Contents of Volume 7

Volume Contents

Contents of Volume 7     

What can subjective forgetting tell us about memory for childhood trauma?

In the present study, we examined the prevalence and predictors of subjective forgetting (i.e., self-reported amnesia) of child sexual abuse (CSA). Adults who, as children, were involved as victims in legal prosecutions were questioned about their CSA experiences, which had been documented in the 1980s, and about lost and recovered memory of those experiences. Males and individuals who experienced more severe abuse were more likely to report forgetting. The majority of individuals attributed their forgetting to active attempts to avoid thinking about the abuse. In contrast, when predictors of subjective forgetting were used to predict objective memory of abuse, more severe abuse and more extended legal involvement were associated with fewer memory errors. The differences between subjective and objective memory underscore the risks of using subjective measures to assess lost memory of abuse.     

Class specificity and the lexical encoding of participant information

It is commonly assumed across the language sciences that some semantic participant information is lexically encoded and some is not. In this article, we propose that semantic obligatoriness and verb class specificity are criteria which influence whether semantic information is lexically encoded. We present a comprehensive survey of the English verbal lexicon and two continuation studies which confirm that both factors play a role in the lexical encoding of participant information.     

Children's reasoning about physics within and across ontological kinds

Reasoning about seven physics principles within and across ontological kinds was examined among 188 5- and 7-year-olds and 59 adults. Individuals in all age groups tended to appropriately generalize what they learned across ontological kinds. However, children also showed sensitivity to ontological kind in their projections: when learning principles with reference to people they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another person than to an inanimate object, and when learning with reference to an inanimate object they were more likely to assume that the principles apply to another inanimate object than to a person. Five-year-olds, but not 7-year-olds, projected concepts learned about people to a greater extent than principles learned about inanimate objects, closely paralleling the findings of Carey for the biological domain (Carey, S. (1985). Conceptual change in childhood. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). Results from a separate sample of 22 5-year-olds suggest that the primary findings cannot be explained by response perseveration. The present findings indicate that children understand physics principles that apply to both animate and inanimate objects, but distinguish between these ontological kinds.     

Spatial metaphors of the mind

A case in which the author began to understand her patient as "collapsing the space between them," rather than as continuing only to free associate, is the occasion for a contemplation of the way psychoanalytic theory effects a transition between what is inner, or lived, and outer, or experienced. Metaphor is seen as the agent of this transition. The author discusses metaphor in relation to the case described, while also examining spatial metaphors of mind in classical analysis and in Kleinian theory. It is suggested that both may be integrated in a third metaphorical-spatial construct, Green's analytic space.     

Motor and functional skills of children with developmental coordination disorder: a pilot investigation of measurement issues

This paper reports on the motor and functional outcomes of 20 children with developmental coordination disorder (DCD) aged 4-8 years consecutively referred to a pediatric physiotherapy service. Children with a Movement ABC (M-ABC) score less than the 15th percentile, and with no concurrent medical, sensory, physical, intellectual or neurological impairments, were recruited. The Motor Assessment Outcomes Model (MAOM) [Coster and Haley, Infants and Young Children 4 (1992) 11] provided the theoretical base for measurement selection, and preliminary findings at the activities and participation levels of the model are reported in this article. Children with DCD performed at the lower end of the normal range on the Peabody Developmental Motor Scales (fine motor total score) (M=85.65, SD=12.23). Performance on the Visual Motor Integration Test (VMI) standard scores was within the average range (M=96.15, SD=10.69). Videotaped observations of the children's writing and cutting indicated that 29% were left-handed and that a large proportion of all children (31%) utilized unusual pencil grasp patterns and immature prehension of scissors. Measurement at the participation level involved use of the Pictorial Scale of Perceived Competence and Social Acceptance (PCSA) and Pediatric Evaluation of Disability Inventory (PEDI). Overall, these young children rated themselves towards the more competent and accepted end of the PCSA over the dimensions of physical and cognitive competence and peer and maternal acceptance. The PEDI revealed generally average performance on social (M=49.98, SD=16.62) and mobility function (M=54.71, SD=3.99), however, self-care function was below the average range for age (M=38.01, SD=12.19). The utility of the MAOM as a framework for comprehensive measurement of functional and motor outcomes of DCD in young children is discussed.