Confirmatory reinforcement learning changes with age during adolescence

Understanding how learning changes during human development has been one of the long-standing objectives of developmental science. Recently, advances in computational biology have demonstrated that humans display a bias when learning to navigate novel environments through rewards and punishments: they learn more from outcomes that confirm their expectations than from outcomes that disconfirm them. Here, we ask whether confirmatory learning is stable across development, or whether it might be attenuated in developmental stages in which exploration is beneficial, such as in adolescence. In a reinforcement learning (RL) task, 77 participants aged 11–32 years (four men, mean age = 16.26) attempted to maximize monetary rewards by repeatedly sampling different pairs of novel options, which varied in their reward/punishment probabilities. Mixed-effect models showed an age-related increase in accuracy as long as learning contingencies remained stable across trials, but less so when they reversed halfway through the trials. Age was also associated with a greater tendency to stay with an option that had just delivered a reward, more than to switch away from an option that had just delivered a punishment. At the computational level, a confirmation model provided increasingly better fit with age. This model showed that age differences are captured by decreases in noise or exploration, rather than in the magnitude of the confirmation bias. These findings provide new insights into how learning changes during development and could help better tailor learning environments to people of different ages.

Research Highlights

• Reinforcement learning shows age-related improvement during adolescence, but more in stable learning environments compared with volatile learning environments.
• People tend to stay with an option after a win more than they shift from an option after a loss, and this asymmetry increases with age during adolescence.
• Computationally, these changes are captured by a developing confirmatory learning style, in which people learn more from outcomes that confirm rather than disconfirm their choices.
• Age-related differences in confirmatory learning are explained by decreases in stochasticity, rather than changes in the magnitude of the confirmation bias.

     

Attentional focus on suprapostural tasks affects balance learning

We examined whether the attentional focus induced by a suprapostural task has an influence on the learning of a dynamic balance task. Participants balanced on a stabilometer and were required to hold a tube horizontal with both hands. In Experiment 1, the tube contained a table tennis ball, whereas it was empty in Experiment 2. Participants were instructed to focus on either their hands (internal focus) or the tube (external focus). We measured balance performance as a function of attentional focus on the suprapostural task. Participants practised for 2 days, and on Day 3 they performed a retention test (with tube) and a transfer test (without tube). In both experiments, the external focus groups demonstrated more effective retention and transfer than the internal focus groups (and than the control group in transfer in Experiment 2). In addition, in Experiment 1 the external group was superior in keeping the tube horizontal. This suggests that the performer's attentional focus regarding the suprapostural task affects performance and learning not only of the suprapostural task itself, but also of the postural task.     

C. I. Lewis,Kant, and the reflective method of philosophy

ABSTRACT

If it seems unquestionable that C. I. Lewis is a Kantian in important respects, it is more difficult to determine what, if anything, is original about his Kantianism. For it might be argued that Lewis’ Kantianism simply reflects an approach to the a priori which was very common in the first half of the twentieth century, namely, the effort to make the a priori relative. In this paper, I will argue that Lewis’ Kantianism does present original features. The latter can be detected by focusing on Lewis’ account of the method of philosophy in the first chapter of Mind and the World Order. In that context, Lewis argues that the method of philosophy should be reflective and critical. It will be my contention that this understanding of philosophy involves a therapeutic perspective, which bears important resemblances to Kant’s account of transcendental reflection in the Amphiboly of the Critique of Pure Reason. I will illustrate how this therapeutic application of reflection works in Lewis’ metaphysics. In this context, reflection can correct errors of reasoning that occur when we are operating within a particular conceptual scheme and use the criteria of reality that are appropriate in another.