Four tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were trained to choose from 2 hook-like tools, 1 of which successfully led to collecting food, whereas the other did not because of inappropriate spatial arrangement of the tool and the food. In Experiment 1, all of the monkeys successfully learned the basic task. The monkeys performed successfully with tools of novel colors and shapes in Experiments 2-5. These results demonstrate that the monkeys used the spatial arrangement of the tool and the food as a cue. However, they failed when there were obstacles (Experiment 6) or traps (Experiment 7) on the path along which the monkeys dragged tools. These results may suggest that capuchin monkeys understand the spatial relationship between 2 items, namely, food and the tool, but do not understand the spatial relationship among 3 items, namely, food, tool, and the environmental condition. The possible role of stimulus generalization is also considered. 相似文献
Human infants perceive two rods moving in concert behind an occluder as one unitary rod. In four experiments we tested whether
pigeons also perceive unity of objects. Pigeons were trained on a matching-to-sample task to discriminate between one unitary
rod moving at a constant speed and two aligned rods moving together at the same speed. The latter stimulus was identical to
the former except for a gap in the center. In experiment 1, we tested pigeons in probe trials in which a rectangle occluded
the center of the sample rods, to see which comparison stimulus, the unitary rod or the aligned two rods, the subjects would
match to the sample. Two of the three subjects pecked at the two rods significantly more often than at the unitary rod. In
experiment 2, we trained the same pigeons to match the sample rods moving "in front of" the occluder. Pigeons persisted in
matching two separate rods to the unitary rod moving in front of the occluder. In experiments 3 and 4, we used a parallelogram
and an undulating shape as the occluder to alter the shape and the size of the portions above and below the occluder by the
motion of the sample rods. Both subjects chose the two rods significantly more often than chance in experiment 3 and one of
them did so in experiment 4. The results suggest that pigeons do not complete occluded portions even though the two elements
move in concert. These negative results suggest that some alternative way of identifying objects may have evolved in pigeons.
Accepted after revision: 2 May 2001
Electronic Publication 相似文献
Depression can be explained by certain behavioural patterns, especially low levels of environmental rewards; it is generally accompanied by infrequent goal-directed behaviour, increased depressed mood, and anhedonia. However, no research has statistically examined the mediating effect of environmental rewards on the relation between goal-directed behaviour and the symptoms of depressed mood or anhedonia. This study sought to determine whether such a mediating effect of environmental rewards is present in cross-sectional study. The participants included 101 patients diagnosed with major depressive disorders. Data were collected through three questionnaires measuring depression and behavioural patterns that maintain depression: the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D), the Environmental Reward Observation Scale (EROS), and the Behavioral Activation for Depression Scale—Short Form (BADS-SF). Mediation analysis was conducted using depressed mood and anhedonia as dependent variables, environmental rewards as the mediating variable, and goal-directed behaviour as the independent variable. Environmental rewards significantly mediated the relationship between goal-directed behaviour and anhedonia but not that between goal-directed behaviour and depressed mood. No significant relationships were found among depressed mood, goal-directed behaviour and environmental rewards. From these results, we conclude that low levels of environmental rewards accompanied by infrequent goal-directed behaviour can lead to increased anhedonia but not depressed mood.
The Japanese concept/character MA (間), commonly translated as “gap, interval, or the in between,” partakes in many forms of Japanese arts and daily-life practices. In this article, we report the results of a qualitative research on the meaning or experience of MA and its relation with the feeling of togetherness in the context of contemporary dance improvisation. We interviewed performers and spectators (all professional dancers) while they watched the videotaped and reduced stick-figure versions of short dance improvisations created in a laboratory installed with motion-capture sensors. Based on the individual narratives, and inspired by Japanese and occidental aesthetic writings, we elaborate a specific understanding of MA as attending to the event's preacceleration, and how this experience causally relates to the feeling of togetherness (一体感, ittaikan). We propose that MA, understood not extensionally (as an empty space or a silent gap), but intentionally/internally as a certain quality of attention or perceptual mode, is fertile ground for serendipity. MA as an interpersonal ethical construct suggests a transsubjective difference as a foundation for a collective coming together. 相似文献
Despite their impressive cognitive abilities, avian species have shown less evidence for metacognition than mammals. We suspect that commonly used tasks such as matching to sample might be too demanding to allow metacognitive processing within birds’ working memory. Here, we examined whether pigeons could control their behavior as a function of knowledge levels on a three-item sequence learning task, a reference memory task supposedly requiring fewer working memory resources. The experiment used two types of lists differing in familiarity. One was familiar to the pigeons through repeated exposure, whereas the other was novel in every new session. In test sessions, pigeons could choose between a trial with a hint specifying the next item to peck and one with no hint. However, successful responses in trials with a hint resulted in lowered rates of primary reinforcement: .60 in the first test and .75 in the second. Results showed that two of four pigeons chose the trial with a hint significantly more often before receiving a novel list than the familiar list in the four sessions of the first test, and three did so in the second test. Impressively, one bird showed robust evidence in the very first sessions in both tests. These results suggest that pigeons may monitor their long-term knowledge states and thereby control their environment before starting to solve a task. 相似文献
Mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 1990) proposes that deliberative mindsets are marked by more open-minded processing of information, whereas implemental mindsets are characterized by more closed-minded processing. Accordingly, deliberative and implemental mindsets should differ in selective processing of incidental information when performing a central task. In three experiments, participants in deliberative and implemental mindsets performed a computer task while randomly presented incidental, unavoidable words. A subsequent recognition memory test assessed selective processing of these incidental words. Results revealed that deliberative mindsets led to superior recognition memory, suggesting increased open-mindedness to processing incidental information. Implications for mindset and goal theories are discussed. 相似文献
In a previous study, Adachi, Kuwahata, Fujita, Tomonaga & Matsuzawa demonstrated that infant Japanese macaques (Macaca fuscata) form cross‐modal representations of conspecifics but not of humans. However, because the subjects in the experiment were raised in a large social group and had considerably less exposure to humans than to conspecifics, it was an open question whether their lack of cross‐modal representation of humans simply reflected their lower levels of exposure to humans or was caused by some innate restrictions on the ability. To answer the question, we used the same procedure but tested infant Japanese macaques with more extensive experience of humans in daily life. Briefly, we presented monkeys with a photograph of either a monkey or a human face on an LCD monitor after playing a vocalization of one of these two species. The subjects looked at the monitor longer when a voice and a face were mismatched than when they were matched, irrespective of whether the preceding vocalization was a monkey's or a human's. This suggests that once monkeys have extensive experience with humans, they will form a cross‐modal representation of humans as well as of conspecifics.相似文献