Arithmetical Soundness and Completeness for $$\varvec{\Sigma }_{\varvec{2}}$$ Numerations

We prove that for each recursively axiomatized consistent extension T of Peano Arithmetic and \(n \ge 2\), there exists a \(\Sigma _2\) numeration \(\tau (u)\) of T such that the provability logic of the provability predicate \(\mathsf{Pr}_\tau (x)\) naturally constructed from \(\tau (u)\) is exactly \(\mathsf{K}+ \Box (\Box ^n p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow \Box p\). This settles Sacchetti’s problem affirmatively.     

Mindless accuracy: on the ubiquity of content in nature

It is widely held in contemporary philosophy of mind that states with underived representational content are ipso facto psychological states. This view—the Content View—underlies a number of interesting philosophical projects, such as the attempt to pick out a psychological level of explanation, to demarcate genuinely psychological from non-psychological states, and to limn the class of states with phenomenal character. The most detailed and influential theories of underived representation in philosophy are the tracking theories developed by Fodor, Dretske, Millikan and others. Tracking theorists initially hoped to ‘naturalize’ underived representation by showing that although it is distinctively psychological it is not irreducibly so, yet they ended up developing theories of representation that by their own lights don’t pick out a distinctively psychological phenomenon at all. Burge (Origins of objectivity, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) sets out to develop a theory of underived representation that does pick out a distinctively psychological phenomenon. His theory promises to vindicate the Content View and the various philosophical projects that depend on it. In this paper I argue that Burge’s theory dementalizes representation for the same reason tracking theories do: These theories hold that representations are states with underived accuracy conditions, yet such states are found in all sorts of mindless systems, like plants.     

Deontology defended

Empirical research into moral decision-making is often taken to have normative implications. For instance, in his recent book, Greene (2013) relies on empirical findings to establish utilitarianism as a superior normative ethical theory. Kantian ethics, and deontological ethics more generally, is a rival view that Greene attacks. At the heart of Greene’s argument against deontology is the claim that deontological moral judgments are the product of certain emotions and not of reason. Deontological ethics is a mere rationalization of these emotions. Accordingly Greene maintains that deontology should be abandoned. This paper is a defense of deontological ethical theory. It argues that Greene’s argument against deontology needs further support. Greene’s empirical evidence is open to alternative interpretations. In particular, it is not clear that Greene’s characterization of alarm-like emotions that are relative to culture and personal experience is empirically tenable. Moreover, it is implausible that such emotions produce specifically deontological judgments. A rival sentimentalist view, according to which all moral judgments are determined by emotion, is at least as plausible given the empirical evidence and independently supported by philosophical theory. I therefore call for an improvement of Greene’s argument.     

Consciousness and the limits of memory

Intermodal representationalism is a popular theory of consciousness. This paper argues that intermodal representationalism is false, or at least likely so. The argument turns on two forms of exceptional episodic memory: hyperthymesia and prodigious visual memory in savant syndrome. Emerging from this argument is a broader lesson about the relationship between memory and perception; that it may be possible to entertain in memory the very same content as in a corresponding perceptual experience, and that the ‘overflow’ interpretation of the classic Sperling paradigm experiments may not fully generalize.     

Enoch’s “Taking-Morality-Seriously Thought” Unpacked and at Work in the Argument from Impartiality

After a brief outline of Enoch’s defense of robust realism in his Taking Morality Seriously (§ 1), I focus on Enoch’s taking-morality-seriously thought by making explicit the assumptions I see involved in it (§ 2). Enoch’s argument from impartiality is then reconstructed (§ 3) to show how these assumptions are at work (§ 4). Next (§§ 5 and 6), I explain the reasons why Enoch does not succeed in converting these assumptions into a positive argument for the thesis implied by robust realism that there is a moral objectivity. Finally (§ 7), I conclude that the critical analysis provided casts a shadow on the reliability of the taking-morality-seriously thought as a basis of a theoretical inquiry into the nature of morality.     

The Recognition of Emotions in Music and Landscapes: Extending Contour Theory

While inanimate objects can neither experience nor express emotions, in principle they can be expressive of emotions. In particular, music is a paradigmatic example of something expressive of emotions that surely cannot feel anything at all. The Contour theory accounts for music expressiveness in terms of those resemblances that hold between its external and perceivable properties (i.e., its contour) and the typical contour of human emotional behavior. Provided that some critical aspects are emended – notably, the stress on the perception of similarity instead of the more plausible hypothesis that the listener perceives manifestations that are similar – we are inclined to endorse contour theory. In particular, we share its basic idea that expressive properties are perceived. Although other kinds of processes – high-level conceptual inferences, imagination – sometimes characterize our encounters with music, still perception constitutes the standard process underlying the detection of expressiveness. Moreover, we propose to extend contour theory to visual arts. Taking into consideration, as a case study, depicted landscapes, we observe that they frequently cannot but express emotions such as joy, sadness, liveliness or melancholy. The fact that pictures, unlike music, lack any temporal dimension is a prima facie reason for doubting the extendibility of contour theory’s conceptual arsenal to them. Nevertheless, while being obviously unable to behave somehow, we claim that depicted landscapes can perfectly convey dynamic information. If this is the case, the extension of the notion of contour to visuals art via the stress on the notion of dynamism would represent a second interesting revision of contour theory.     

When the Arrow Came before the Trolley: Jewish Aspects of the Trolley Problem

In 2014 Bruers and Breckman addressed a series of subsidiary questions arising from the trolley problem and their answers. In this article I describe ancient and precedent treatments of some of these issues over thousands of years as found in Jewish literature and the original solutions that have been proposed throughout history by Jewish philosophers and legal scholars. I address questions that have been posed to Jewish halakhic authorities when two obligations clash — whether one may save the lives of many at the cost of killing an individual — and discuss whether this is permitted in order to save lives or forbidden owing to the prohibition of murder. I also present new problems that have been introduced into the halakhic and philosophical discussions around the trolley problem in Jewish literature.     

Health-Related Quality of Life in a Low-Socioeconomic Status Public Rental-Flat Population in Singapore

Health-related quality of life (HRQoL) is a well-established measure of health and general well-being. Socioeconomic status (SES) can affect HRQoL. We sought to determine whether there were differences in HRQoL between low versus higher area-SES flat communities in Singapore. Residents in two integrated public housing precincts comprising of rental-flat blocks (low area-SES neighborhood) and neighboring owner-occupied blocks (higher area-SES neighborhood) were asked to rate their self-perceived HRQoL using the EuroQol Group five dimensions (EQ-5D) instrument. The EQ-5D assesses HRQoL in five domains (mobility, self-care, usual activities, anxiety/mood and pain) and with a global visual analogue scale (EQ-VAS). We evaluated differences in HRQoL between the rental and owner-occupied neighborhoods, and factors associated with anxiety/depression in the rental-flat neighborhood using multivariate logistic regression. The participation rate was 89.1% (634/711). In the owner-occupied neighborhood, 56.7% (216/381) were in full health, compared with 54.2% (137/253) in the rental-flat population (OR = 0.90, 95%CI = 0.66–1.24, p = 0.568). Across the five domains, staying in a rental-flat neighborhood was independently associated with anxiety/depression (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 1.79, 95%CI = 1.10–2.92, p = 0.019). In the rental-flat population, having anxiety/depression was independently associated with minority ethnicity, problems with self –care, pain/discomfort, difficulty with healthcare costs, and not being on subsidized primary care (p < 0.05). There was no significant difference on the EQ-VAS between the two neighborhoods (p = 0.627). Staying in a low area-SES neighborhood was associated with more mental health problems. In the rental-flat population, self-reported anxiety/depression was associated with minority ethnicity, physical health problems, and financial disadvantage in healthcare.     

Models of Public Engagement: Nanoscientists’ Understandings of Science–Society Interactions

This paper explores how scientists perceive public engagement initiatives. By drawing on interviews with nanoscientists, it analyzes how researchers imagine science–society interactions in an early phase of technological development. More specifically, the paper inquires into the implicit framings of citizens, of scientists, and of the public in scientists’ discourses. It identifies four different models of how nanoscientists understand public engagement which are described as educational, paternalistic, elitist, and economistic. These models are contrasted with the dialog model of public engagement promoted by social scientists and policymakers. The paper asks if and in what ways participatory discourses and practices feed back into scientists’ understandings, thus co-producing public discourses and science.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Yin-Yang</Emphasis> and the Heart-Mind

The East Asian notion of a heart-mind (Chinese xin 心, Japanese kokoro こころ, and Korean maum ??) is arguably more accurate to our psychology than the Western term “mind” and its equivalents are: the latter term implies the possibility of psychological functioning in the absence of all emotion, and it can be shown that that is impossible. But then it turns out that we can update the traditional Chinese notions of yin 陰 and yang 陽 in such a way as to help us philosophically explain how our functioning psychology involves emotion and why any possible psychology has to rest on such a basis. Yin-yang is the essence of heart-mind, and heart-mind is essential to any functioning psychology.