Simple Objects of Comparison for Complex Grammars: An Alternative Strand in Wittgenstein's Later Remarks on Religion

The predominant interpretation of Wittgenstein's later remarks on religion takes him to hold that all religious utterances are non‐scientific, and to hold that the way to show that religious utterances are non‐scientific is to identify and characterise the grammatical rules governing their use. This paper claims that though this does capture one strand of Wittgenstein's later thought on religion, there is an alternative strand of that thought which is quite different and more nuanced. In this alternative strand Wittgenstein stresses that religious utterances and beliefs can come in both scientific and non‐scientific varieties. More than that, he claims that the grammar of religious utterances, and the logic of religious beliefs, is often complex – in that individual utterances and beliefs will often be mixed between, indeterminate between, or fluid between being scientific and being non‐scientific. This complexity means that it will often be unhelpful to try to pin down one particular grammar or logic for a given utterance or belief. Wittgenstein therefore suggests a new method of grammatical and logical investigation, which is less likely to distort complex grammars or logics by being overly simplistic or rigid. This method is to use simple examples of utterances and beliefs as objects of comparison, so as to illuminate the different aspects of the more complex actual utterances and beliefs under examination. This alternative strand in Wittgenstein's later remarks on religion is a manifestation of a broader strand of Wittgenstein's later thought as a whole, which was first described by Friedrich Waismann, and later developed by Gordon Baker and Oskari Kuusela. The paper concludes by providing examples of religious beliefs which are logically mixed, indeterminate, and fluid, and showing how simple objects of comparison can be used to illuminate them.     

Real three-dimensional objects: effects on mental rotation

The current experiment investigated real three-dimensional (3D) objects with regard to performance on a mental rotation task and whether the appearance of sex differences may be mediated by experiences with spatially related activities. 40 men and 40 women were presented with alternating timed trials consisting of real-3D objects or two-dimensional illustrations of 3D objects. Sex differences in spatially related activities did not significantly influence the finding that men outperformed women on mental rotation of either stimulus type. However, on measures related to spatial activities, self-reported proficiency using maps correlated positively with performance only on trials with illustrations whereas self-reported proficiency using GPS correlated negatively with performance regardless of stimulus dimensionality. Findings may be interpreted as suggesting that rotating real-3D objects utilizes distinct but overlapping spatial skills compared to rotating two-dimensional representations of 3D objects, and real-3D objects can enhance mental rotation performance.     

The shape of action

How do people understand the everyday, yet intricate, behaviors that unfold around them? In the present research, we explored this by presenting viewers with self-paced slideshows of everyday activities and recording looking times, subjective segmentation (breakpoints) into action units, and slide-to-slide physical change. A detailed comparison of the joint time courses of these variables showed that looking time and physical change were locally maximal at breakpoints and greater for higher level action units than for lower level units. Even when slideshows were scrambled, breakpoints were regarded longer and were more physically different from ordinary moments, showing that breakpoints are distinct even out of context. Breakpoints are bridges: from one action to another, from one level to another, and from perception to conception.     

Does Anxiety Improve Voters' Decision Making?

Affective Intelligence (AI) theory proposes to answer a fundamental question about democracy: how it succeeds even though most citizens pay little attention to politics. AI contends that, when circumstances generate sufficient anxiety, citizens make informed and thoughtful political decisions. In Ladd and Lenz (2008 ), we showed that two simpler depictions of anxiety's role can explain the vote interactions that apparently support AI. Here, we again replicate Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen's (2000 )'s voting model, which they contend supports AI, and again show that it is vulnerable to these alternative explanations, regardless of how candidate choice is measured. We also briefly review the broader literature and discuss Brader's (2005, 2006 ) important experimental results. Although the literature undoubtedly supports other aspects of AI, few studies directly test AI's voting claims, which were the focus of our reassessment. In our view, the only study that does so while ruling out the two alternatives is our analysis of the 1980 ANES Major Panel ( Ladd & Lenz, 2008 ), which finds no support for AI, but ample support for the alternatives. None of the responses to Ladd and Lenz (2008 ) addresses these findings. Overall, evidence that anxiety helps solve the problem of voter competence remains sparse and vulnerable to alternative explanations.     

The Efficient Assessment of Self-Esteem: Proposing the Brief Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

Self-esteem is defined as sense of self-worth and self-respect, being crucial for understanding people’s well-being and success. It is one of the most studied constructs in the social sciences, with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) being the most used measure. Across four studies (N = 1450), we tested the psychometric parameters of an abbreviated version of the RSES. Through Item Response Theory, the five best items were selected to form the unidimensional Brief Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (B-RSES), a reliable and valid measure of self-esteem, which is invariant across age groups and gender. In addition, both RSES and B-RSES correlated very similarly with the Big Five Personality Factors. Also, the B-RSES was strongly correlated with three other short measures of self-esteem, besides being more strongly associated with a range of variables such as conscientiousness and self-competence in comparison to the other three short scales. Together, the B-RSES is especially useful in research that requires rapid evaluation and the use of multiple variables.

     

Leveraged Resources and Systems Changes in Community Collaboration

Most models of community collaboration emphasize the ability of diverse partners to come together to enact systematic changes that improve the health of individuals and communities. The ability of these groups to leverage resources is thought to be an important marker of successful collaboration and eventual improvements in community health. However, there is a paucity of research addressing linkages between systems change activities and leveraged resources. This study used a sample of collaboratives (N = 157) that received technical assistance and funding through the Georgia Family Connection Partnership (GaFCP) between 2006 and 2007. Data were collected from collaborative report of activities and funding, member ratings of collaborative functioning, and characteristics of the communities served by the collaboratives drawn from US Census data. Cross-lagged regression models tested longitudinal associations between systems change activities and leveraged dollars. The results indicated that systems change activities predict increased leveraging of resources from state/federal and private partners. However, there was no evidence that systems changes were linked with leveraging resources from local groups and agencies. These findings have important implications for providing technical assistance and training to health partnerships. Furthermore, future research should consider the relative strength of different systems change activities in relation to the ability of coalitions to leverage resources.     

On the notions of indiscernibility and indeterminacy in the light of the Galois–Grothendieck theory

We analyze the notions of indiscernibility and indeterminacy in the light of the Galois theory of field extensions and the generalization to \(K\) -algebras proposed by Grothendieck. Grothendieck’s reformulation of Galois theory permits to recast the Galois correspondence between symmetry groups and invariants as a Galois–Grothendieck duality between \(G\) -spaces and the minimal observable algebras that discern (or separate) their points. According to the natural epistemic interpretation of the original Galois theory, the possible \(K\) -indiscernibilities between the roots of a polynomial \(p(x)\in K[x]\) result from the limitations of the field \(K\) . We discuss the relation between this epistemic interpretation of the Galois–Grothendieck duality and Leibniz’s principle of the identity of indiscernibles. We then use the conceptual framework provided by Klein’s Erlangen program to propose an alternative ontologic interpretation of this duality. The Galoisian symmetries are now interpreted in terms of the automorphisms of the symmetric geometric figures that can be placed in a background Klein geometry. According to this interpretation, the Galois–Grothendieck duality encodes the compatibility condition between geometric figures endowed with groups of automorphisms and the ‘observables’ that can be consistently evaluated at such figures. In this conceptual framework, the Galoisian symmetries do not encode the epistemic indiscernibility between individuals, but rather the intrinsic indeterminacy in the pointwise localization of the figures with respect to the background Klein geometry.     

Observing a client's grieving process: bringing logical positivism into qualitative grief counselling research

This positional paper originates from our need as researcher/practitioners to establish a meaningful epistemological framework for research into bereaved people's journey through loss and grief over time. We describe how the field of grief research has a long and established biological basis, in keeping with a positivist epistemology. However, there has been a diminution of the influence of logical positivism in twenty-first-century counselling research. We argue that in grief counselling research, naturalistic observation of the grieving process within a logical positivist paradigm, remains a valid and valuable construct. We posit an observational protocol for the grief counselling process which minimises the intrusion of research method into the therapeutic process. We offer this as a means of conducting qualitative research within a bereavement counselling service. Further, we suggest that the development of an observational protocol for a client's grieving process has potential implications for developing good practice in grief work.     

The structure of analog representation

This paper develops a theory of analog representation. We first argue that the mark of the analog is to be found in the nature of a representational system's interpretation function, rather than in its vehicles or contents alone. We then develop the rulebound structure theory of analog representation, according to which analog systems use interpretive rules that map syntactic structural features onto semantic structural features. The theory involves three degree-theoretic measures that capture three independent ways in which a system can be more or less analog. We explain how our theory improves upon prior accounts of analog representation, provides plausible diagnoses for novel challenge cases, extends to hybrid systems that are partially analog and partially symbolic, and accounts for some of the advantages and disadvantages of representing analogically versus symbolically.