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291.
Jack Douglas Stecher 《Synthese》2011,178(1):49-66
This paper studies an economy whose agents perceive their consumption possibilities subjectively, and whose preferences are defined on what they subjectively experience, rather than on those alternatives that are objectively present. The model of agents’ perceptions is based on intuitionistic logic. Roughly, this means that agents reason constructively: a solution to a problem exists only if there is a construction by which the problem can be solved. The theorems that can be proved determine how an agent perceives a set of alternatives. A dual model relates perceived alternatives to a shared language, which the agents use in trading. So perceptions relate objective alternatives to an agent’s subjective view of them, and reporting dually relates an agent’s subjective world to a shared language. It turns out that an appropriately modified notion of competitive equilibrium always exists. However, in contrast with standard results in economic theory, competitive equilibrium need not be efficient. 相似文献
292.
293.
Simon Robertson 《Synthese》2011,181(1):81-106
What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both. 相似文献
294.
Michela Massimi 《Synthese》2011,182(1):101-116
This paper investigates some metaphysical and epistemological assumptions behind Bogen and Woodward’s data-to-phenomena inferences.
I raise a series of points and suggest an alternative possible Kantian stance about data-to-phenomena inferences. I clarify
the nature of the suggested Kantian stance by contrasting it with McAllister’s view about phenomena as patterns in data sets. 相似文献
295.
James Ladyman 《Synthese》2011,178(1):87-98
van Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes
them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches
to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism,
verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard
the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion as a true and explanatory account and insist on not taking ‘spooky’
entities or processes seriously as potential explanations of phenomena that so far lie outside the scope of successful science.
The history of science shows us that both stances have been instrumental in the achievement of progress at various times.
It is therefore plausible for a naturalist to suggest that science depends for its success on the dialectic between empiricism
and materialism. A truly naturalist approach to philosophy ought then to synthesise them. Call the synthesized empiricist
and materialist stances ‘the scientistic stance’. This paper elaborates and defends it. 相似文献
296.
Haim Gaifman 《Synthese》2011,179(3):501-502
297.
Elliott Sober 《Synthese》2011,181(1):3-21
This paper is a sympathetic critique of the argument that Reichenbach develops in Chap. 2 of Experience and Prediction for the thesis that sense experience justifies belief in the existence of an external world. After discussing his attack
on the positivist theory of meaning, I describe the probability ideas that Reichenbach presents. I argue that Reichenbach
begins with an argument grounded in the Law of Likelihood but that he then endorses a different argument that involves prior
probabilities. I try to show how this second step in Reichenbach’s approach can be strengthened by using ideas that have been
developed recently for understanding causation in terms of the idea of intervention. 相似文献
298.
Frederick Eberhardt 《Synthese》2011,181(1):125-136
Hans Reichenbach is well known for his limiting frequency view of probability, with his most thorough account given in The Theory of Probability in 1935/1949. Perhaps less known are Reichenbach’s early views on probability and its epistemology. In his doctoral thesis
from 1915, Reichenbach espouses a Kantian view of probability, where the convergence limit of an empirical frequency distribution
is guaranteed to exist thanks to the synthetic a priori principle of lawful distribution. Reichenbach claims to have given
a purely objective account of probability, while integrating the concept into a more general philosophical and epistemological
framework. A brief synopsis of Reichenbach’s thesis and a critical analysis of the problematic steps of his argument will
show that the roots of many of his most influential insights on probability and causality can be found in this early work. 相似文献
299.
Hannes Leitgeb 《Synthese》2011,179(2):339-350
This is a personal, incomplete, and very informal take on the role of logic in general philosophy of science, which is aimed at a broader audience. We defend and advertise the application of logical methods in philosophy of science, starting with the beginnings in the Vienna Circle and ending with some more recent logical developments. 相似文献
300.
Peter Nilsson 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):125-144
Compassion is often described in terms of suffering. This paper investigates the nature of this suffering. It is argued that
compassion involves suffering of a particular kind. To begin with a case is made for the negative claim that compassion does
not involve an ordinary, or afflictive, suffering over something. Secondly, it is argued that the suffering of compassion
is a suffering for someone else’s sake: If you feel compassion for another person, P, then you suffer over P:s suffering for
P:s sake, and if that is all you do, then you are not affected with an afflictive suffering over something. The final section
identifies and addresses a problem concerning self-pity, and a suggestion is made on how to specify the proposed account so
as to cover both self-directed and other-directed compassion. 相似文献