The meaning and legacy of the Reformation in a global perspective

When reviewing the non‐European perspectives of Lutheran theology presented in the contributions of this issue of Dialog, it is easy to recognize a dominant, unifying theme and a common task in a confrontation with the new Pentecostal churches. It then makes sense to refer to the two central themes and tasks of Lutheran theology mentioned in this volume: the development of a Lutheran pneumatology in contrast to the Pentecostal/charismatic movements; and an interpretation of the Lutheran doctrine of justification that concentrates on how the pure grace and love of God can be witnessed in good works. As a future focal point of Lutheran theology, the contributions from non‐European Lutheran Christianity presented here show that the connection between the theology of the cross as a central element of the grammar of Lutheran Christianity and the dialectics of law and gospel for the interpretation of the salutary efficacy and experienceable nature of the Spirit requires further reflection.     

Propositional Attitudes Without Propositions

The most common account of attitude reports is the relational analysis according towhich an attitude verb taking that-clause complements expresses a two-placerelation between agents and propositions and the that-clause acts as an expressionwhose function is to provide the propositional argument. I will argue that a closerexamination of a broader range of linguistic facts raises serious problems for thisanalysis and instead favours a Russellian `multiple relations analysis' (which hasgenerally been discarded because of its apparent obvious linguistic implausibility).The resulting account can be given independent philosophical motivations within anintentionalist view of truth and predication.     

Nominalizing Quantifiers

Quantified expressions in natural language generally are taken to act like quantifiers in logic, which either range over entities that need to satisfy or not satisfy the predicate in order for the sentence to be true or otherwise are substitutional quantifiers. I will argue that there is a philosophically rather important class of quantified expressions in English that act quite differently, a class that includes something, nothing, and several things. In addition to expressing quantification, such expressions act like nominalizations, introducing a new domain of objects that would not have been present in the semantic structure of the sentence otherwise. The entities those expressions introduce are of just the same sort as those that certain ordinary nominalizations refer to (such as John's wisdom or John's belief that S), namely they are tropes or entities related to tropes. Analysing certain quantifiers as nominalizing quantifiers will shed a new light on philosophical issues such as the status of properties and the nature of propositional attitudes.     

Strenge objekt/subjekt-scheidung als vorausfetzung wiffenfchaftlicher biologie

Ohne Zusammenfassung