The relative contributions of subjective and objective measures of body shape and size to body image and disordered eating in women

This research explored the relative contributions of subjective perceptions of body weight and body shape/proportion, as well as objective measures of body mass index (BMI) and waist-to-hip ratio (WHR) to disordered eating, exercise involvement, and body image. One hundred and fifty-eight female university students completed questionnaires and provided body measurements for this study. Although an interaction between BMI and WHR was found for some measures (i.e., Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire total and subscale scores), results indicated that BMI was consistently the better objective predictor of disordered eating and body image. Subjective perceptions of body weight and, to a lesser extent, body shape, were found to account for the greatest proportion of variance in the dependent measures (disordered eating, body esteem, and body dissatisfaction). Overall, these results offer more support for sociocultural theories emphasizing the importance of thinness for women, than evolutionary theories emphasizing the role of WHR.     

Entailment and Bivalence

My purpose in this paper is to argue that the classical notion of entailment is not suitable for non-bivalent logics, to propose an appropriate alternative and to suggest a generalized entailment notion suitable to bivalent and non-bivalent logics alike. In classical two valued logic, one can not infer a false statement from one that is not false, any more than one can infer from a true statement a statement that is not true. In classical logic in fact preserving truth and preserving non-falsity are one and the same thing. They are not the same in non-bivalent logics however and I will argue that the classical notion of entailment that preserves only truth is not strong enough for such a logic. I will show that if we retain the classical notion of entailment in a logic that has three values, true, false and a third value in between, an inconsistency can be derived that can be resolved only by measures that seriously disable the logic. I will show this for a logic designed to allow for semantic presuppositions, then I will show that we get the same result in any three valued logic with the same value ordering. I will finally suggest how the notion of entailment should be generalized so that this problem may be avoided. The strengthened notion of entailment I am proposing is a conservative extension of the classical notion that preserves not only truth but the order of all values in a logic, so that the value of an entailed statement must alway be at least as great as the value of the sequence of statements entailing it. A notion of entailment this strong or stronger will, I believe, be found to be applicable to non-classical logics generally. In the opinion of Dana Scott, no really workable three valued logic has yet been developed. It is hard to disagree with this. A workable three valued logic however could perhaps be developed however, if we had a notion of entailment suitable to non-bivalent logics.     

The distortion of criteria after decision-making

The results of two experiments indicate that decision-makers separately distort their interpretations of decision criteria and evaluations of information in a manner that justifies their decisions. In Study 1, participants reported a yes/no decision either before or after they rated the applicable decision criterion and problem information. Participants distorted their criterion and information ratings more when they reported their decisions before, rather than after, they rated the decision criterion and problem information. Study 2 demonstrated that distortion of decision criterion ratings occurred after a decision had been made whereas distortion of information evaluations occurred during the process of reaching a decision. These results are consistent with a two-stage model of decision-making in which the distortion of decision criteria is distinct from the distortion of decision information.     

Comparison of the MMPI and MMPI-2 Among Job Applicants

The primary objective was to compare the MMPI-2 profiles for professional job applicants with corresponding profiles on the original MMPI. Male and female MMPI-2 profiles were also compared, and correlational and factor analyses were used to examine: A) Interscale correlations vis-à-vis item overlap, and B) The impact of K-corrections. The subjects were 82 auditor applicants, plus 212 sales and management applicants from an earlier study. The original MMPI was found to overpathologize applicant profiles. Male and female MMPI-2 profiles differed only on Mf. Scales L, K, and Hy formed a favorable cluster for job applicants, while F, Hs, Pt, Sc formed one unfavorable cluster—and D, Si a second. K-corrections consistently moved clinical scales in the direction of the favorable cluster.     

Bent passions: Heterosexual masculinity, pornography, and gay male identity

Gay male pornography, as an expression of gay male sexuality, identity and desire requires a set of assumptions and questions different than those used in interrogating heterosexual pornography. Drawing upon Linda Williams’ argument that heterosexual pornography creates utopias of sexual abundance, this paper examines the manner in which gay male pornography likewise creates sexual utopias that both express gay male desire but which also, at the same time, attempt to confront and resolve the conflict between such desire and the overarching dominant heterosexual sex system.     

Sacred texts

It seems indisputable that the way we define and classify texts influences the way we read texts. My concern is to develop methods for reading and understanding texts that are influenced by distinctions between the secular and the sacred, and then draw out some preliminary implications of these methods and distinctions for relationships between church and state in liberal democracies. Distinctions between sacred and secular texts can be tracked with the conjecture that a full textual reading of a sacred text requires a kind of interior commitment. I develop the conjecture, and then argue that this requirement increases the distance between scepticism and religious belief. The upshot of such distinctions and implications is that we cannot read sacred texts as sacred while maintaining the secular consciousness that defines liberal democracies. Acknowledging these textual differences between religion and politics lays to rest, permanently, the popular creed of exceptionalism, the belief that secular patterns of thought, grounded in compromise and toleration, can scan and comprehend religious beliefs from some impartial perspective.