Metacognitions as a predictor of drinking status and level of alcohol use following CBT in problem drinkers: A prospective study

This study investigated the role of negative emotions and metacognitions in predicting problem drinkers' drinking status (absence or presence of drinking) and level of weekly alcohol use at 3, 6 and 12 months after a course of treatment. A total of 70 problem drinkers with a DSM-IV diagnosis of alcohol abuse participated in the study. Depressive symptoms were assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory and symptoms of anxiety were measured with the state anxiety sub-scale of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Metacognitions were measured with the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire. Results indicated that beliefs about need to control thoughts predicted: (1) drinking status at 3 and 6 months; and (2) level of weekly alcohol use at 3, 6 and 12 months. The contribution of metacognition was independent of negative emotions and initial level of weekly alcohol use. The results support the role of metacognition in problem drinking. Given that metacognitions are a possible risk factor for drinking status and level of weekly alcohol use it is suggested that treatment for problem drinking could target this variable.     

The automaticity of complex motor skill learning as a function of attentional focus

The present experiment was designed to test the predictions of the constrained-action hypothesis. This hypothesis proposes that when performers utilize an internal focus of attention (focus on their movements) they may actually constrain or interfere with automatic control processes that would normally regulate the movement, whereas an external focus of attention (focus on the movement effect) allows the motor system to more naturally self-organize. To test this hypothesis, a dynamic balance task (stabilometer) was used with participants instructed to adopt either an internal or external focus of attention. Consistent with earlier experiments, the external focus group produced generally smaller balance errors than did the internal focus group and responded at a higher frequency indicating higher confluence between voluntary and reflexive mechanisms. In addition, probe reaction times (RTs) were taken as a measure of the attention demands required under the two attentional focus conditions. Consistent with the hypothesis, the external focus participants demonstrated lower probe RTs than did the internal focus participants, indicating a higher degree of automaticity and less conscious interference in the control processes associated with the balance task.     

Solving the Interface Problem Without Translation: The Same Format Thesis

In this article, we propose a new account concerning the interlock between intentions and motor representations (henceforth: MRs), showing that the interface problem is not as deep as previously proposed. Before discussing our view, in the first section we report the ideas developed in the literature by those who have tried to solve this puzzle before us. The article proceeds as follows. In Sections 2 and 3, we address the views by Butterfill and Sinigaglia, and Mylopoulos and Pacherie, respectively, and argue that both solutions entail a translation between representational formats, which both accounts aim to avoid. In Section 4, we present our brand‐new claim, according to which intentions and MRs partially share the same motor format, inasmuch as executable action concepts are naturally represented in the agent's motor system together with the action's outcomes. Indeed, since intentions are constituted by executable action concepts and since there is evidence that action concepts are represented (and, thus, built) in the same motor format as action outcomes, the interlock between intentions and MRs no longer constitutes a problem. Then, in Section 5, we report empirical evidence in support of our claim, and before concluding, in Section 6 we briefly clarify our relations with two very recent accounts that criticized the proposals by Mylopoulos and Pacherie and Butterfill and Sinigaglia: Shepherd's and Burnston's. Finally, in Section 7, we offer some remarks about the philosophical idea defended here. The basic insight is that interface without translation is possible because action concepts are such stuff as MRs are made on.     

Mind-World Identity Theory and Semantic Realism: Haldane and Boulter on Aquinas

Stephen Boulter, in The Philosophical Quarterly , 48 (1998), pp. 504–13, attacks John Haldane's proposed account of the relationship between mind and world based on Aquinas' theory of cognition. Boulter argues against Haldane's attempt to square metaphysical realism with semantic anti-realism. I argue that even if metaphysical realism and a full-bodied semantic anti-realism may be incompatible, from the stance of the mind-world identity theory, one may nevertheless maintain metaphysical realism together with the negation of semantic realism. I suggest that this is what Haldane actually claimed, and moreover that Aquinas would have accepted it. Aquinas' analogy-based semantics enlarges the recognitional capacities of speakers, and one's capacity to recognize a fact empirically is different from one's capacity to form thoughts about a fact.     

Strategic behavior without awareness? Effects of implicit learning in the Eriksen flanker paradigm

This experiment investigated whether subjects' selection and use of strategies in detecting a target letter in a flanker task requires intention. Subjects' expectancies for compatible and incompatible trials (trials on which the response to the flanker stimulus was consistent or inconsistent with the target response) were manipulated by presenting cues that signaled the occurrence of these types of trials. Three groups of subjects received explicit, partially explicit, or implicit instructions about the meaning of the cues. By the end of the experiment, all the groups were able to select and use strategies based on the cues to improve their performance. However, this strategy selection developed slowly with practice in the latter two groups, whereas it was present from the outset in the first group. In addition, forced choice tests performed after the experiment showed that the subjects in the implicit condition could not intentionally indicate which stimuli were most likely to follow a given cue. Thus, the data suggest that the selection of strategies occurred outside the subjects' awareness, and without their intention.     

Transfer of skill engendered by complex task training under conditions of variable priority

We explored the theoretical underpinnings of a commonly used training strategy by examining issues of training and transfer of skill in the context of a complex video game (Space Fortress, Donchin, 1989). Participants trained using one of two training regimens: Full Emphasis Training (FET) or Variable Priority Training (VPT). Transfer of training was assessed with a large battery of cognitive and psychomotor tasks ranging from basic laboratory paradigms measuring reasoning, memory, and attention to complex real-world simulations. Consistent with previous studies, VPT accelerated learning and maximized task mastery. However, the hypothesis that VPT would result in broader transfer of training received limited support. Rather, transfer was most evident in tasks that were most similar to the Space Fortress game itself. Results are discussed in terms of potential limitations of the VPT approach.     

Rescuing stimuli from invisibility: Inducing a momentary release from visual masking with pre-target entrainment

At near-threshold levels of stimulation, identical stimulus parameters can result in very different phenomenal experiences. Can we manipulate which stimuli reach consciousness? Here we show that consciousness of otherwise masked stimuli can be experimentally induced by sensory entrainment. We preceded a backward-masked stimulus with a series of rapid visual events presented at 12 Hz for 800 ms. Peaks in visual sensitivity (d′) were observed when the target appeared at the time that the next entraining stimuli would have occurred. Observers’ sensitivity for identical masked near-threshold stimuli increased by factors as large as 55%, but only at this precise moment in time. These data thus reveal that awareness of near-threshold stimuli can be manipulated by entrainment to rhythmic events, supporting the functional role of induced oscillations in underlying cortical excitability, and suggest a plausible mechanism of temporal attention.