Awe as a Scientific Emotion

Awe has traditionally been considered a religious or spiritual emotion, yet scientists often report that awe motivates them to answer questions about the natural world, and to do so in naturalistic terms. Indeed, awe may be closely related to scientific discovery and theoretical advance. Awe is typically triggered by something vast (either literally or metaphorically) and initiates processes of accommodation, in which existing mental schemas are revised to make sense of the awe‐inspiring stimuli. This process of accommodation is essential for the kind of belief revision that characterizes scientific reasoning and theory change. Across six studies, we find that the tendency to experience awe is positively associated with scientific thinking, and that this association is not shared by other positive emotions. Specifically, we show that the disposition to experience awe predicts a more accurate understanding of how science works, rejection of creationism, and rejection of unwarranted teleological explanations more broadly.     

Law Without Legitimacy or Justification? The Flawed Foundations of Philosophical Anarchism

In this article, I examine A. John Simmons’s philosophical anarchism, and specifically, the problems that result from the combination of its three foundational principles: the strong correlativity of legitimacy rights and political obligations; the strict distinction between justified existence and legitimate authority; and the doctrine of personal consent, more precisely, its supporting assumptions about the natural freedom of individuals and the non-natural states into which individuals are born. As I argue, these assumptions, when combined with the strong correlativity and strict distinction theses, undermine Simmons’s claim, which is central to his philosophical anarchism, that a state may be justified in enforcing the law, even if illegitimate or unjustified in existing.     

Simple Objects of Comparison for Complex Grammars: An Alternative Strand in Wittgenstein's Later Remarks on Religion

The predominant interpretation of Wittgenstein's later remarks on religion takes him to hold that all religious utterances are non‐scientific, and to hold that the way to show that religious utterances are non‐scientific is to identify and characterise the grammatical rules governing their use. This paper claims that though this does capture one strand of Wittgenstein's later thought on religion, there is an alternative strand of that thought which is quite different and more nuanced. In this alternative strand Wittgenstein stresses that religious utterances and beliefs can come in both scientific and non‐scientific varieties. More than that, he claims that the grammar of religious utterances, and the logic of religious beliefs, is often complex – in that individual utterances and beliefs will often be mixed between, indeterminate between, or fluid between being scientific and being non‐scientific. This complexity means that it will often be unhelpful to try to pin down one particular grammar or logic for a given utterance or belief. Wittgenstein therefore suggests a new method of grammatical and logical investigation, which is less likely to distort complex grammars or logics by being overly simplistic or rigid. This method is to use simple examples of utterances and beliefs as objects of comparison, so as to illuminate the different aspects of the more complex actual utterances and beliefs under examination. This alternative strand in Wittgenstein's later remarks on religion is a manifestation of a broader strand of Wittgenstein's later thought as a whole, which was first described by Friedrich Waismann, and later developed by Gordon Baker and Oskari Kuusela. The paper concludes by providing examples of religious beliefs which are logically mixed, indeterminate, and fluid, and showing how simple objects of comparison can be used to illuminate them.     

Real three-dimensional objects: effects on mental rotation

The current experiment investigated real three-dimensional (3D) objects with regard to performance on a mental rotation task and whether the appearance of sex differences may be mediated by experiences with spatially related activities. 40 men and 40 women were presented with alternating timed trials consisting of real-3D objects or two-dimensional illustrations of 3D objects. Sex differences in spatially related activities did not significantly influence the finding that men outperformed women on mental rotation of either stimulus type. However, on measures related to spatial activities, self-reported proficiency using maps correlated positively with performance only on trials with illustrations whereas self-reported proficiency using GPS correlated negatively with performance regardless of stimulus dimensionality. Findings may be interpreted as suggesting that rotating real-3D objects utilizes distinct but overlapping spatial skills compared to rotating two-dimensional representations of 3D objects, and real-3D objects can enhance mental rotation performance.     

The shape of action

How do people understand the everyday, yet intricate, behaviors that unfold around them? In the present research, we explored this by presenting viewers with self-paced slideshows of everyday activities and recording looking times, subjective segmentation (breakpoints) into action units, and slide-to-slide physical change. A detailed comparison of the joint time courses of these variables showed that looking time and physical change were locally maximal at breakpoints and greater for higher level action units than for lower level units. Even when slideshows were scrambled, breakpoints were regarded longer and were more physically different from ordinary moments, showing that breakpoints are distinct even out of context. Breakpoints are bridges: from one action to another, from one level to another, and from perception to conception.     

Does Anxiety Improve Voters' Decision Making?

Affective Intelligence (AI) theory proposes to answer a fundamental question about democracy: how it succeeds even though most citizens pay little attention to politics. AI contends that, when circumstances generate sufficient anxiety, citizens make informed and thoughtful political decisions. In Ladd and Lenz (2008 ), we showed that two simpler depictions of anxiety's role can explain the vote interactions that apparently support AI. Here, we again replicate Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen's (2000 )'s voting model, which they contend supports AI, and again show that it is vulnerable to these alternative explanations, regardless of how candidate choice is measured. We also briefly review the broader literature and discuss Brader's (2005, 2006 ) important experimental results. Although the literature undoubtedly supports other aspects of AI, few studies directly test AI's voting claims, which were the focus of our reassessment. In our view, the only study that does so while ruling out the two alternatives is our analysis of the 1980 ANES Major Panel ( Ladd & Lenz, 2008 ), which finds no support for AI, but ample support for the alternatives. None of the responses to Ladd and Lenz (2008 ) addresses these findings. Overall, evidence that anxiety helps solve the problem of voter competence remains sparse and vulnerable to alternative explanations.     

The Efficient Assessment of Self-Esteem: Proposing the Brief Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

Self-esteem is defined as sense of self-worth and self-respect, being crucial for understanding people’s well-being and success. It is one of the most studied constructs in the social sciences, with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) being the most used measure. Across four studies (N = 1450), we tested the psychometric parameters of an abbreviated version of the RSES. Through Item Response Theory, the five best items were selected to form the unidimensional Brief Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (B-RSES), a reliable and valid measure of self-esteem, which is invariant across age groups and gender. In addition, both RSES and B-RSES correlated very similarly with the Big Five Personality Factors. Also, the B-RSES was strongly correlated with three other short measures of self-esteem, besides being more strongly associated with a range of variables such as conscientiousness and self-competence in comparison to the other three short scales. Together, the B-RSES is especially useful in research that requires rapid evaluation and the use of multiple variables.