Setting and response generalization in rational-emotive therapy: A case study

A single case study (n=1) conducted during therapy investigated the relationship between disputing irrational beliefs in vivo and setting and response generalization. Irrational beliefs associated with the subject's anger and depression were disputed at different intervals over a ten week period utilizing a multiple baseline design across four classes in a school setting (setting 1). Depression and anger were rated several times each week. The subject's level of anxiety was also rated in setting 1 but the irrational beliefs associated with it were not disputed. Anger, depression, and anxiety were rated without disputation in a separate work setting (setting 2). Affect ratings significantly decreased across both settings throughout the ten week period. Results indicated that 1) disputing irrational beliefs associated with anger and depression in setting 1 led to reductions in anxiety in this setting (response generalization), 2) anger and depression reductions in setting 2 paralleled setting 1 reductions (setting generalization), and 3) anxiety reductionsWilliam J. Ruth, PhD, Staff Psychologist and practicum supervisor, Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, NY City; School Psychologist, Board of Cooperative Educational Services, Southern Westchester.Raymond DiGiuseppe, PhD, ABPP, Director of Training and Research, Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, NY City; Graduate Professor, St. John's University, NY City; co-author,Practitioner's Guide to Rational-Emotive Therapy and RET with Alcoholics and Substance Abusers.     

Continuities in the development of the physical and social sciences: Principles of a new social physics

The original concept of “social physics” was built on positivist philosophy and scientific method. Evidence from quantum physics suggests that a postpositivist “social physics” may yet be viable, not because social science should emulate physics, but because physics is more like social science. The five principles of complementarty, uncertainty, the measurement problem, nonlocal causation, and participatory collusion are presented in this article to demonstrate the contemporary convergence of the physical and social sciences into a new social physics. E. Sam Overman is associate professor of public affairs at the Graduate School of Public Affairs, University of Colorado at Denver, Denver CO 80204. He recently editedMethodology and Epistemology for Social Science, selected papers by Donald T. Campbell (University of Chicago Press, 1988). He has published other articles on policy physics and social science philosophy, and has conducted research and published extensively in the area of information resource policy and management.     

Cognitive guidelines for simplifying medical information: Data framing and perception

In this paper, 1 describe psychological guidelines for simplifying medical information — methods to aid the perception and recognition of abnormalities in medical test reports. These techniques resemble natural human editing strategies outlined in prospect theory. The methods pre-edit data as humans do but to reduce human effort. I review empirical studies assessing these techniques and discuss needs for further research.     

Psychological conceptions of randomness

This article presents a critique of the concept of randomness as it occurs in the psychological literature. The first section of our article outlines the significance of a concept of randomness to the process of induction; we need to distinguish random and non-random events in order to perceive lawful regularities and formulate theories concerning events in the world. Next we evaluate the psychological research that has suggested that human concepts of randomness are not normative. We argue that, because the tasks set to experimental subjects are logically problematic, observed biases may be an artifact of the experimental situation and that even if such biases do generalise they may not have pejorative implications for induction in the real world. Thirdly we investigate the statistical methodology utilised in tests for randomness and find it riddled with paradox. In a fourth section we find various branches of scientific endeavour that are stymied by the problems posed by randomness. Finally we briefly mention the social significance of randomness and conclude by arguing that such a fundamental concept merits and requires more serious considerations.     

Sign language as cognition for deaf people: Pitfalls and prospects

With a tradition reliance on verbal paradigms cognitive psychology has repeatedly rediscovered the centrality of verbal processes in the cognitive representation of the world. Frequently it has been considered that non-speaking groups offer the proof of such psychological theories. Deaf people, because of their apparently poor memory, retardation in reading, relative lack of speech, yet cognitive viability, have offered an ideal test population for cognitive paradigs. Unfortunately deaf people turn out not to be a non linguistic control. We have now discovered sign language—a visual, spatial representation form used naturally by profoundly deaf people. This apparently offers the key the deaf people's cognition without speech. This paper describes some aspects of what we know of deaf people and their language, critically examines some of the evidence for sign representation in memory, and discusses the methodological problems to be faced by anyone searching for conclusive evidence on deaf people's working memory. Despite the attractiveness of ‘sings for words’ in cognition, this paper argues that the evidences is weak and signs may not be equated easily with words.     

Errors in the quantification of uncertainty: A product of heuristics or minimal probability knowledge base?

The use of intuitive heuristics (e. g. representativeness and availability) has been put forward as an explanation for peoples' assignment of probabilities (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). This phenomenon is seen as robust since experts as defined by education (professional psychologisis), despite advanced training in statistics and methodology, rely on the same heuristics as novices (lay people). Both experts and novices, as defined by education, were studied in a series of experiments and further classified as experts and novices according to their probability knowledge base, prior to receiving (or not) a brief (15-minute) training session. Immediately following training, subjects completed a probability test which consisted of ten Tversky and Kahneman (e. g. 1974) problems. The training significantly increased the number of problems correctly solved on the probability test and eliminated the expert/novice education classification. The results of a follow-up test 5 weeks after the experiment indicated that the training group maintained its superior performance. It is proposed that failure to use proper methods of probability assignment may not be due to intrinsic human inference biases or heuristics, but is a result of a minimal probability knowledge base.     

Children’s competitive behavior: A challenging alternative

The effect of challenge on the cooperative and competitive behavior of 120 urban American children was assessed using two experimental game apparatuses, one of which provided a challenging cooperative response. Significantly more cooperation was observed when the subjects were presented with a challenging cooperative response. In addition, a reliable age effect was found indicating that the older subject group (10–12 years old) was more cooperative than the younger two age groups (5–7 and 8–10 years old). Finally, a significant game condition x order interaction was discovered suggesting that under some conditions the order in which the games were played affected the degree of subject cooperation. Results are related to a theory of competence motivation. It is argued that cooperation among American children may be increased if the task involves the presence of challenge. A portion of this research was presented at the biennial meetings of the Society for Research in Child Development, Detroit, Michigan, 1983.