: To examine people's false memories for end-of-life decisions. DESIGN: In Study 1, older adults decided which life-sustaining treatments they would want if they were seriously ill. They made these judgments twice, approximately 12 months apart. At Time 2, older adults and their self-selected surrogate decision makers tried to recall the older adults' Time 1 decisions. In Study 2, younger adults made treatment decisions twice, approximately 4 months apart. At Time 2, younger adults tried to recall their Time 1 decisions. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Percentage of participants who falsely remembered that their original treatment decisions were the same as their current decisions. RESULTS: In Study 1, older adults falsely remembered that 75% of their original decisions were the same as their current decisions; surrogates falsely thought that 86% of older adults' decisions were the same. In Study 2, younger adults falsely remembered that 69% of their original decisions were the same as their current decisions. CONCLUSION: Age alone cannot account for people's false memories of their end-of-life decisions; we discuss other mechanisms. The results have practical implications for policies that encourage people to make legal documents specifying their end-of-life treatment decisions.