Liberalism and Democracy

ABSTRACT Political liberalism and the democratic ideal together supply the foundation of almost all contemporary political thinking. This essay explores the relation between them. It argues that, despite common parlance, there is an inevitable tension between the two. Furthermore, attempts to resolve this tension by showing that democracy is a good thing in its own right, or that it is the inevitable development of liberal aspirations, or that it is conceptually connected to fundamental liberal ideas, all fail. The conclusion to be drawn is that liberalism requires a pragmatic rather than a principled approach to democratic aspirations.     

Eliminating Racism: Dummett's On Immigration and Refugees and the Philosophy of Language

abstract   This paper examines a claim made by Michael Dummett in his recent book On Immigration and Refugees that the feeling of racism can be removed by the creation of a social climate in which the expression of that feeling is disreputable. I suggest that Dummett's claim can be better appreciated if viewed in the light of some guiding principles of his project in the philosophy of language. With these principles in place, I argue that they provide convincing support for Dummett's claim, as well as showing an important connection between On Immigration and Dummett's broader philosophical concerns. I conclude the essay by suggesting some ways in which the insights gleaned from Dummett's philosophy may be applied to the case of asylum seekers and their representation by the media and in political rhetoric.     

KNOWING WHEN TO “SECOND-GUESS”

Studies on social information gathering typically investigate how an interactant actively elicits needed information from another source. An alternative approach would focus on how a hearer gathers selected bits of information from the message(s) at hand. The process of second-guessing is proposed as one such interpretive approach to information gathering. Previous research confirmed that social actors do use this strategy and use it reasonably effectively. This article extends our knowledge of second-guessing by looking at the conditions or “cues” that provoke the process, and by showing that participants in an experimental study second-guess when confronted with those cues.