Auto-shaping in bobwhite quail

Bobwhite quail were given extended auto-shaping, a procedure in which response-key illumination or color change is paired with response-independent food presentations. Continuation of the auto-shaping procedure yielded increased responding across sessions, although responses were never instrumental in producing food. The quail were shifted directly from the auto-shaping procedure to a variable-interval 60-sec schedule of reinforcement. All three birds were approaching stable response rates by the fifth session on the variable-interval schedule.     

Experiences of habit formation: a qualitative study

Habit formation is an important goal for behaviour change interventions because habitual behaviours are elicited automatically and are therefore likely to be maintained. This study documented experiences of habit development in 10 participants enrolled on a weight loss intervention explicitly based on habit-formation principles. Thematic analysis revealed three themes: Strategies used to support initial engagement in a novel behaviour; development of behavioural automaticity; and selecting effective cues to support repeated behaviour. Results showed that behaviour change was initially experienced as cognitively effortful but as automaticity increased, enactment became easier. Habits were typically formed in work-based contexts. Weekends and vacations temporarily disrupted performance due to absence of associated cues, but habits were reinstated on return to work. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.     

Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in the light of Kant’s Third <Emphasis Type="Italic">Critique</Emphasis> and Schelling’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Real</Emphasis>-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Idealismus</Emphasis>

In this paper I offer a selective, systematic rather than historical account of Merleau-Ponty’s highly complex relation to classical German philosophy, focussing on issues which bear on the question of his relation to transcendentalism and naturalism. I argue that the concerns which define his project in Phenomenology of Perception are fundamentally those of transcendental philosophy, and that Merleau-Ponty’s disagreements with Kant, and the position he arrives at in The Visible and the Invisible, are helpfully viewed in light of (1) issues which Merleau-Ponty identifies as raised by Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement, and (2) Schelling’s conversion of Kantian idealism into a Real-Idealismus. Finally I address the question of whether, and on what basis, Merleau-Ponty’s claim to have surpassed systematic philosophy can be defended.