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331.
Douglas Walton 《Synthese》2011,179(3):377-407
This paper argues that some traditional fallacies should be considered as reasonable arguments when used as part of a properly
conducted dialog. It is shown that argumentation schemes, formal dialog models, and profiles of dialog are useful tools for
studying properties of defeasible reasoning and fallacies. It is explained how defeasible reasoning of the most common sort
can deteriorate into fallacious argumentation in some instances. Conditions are formulated that can be used as normative tools
to judge whether a given defeasible argument is fallacious or not. It is shown that three leading violations of proper dialog
standards for defeasible reasoning necessary to see how fallacies work are: (a) improper failure to retract a commitment,
(b) failure of openness to defeat, and (c) illicit reversal of burden of proof. 相似文献
332.
Hannes Leitgeb 《Synthese》2011,179(2):339-350
This is a personal, incomplete, and very informal take on the role of logic in general philosophy of science, which is aimed at a broader audience. We defend and advertise the application of logical methods in philosophy of science, starting with the beginnings in the Vienna Circle and ending with some more recent logical developments. 相似文献
333.
Peter Nilsson 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):125-144
Compassion is often described in terms of suffering. This paper investigates the nature of this suffering. It is argued that
compassion involves suffering of a particular kind. To begin with a case is made for the negative claim that compassion does
not involve an ordinary, or afflictive, suffering over something. Secondly, it is argued that the suffering of compassion
is a suffering for someone else’s sake: If you feel compassion for another person, P, then you suffer over P:s suffering for
P:s sake, and if that is all you do, then you are not affected with an afflictive suffering over something. The final section
identifies and addresses a problem concerning self-pity, and a suggestion is made on how to specify the proposed account so
as to cover both self-directed and other-directed compassion. 相似文献
334.
We show that the contemporary debate surrounding the question “What is the norm of assertion?” presupposes what we call the quantitative view, i.e. the view that this question is best answered by determining how much epistemic support is required to warrant assertion. We consider what Jennifer Lackey (2010) has called cases of isolated second-hand knowledge and show—beyond what Lackey has suggested herself—that these cases are best understood as ones where a certain type of understanding, rather than knowledge, constitutes the required epistemic credential to warrant assertion. If we are right that understanding (and not just knowledge) is the epistemic norm for a restricted class of assertions, then this straightforwardly undercuts not only the widely supposed quantitative view, but also a more general presupposition concerning the universalisability of some norm governing assertion—the presumption (almost entirely unchallenged since Williamson’s 1996 paper) that any epistemic norm that governs some assertions should govern assertions—as a class of speech act—uniformly. 相似文献
335.
Adam D. Bailey 《Philosophia》2011,39(2):237-250
Grounded in what Alan Wertheimer terms the “nonworseness claim,” it is thought by some philosophers that what will be referred to herein as “better-than-permissible acts”—acts that, if undertaken, would make another or others better off than they would be were an alternative but morally permissible act to be undertaken—are necessarily morally permissible. What, other than a bout of irrationality, it may be thought, would lead one to hold that an act (such as outsourcing production to a “sweatshop” in a developing country) that produces more benefits for others than an act that is itself morally permissible (such as not doing business in the developing country at all) with respect to those same others, is not morally permissible? In this article, I argue that each of the two groups of philosophers that are most likely to accept the nonworseness claim—consequentialists and non-consequentialists—have reason to reject it, and thereby also have reason to reject the belief that better-than-permissible acts are necessarily morally permissible. 相似文献
336.
Michael T. McFall 《Philosophia》2011,39(4):657-672
The decision to get married, as well as choosing whom to marry, is of the utmost importance to most people. This decision
consists of many amoral considerations, but an ethical relationship arises when a promise is made, especially a vow that binds
for a lifetime and affects oneself, one’s spouse, one’s children, and society. This essay provides an account of ideal romantic
marriage, arguing that John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty provides an excellent foundation for constructing such an account. Neither dead dogma nor living truth is a healthy model
for marriage, so a hybrid model of marriage, living dogma, is developed. The importance of the marital vow becomes apparent
as the living dogma account is revealed, and this examination yields a model for how to decide when and whom to marry. 相似文献
337.
Brandon Warmke 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):179-200
Moral responsibility invariantism is the view that there is a single set of conditions for being morally responsible for an
action (or omission or consequence of an act or omission) that applies in all cases. I defend this view against some recent
arguments by Joshua Knobe and John Doris. 相似文献
338.
Recently, the ‘right to die’ became a major social issue. Few agree suicide is a right tout court. Even those who believe suicide (‘regular’, passive, or physician-assisted) is sometimes morally permissible usually require
that a suicide be ‘rational suicide’: instrumentally rational, autonomous, due to stable goals, not due to mental illness,
etc. We argue that there are some perfectly ‘rational suicides’ that are, nevertheless, bad mistakes. The concentration on
the rationality of the suicide instead of on whether it is a mistake may lead to permitting suicides that should be forbidden. 相似文献
339.
Kevin Reuter 《Philosophia》2011,39(1):31-38
The literature suggests that in sensory imagination we focus on the imagined objects, not on the imaginative states themselves,
and that therefore imagination is not introspective. It is claimed that the introspection of imaginative states is an additional
cognitive ability. However, there seem to be counterexamples to this claim. In many cases in which we sensorily imagine a
certain object in front of us, we are aware that this object is not really where we imagine it to be. So it looks as if in
these cases of imagination, we are aware of the mere appearance of the imagined object, and hence introspection is a constitutive
part of imagination. In this article, I address this contradictory state of affairs and argue that we should classify at least
some forms of sensory imagination as introspective. For this purpose I use the appearance-reality distinction as a central
notion for introspection. I also defend the thesis of introspective imagination against the objection that young children
imagine without yet understanding the concept of experience. 相似文献
340.
An immunizing strategy is an argument brought forward in support of a belief system, though independent from that belief system, which makes it more or less invulnerable to rational argumentation and/or empirical evidence. By contrast,
an epistemic defense mechanism is defined as a structural feature of a belief system which has the same effect of deflecting arguments and evidence. We discuss the remarkable recurrence of certain patterns of immunizing strategies and defense mechanisms in pseudoscience and other belief systems. Five different
types will be distinguished and analyzed, with examples drawn from widely different domains. The difference between immunizing
strategies and defense mechanisms is analyzed, and their epistemological status is discussed. Our classification sheds new
light on the various ways in which belief systems may achieve invulnerability against empirical evidence and rational criticism, and we propose our analysis as part of an explanation of these belief
systems’ enduring appeal and tenacity. 相似文献