Integrated learning communities as a peer support initiative for first year university students

Peer Mentoring schemes tend to be developed as retention strategies, however, they can also serve other purposes (psychosocial or career-related). However, evidence of the effectiveness of these presents mixed results and less is known about the horizontal peer support schemes which may help students capitalize on existing peer relationships. We developed an integrated learning communities (ILC) peer support scheme, building on the theoretical principles of social identity theory, which we embedded within our existing teaching framework and designed functional activities. Collective activities were undertaken to promote the processes of social identity with the intention that these may foster social and academic integration experiences. This intervention was undertaken with an entire cohort of first year undergraduate psychology students. We conducted semi-structured interviews with a self-selected sample of these students (N = 17). Thematic analysis revealed two main themes, each with two sub-themes. These were: “Divergent Experiences” with the sub-themes of “dependent on people” and “types of support”, and “Good idea in principle” with the sub-themes of “Theory ≠ Practice” and “Dependent on student engagement”. Although identifying with a peer group was not transparent in the interviews, the existence of a peer support scheme was perceived positively by students which might explain the success of the newly developed student-led Psychology Society. Indeed, this Psychology Society can provide a lasting framework for further amplification of the student voice. We conclude that our embedded ILC was both feasible and potentially valuable, but it is crucial for the peer support approach to have transactional significance.     

Effects of Hand Massage and Therapeutic Touch on Comfort and Anxiety Living in a Nursing Home in Turkey: A Randomized Controlled Trial

Journal of Religion and Health - This study was carried out to investigate the effects of hand massage and therapeutic touch on comfort and anxiety in the elderly living in nursing homes. The study...     

Seeing the World in Pink and Blue: Developing and Exploring a New Measure of Essentialistic Thinking about Gender

Sex Roles - Essentialism, or the belief that certain categories have fundamental, intrinsic, and stable essences, pervasively influences social judgments. Among the many groupings that describe...     

How do we judge our confidence? Differential effects of meta-memory feedback on eyewitness accuracy and confidence

According to the cue–belief model, we assess confidence in our memories using self-credibility cues that reflect beliefs about our memory faculties. We tested the influence of meta-memory feedback on self-credibility cues in the context of eyewitness testimony, when feedback was provided prior to “testifying” via a memory questionnaire (Experiment 1) and after an initial memory questionnaire but before participants had to retake it (Experiment 2). Participants received feedback (good score, bad score, or none) on a fictitious scale purported to predict eyewitness memory ability. Those given good score feedback before testifying were more confident (but no more accurate) than those given bad score feedback. Feedback also affected confidence (good increased and bad decreased) and accuracy (good increased) after testifying but only on leading questions. These differential effects of meta-memory feedback on confidence for normal and leading questions are not explained by the cue–belief model. Implications for our confidence judgments are discussed.     

Solutions to the problems of incremental validity testing in relationship science

Incremental validity testing (i.e., testing whether a focal predictor is associated with an outcome above and beyond a covariate) is common (e.g., 57% of Personal Relationships articles in 2017), yet it is fraught with conceptual and statistical problems. First, researchers often use it to overemphasize the novelty or counterintuitiveness of findings, which hinders cumulative understanding. Second, incremental validity testing requires that the focal predictor and the covariate represent separate constructs; researchers risk committing the “jangle fallacy” without such evidence. Third, the most common approach to incremental validity testing (i.e., standard multiple regression, 88% of articles) inflates Type I error and can produce invalid conclusions. This article also discusses the relevance of these issues to dyadic/longitudinal designs and offers concrete solutions.     

Asian American-white American differences in expressions of social anxiety: a replication and extension

This study examined whether Asian American-White American differences on a trait measure of social anxiety extend to nonverbal behavior and to reports of anxiety-related emotions during a 3-min social performance task. Forty Asian Americans and 40 White Americans completed a trait measure of social anxiety and rated their emotions before, and immediately after, a social performance task. Their videotaped behavior was coded using microlevel behavioral codes (e.g., gaze avoidance, fidgeting). Results indicated that Asian Americans reported more anxiety than White Americans on the trait measure and on the emotion rating scales but that they did not differ substantially on microlevel behavioral indexes of social anxiety. Implications of ethnic variations in the patterns of anxious responding are discussed.     

Facing faces: studies on the cognitive aspects of physiognomy

Physiognomy, the art of reading personality traits from faces, dates back to ancient Greece, and is still very popular. The present studies examine several aspects and consequences of the process of reading traits from faces. Using faces with neutral expressions, it is demonstrated that personality information conveyed in faces changes the interpretation of verbal information. Moreover, it is shown that physiognomic information has a consistent effect on decisions, and creates overconfidence in judgments. It is argued, however, that the process of "reading from faces" is just one side of the coin, the other side of which is "reading into faces." Consistent with the latter, information about personality changes the perception of facial features and, accordingly, the perceived similarity between faces. The implications of both processes and questions regarding their automaticity are discussed.