Commentary: A Patient's Perspective on Predictive Testing for Alzheimer Disease

Commentary

Commentary: A Patient's Perspective on Predictive Testing for Alzheimer Disease     

The name game: using retrieval practice to improve the learning of names

In medium-sized groups such as classes, it is often desirable that the members become acquainted with one another. Toward this end, various methods of introducing group members are often used, with only anecdotal evidence for their effectiveness. The name game is a method for introducing group members that is based on the principles of retrieval practice. The authors compared 2 versions of the name game with a widely used introductory method--pairwise introductions--and found that the name game participants were much better at remembering one another's name after 30 min, 2 weeks, and 11 months. A second experiment tested the contribution of retrieval practice by comparing 2 versions of the name game with a procedure that was matched for number of repetitions and time spent on the task. Again, the name games were superior.     

Neubewertung kognitiver Leistungen im Lichte der F?higkeiten einzelliger Lebewesen

A closer look at unicellular organisms and their behavior as autonomous and social beings sheds new light on the nature of cognition. This allows, at the same time, a search for minimal conditions that help to identify the yet unknown appearance of cognition during evolution. Positive results might also serve as principles for the construction of intelligent artefacts as striven for in artificial intelligence and cognitive robotics research. Analyzing the abilities of prokaryotes and unicellular eukaryotes and comparing them to the abilities of "higher" organisms, we conclude that common definitions of cognition are not specific enough. The attempt to define cognition by focusing on the coupling between stimulus and response and asserting that (to have cognition) it has to be indirect and modifiable fails, simply because in all organisms every reaction to a stimulus is indirect and modifiable. A definition of cognition based on such a distinction cannot hold unless one is willing to ascribe cognitive capacities also to Escherichia coli bacteria, for instance. Viewing cognition as the sum of abilities necessary for coping with a complex physical and social environment is also highly questionable, i.e. unspecific. We show that functions comparable to the cognitive functions "perception" and "memory" in higher organisms can well be identified in unicellular beings. The "architecture" of the bacterial (prokaryotic) sensorimotor apparatus is also in some structures, but particularly at the functional level, comparable with that of higher organisms and should be, as a consequence, indicative of cognition. Furthermore, we discuss other, somewhat more delimitable, phenomena like detection of identity, counting, adaptation, habituation and learning in ethological categories and compare them to findings from the microorganismic world. In this context, we argue that so-called "true learning" and the appearance of nervous systems are not break-points in the evolution of cognition. The presence of nervous systems means only a huge amplification of the recognition power of individual organisms. The molecular net that realizes the regulation and transduction of signals in unicellular beings is comparable to the processes within a neural net, and a population of unicellular organisms can be viewed as an individual, multicellular net with amplified recognition power. Finally, we show that sophisticated forms of cooperation and competition developed also in populations of unicellular organisms. This seems not to be true for the phenomena imagination (rehearsal) and introspection, also to be seen as stemming from social problem-solving needs. As for these aspects, further research is needed, however, to put them on firm scientific grounds. Zusammenfassung. Eine genaue Betrachtung einzelliger Lebewesen und ihres Verhaltens als autonome und soziale Wesen wirft neues Licht auf die Natur von Kognition. Das erlaubt gleichzeitig eine Suche nach minimalen Bedingungen, die bei der Bestimmung des Erscheinens von Kognition in der Evolution helfen. Positive Ergebnisse könnten auch als Prinzipien für die Konstruktion intelligenter Artefakte dienen, wie sie in der Künstlichen Intelligenz und der kognitiven Robotikforschung angestrebt werden. Ein Vergleich der Fähigkeiten von Einzellern mit denen von "höheren" Organismen führt uns zu dem Schluß, daß gängige Definitionen von Kognition nicht spezifisch genug sind. Der Versuch, Kognition über die Indirektheit und Modifizierbarkeit der Kopplung zwischen Reiz und Reaktion zu definieren, scheitert, weil in allen Organismen Reiz-Reaktionsverbindungen indirekt und modifizierbar sind. Eine solche Definition ist nicht haltbar, es sei denn, man ist bereit, z.B. auch Escherichia coli-Bakterien kognitive Eigenschaften zuzubilligen. Die Definition von Kognition als Summe der Eigenschaften, die notwendig sind, um in einer komplexen physikalischen und sozialen Umgebung zu bestehen, ist ebenfalls hinterfragbar und unspezifisch. Wir zeigen, daß Leistungen, die mit den Kognitionsleistungen "Wahrnehmung" und "Gedächtnis" in höheren Organismen vergleichbar sind, in Einzellern nachweisbar sind. Die sensomotorische Komplexität von Einzellern ist auch in vieler Hinsicht strukturell, vor allem aber funktionell vergleichbar mit derjenigen höherer Organismen und kann deshalb als ein Hinweis auf Kognition gewertet werden. Darüber hinaus diskutieren wir andere, abgrenzbare Phänomene, wie Erfassung von Identität, Zählen, Adaptation, Habituation und Lernen, aus der Sicht der Verhaltensforschung und vergleichen sie mit Befunden aus der Welt der Mikroorganismen. In diesem Zusammenhang bestreiten wir, daß sogenanntes "echtes Lernen" und das Erscheinen von Nervensystemen Bruchstellen in der Evolution von Kognition sind. Die Anwesenheit von Nervensystemen bedeutet nur den Übergang von Systemen mit einem relativ begrenzten (Erkennungs-) Potential zu solchen mit einem riesigen Potential. Das molekulare Netz, das die Regulation und Transduktion von Signalen in Einzellern realisiert, ist vergleichbar mit den Prozessen innerhalb eines Nervennetzes. Eine Population von einzelligen Organismen kann als individuelles, multizelluläres Netz mit erhöhtem Erkennungspotential angesehen werden. Schließlich zeigen wir, daß raffinierte Formen von Kooperations- und Konkurrenzverhalten auch in Einzellerpopulationen vorhanden sind. Eine ähnliche Aussage scheint nicht für Phänomene wie Imagination (Probehandeln) und Introspektion möglich zu sein, die auch im Zusammenhang mit der Bewältigung sozialer Probleme zu sehen sind. Eine genaue naturwissenschaftliche Erfassung solcher Aspekte, die erst einen Vergleich zwischen Mehrzellern und Einzellern erlauben würde, ist allerdings noch zu leisten.     

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Instructions for Authors

Instructions to Contributors     

Modelling therapy for test anxiety: The role of model affect and consequences

This study assessed the effectiveness of modelling therapy as a treatment for test anxiety and investigated the role of model affect and consequences in determining that effectiveness. Twenty-four test anxious subjects were shown one of four one-hour modelling displays of intelligence testing sessions. The displays represented combinations of calm or anxious model affect and positive or negative consequences. Two self report and two performance measures of test anxiety were analyzed by means of a 2 × 2 vs. control group factorial design. The results indicated an overall significant improvement on modelled intelligence tests for the experimental groups vs. the control group. Differential effects were also found depending upon the characteristics of the modelling display. Viewing anxious models lead to a significant increase in introductory psychology grades and viewing negative consequences lead to a decrease in self-reported test anxiety. The present results question the notion that the most effective modelling scenes are ones displaying calm models and positive consequences (Bandura, 1969). Parallels were drawn between the results of the research and the recent success of implosively-oriented behaviour therapies.     

The role of reinforcement contingencies in chronic alcoholism: An experimental analysis of one case

investigators have questioned chronic alcoholics and round that some of them have returned to normal social drinking (Davies, 1962; Lemere, 1953; Nørvig and Nielsen, 1956; Selzer and Holloway. 1957; and Shea, 1954). These findings would seem inconsistent with such notions as loss of control or craving as the basis of compulsive drinking. Moreover, antecedents and consequences of these explanatory constructs, have not been elucidated. The purpose of this research was to make an intensive study of a single subject to see if specific conditions could be identified under which a chronic alcoholic's drinking could be controlled, in a setting in which environmental variables could be systematically varied and drinking behavior documented.     

A physiological model of phobic anxiety and desensitization

The relationship between arousal and phobic anxiety is discussed with regard to recent psychophysiological studies of habituation in normal subjects and in groups of anxious and phobic patients. A physiological model of the mechanisms underlying generalized and phobic anxiety is postulated. Some criticisms of Wolpe's conception of systematic desensitization are offered and an alternative explanation consistent with the above postulate is put forward. This alternative states that the underlying mechanism of systematic desensitization is identical with that of habituation proceeding under optimal conditions (the “maximal habituation” hypothesis). The two accounts of desensitization are compared and contrasted.