Social contract theory and the ethics of deception in consumer research

Deception of research participants is a pervasive ethical issue in experimental consumer research. Content analyses find as many as three-fourths of published human participant studies in our field involved some form of deception, almost all of which employed experimental methodologies. However, researchers have little guidance on the acceptability of the use of deception, notwithstanding the codes of root disciplines. We turn to theories of moral philosophy and use social contract theory specifically to identify conditions under which deception may be justified as morally permissible. Seven guiding principles for research practice are formulated and their implications for consumer researchers are identified, together with practical recommendations for decision making on studies involving deception.     

Applying Self‐Determination Theory to the Prediction of Distress and Well‐Being in Gay Men With HIV and AIDS1

Self‐determination theory (Deci & Ryan. 1985. 1991) was used to predict psychological well‐being and distress in 48 gay men with HIV. 39 AIDS patients. and 38 HIV‐negative control participants. Participants listed 10 to 15 personal strivings and identitied their reasons for engaging in each striving. Multiple regression analyses revealed that introjection (engaging in strivings because of an internal sense of obligation or necessity) was associated with increased distress. especially among HIV‐ and AIDS participants. Introjection also predicted decreased well‐being. Integration (engaging in strivings because they are personally valued and meaningful) was positively related to well‐being. Adjustment to a life‐threatening illness is influenced by individuals' feelings of autonomy; that is. the extent to which they believe themselves to be the source of their actions.     

Both trace and delay conditioned eyeblink responding can be dissociated from outcome expectancy

Squire and colleagues have proposed that trace and delay eyeblink conditioning are fundamentally different kinds of learning: trace conditioning requires acquisition of a conscious declarative memory for the stimulus contingencies whereas delay conditioning does not. Declarative memory in trace conditioning is thought to generate conditioned responding through the activation of a conscious expectancy for when the unconditioned stimulus (US) is going to occur. Perruchet (1985) has previously shown that in a 50% partial reinforcement design it is possible to dissociate single cue delay eyeblink conditioning from conscious expectancy for the US by examining performance over runs of reinforced and nonreinforced trials. Clark, Manns, and Squire (2001) claim that this dissociation does not occur in trace eyeblink conditioning. In the present experiment we examined the Perruchet effect for short, moderate, and long trace intervals (600, 1000, and 1400 ms) and for the equivalent interstimulus intervals (ISIs) in a delay conditioning procedure. We found evidence for a dissociation of eyeblink CRs and US expectancy over runs regardless of whether there was a delay or a trace arrangement of cues. The reasons for the Perruchet effect are still unclear, but the present data suggest that it does not depend on a separate nondeclarative system of the type proposed by Squire and colleagues.     

The social and psychological costs of punishing

We review evidence of the psychological and social costs associated with punishing. We propose that these psychological and social costs should be considered (in addition to material costs) when searching for evidence of costly punishment "in the wild."     

Treadmill performance of mice with cerebellar lesions: 2. Lurcher mutant mice

The sensorimotor skills of a spontaneous mouse mutant with cerebellar cortical atrophy, Lurcher, were examined on either a fast or a slow treadmill inclined at one of three slopes, requiring forward movements in order to avoid footshocks. During the early part of acquisition, Lurcher mutants had lower latencies before falling on either treadmill than normal mice, but not during a retention test. For both Lurcher mutants and controls, the amount of time spent walking as a function of time spent on the belt increased with an increase in belt speed. Lurcher mutants had higher walking time/total time ratios on the slow but not on the fast treadmill. It is concluded that cerebellar cortical degeneration impaired the time course of acquisition but not long-term retention of the treadmill task.     

Color perception involves color representations firstly at a semantic level and then at a lexical level

Studies and models have suggested that color perception first involves access to semantic representations of color. This result leads to two questions: (1) is knowledge able to influence the perception of color when associated with a color? and (2) can the perception of color really involve only semantic representations? We developed an experiment where participants have to discriminate the color of a patch (yellow vs. green). The target patch is preceded either by a black-and-white line drawing or by a word representing a natural object associated with the same or a different color (banana vs. frog). We expected a priming effect for pictures because, with a 350-ms SOA, they only involve access to semantic representations of color, whereas words seem only elicit an access to lexical representations. As expected, we found a priming effect for pictures, but also for words. Moreover, we found a general slowdown of response times in the word-prime-condition suggesting the need of an additional processing step to produce priming. In a second experiment, we manipulated the SOA in order to preclude a semantic access in the word-prime-condition that could explain the additional step of processing. We also found a priming effect, suggesting that interaction with perception occurs at a lexical level and the additional step occurs at a color perception level. In the discussion, we develop a new model of color perception assuming that color perception involves access to semantic representations and then access to lexical representations.     

Cognitive-behavioural Anger Management Training for Adults with Mild Intellectual Disability

Although people with intellectual disabilities often display anger control problems, little research has been conducted on the development and evaluation of cost-effective anger management training programs for this special population. This study evaluated the efficacy of cognitive-behavioural anger management for 11 adults with mild intellectual disabilities in a group therapy format. Improvements were evident on self-report measures of anger and self-esteem. Additionally, caregiver reports indicated general improvements in emotional and behavioural adjustment. Limitations of the study are acknowledged, including the absence of a control condition.     

Ethical Decision Making and Research Deception in the Behavioral Sciences: An Application of Social Contract Theory

Despite significant ethical advances in recent years, including professional developments in ethical review and codification, research deception continues to be a pervasive practice and contentious focus of debate in the behavioral sciences. Given the disciplines' generally stated ethical standards regarding the use of deceptive procedures, researchers have little practical guidance as to their ethical acceptability in specific research contexts. We use social contract theory to identify the conditions under which deception may or may not be morally permissible and formulate practical recommendations to guide researchers on the ethical employment of deception in behavioral science research.     

Natural kind and entitative beliefs in relation to prejudice toward mental disorders

Mental health campaigns often promote biogenetic beliefs to reduce stigma, but their effectiveness may vary across disorders. Our study (N = 127) examined two components of essentialist beliefs—entitative (i.e., characterizing groupness) and natural kinds (i.e., biogenetic)—about two stigmatized mental disorders (schizophrenia, alcoholism) as well as a somatic disorder (Parkinson's disease), and their relation to prejudice. The three disorders significantly differed in natural kind beliefs (Parkinson's highest, then schizophrenia, and alcoholism lowest) and prejudice (alcoholism highest, then schizophrenia, and Parkinson's lowest), but not entitative beliefs. Entitative beliefs, however, was a stronger predictor of prejudice against schizophrenia than natural kind beliefs even after controlling for social dominance orientation and prior contact. Implications for anti‐stigma efforts and strategies are discussed.