In defense of representation

The computational paradigm, which has dominated psychology and artificial intelligence since the cognitive revolution, has been a source of intense debate. Recently, several cognitive scientists have argued against this paradigm, not by objecting to computation, but rather by objecting to the notion of representation. Our analysis of these objections reveals that it is not the notion of representation per se that is causing the problem, but rather specific properties of representations as they are used in various psychological theories. Our analysis suggests that all theorists accept the idea that cognitive processing involves internal information-carrying states that mediate cognitive processing. These mediating states are a superordinate category of representations. We discuss five properties that can be added to mediating states and examine their importance in various cognitive models. Finally, three methodological lessons are drawn from our analysis and discussion.     

An implementation and empirical evaluation of an exploration environment with different tutoring strategies

An exploration environment and tutoring strategies were developed for the first few hours of learning the programming language LISP. In this environment, the amount of exploratory and receptive learning can be systematically manipulated. In an experimental study with three different learning conditions, learning in a basic exploration environment (without an automated tutor) was compared to learning with an automated tutor that provided help rather selectively, and with an automated tutor that provided help whenever possible. The results showed that the selective tutor condition was most effective: The students in this condition took the least time in acquiring knowledge and solving the criterion test tasks, while solving equal numbers of the tasks correctly.     

Rising High or Falling Deep? Pathways of Self‐Esteem in a Representative German Sample

In many longitudinal studies, self‐esteem has been shown to increase up until around age 50 or 60 and to decrease thereafter. These studies have also found substantial inter‐individual differences in the intra‐individual development of self‐esteem. In the current study, we examined whether this variation in change could be attributed to underlying latent classes of individuals following different trajectories of self‐esteem development over time. By applying general growth mixture modelling to data from the representative German pairfam study (N = 12 377), four latent classes of self‐esteem development across five years were extracted. Based on their mean levels, trajectories, and variability, individuals in the latent classes could be described as having (a) constant and stable high self‐esteem (29.00% of the sample), (b) constant but variable moderate self‐esteem (31.69%), (c) increasing and stabilizing self‐esteem (15.13%), and (d) decreasing and variable self‐esteem (24.18%). Furthermore, these latent classes differed in accordance with findings of prior research on self‐rated, partner‐rated, and objective correlates of the domains of health and well‐being, partner relationships, and occupational status. Thus, the current study shows that inter‐individual variation in intra‐individual change in self‐esteem is not random but reflects specific individual trajectories, or pathways, of self‐esteem. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Hegel's Essentialism. Natural Kinds and the Metaphysics of Explanation in Hegel's Theory of ‘the Concept’

Several recent interpretations see Hegel's theory of the Concept as a form of conceptual realism, according to which finite reality is articulated by objectively existing concepts. More precisely, this theory has been interpreted as a version of natural kind essentialism, and it has been proposed that its function is to account for the possibility of genuine explanations. This suggests a promising way to reconstruct the argument that Hegel's theory of objective concepts is based on—an argument that shows that the possibility of explanation rests on metaphysical preconditions and that natural kind essentialism gives the only adequate account of those preconditions. But in order for such a reconstruction to be successful, one needs to spell out the metaphysical features in virtue of which Hegelian natural kinds can account for the possibility of explanation. The article takes up this challenge. It offers the first detailed analysis of the modal fine‐structure of Hegel's natural kind essentialism and shows how Hegel's position, thus understood, provides the details needed to complete the explanation‐based argument.     

T × W Completeness

T × W logic is a combination of tense and modal logic for worlds or histories with the same time order. It is the basis for logics of causation, agency and conditionals, and therefore an important tool for philosophical logic. Semantically it has been defined, among others, by R. H. Thomason. Using an operator expressing truth in all worlds, first discussed by C. M. Di Maio and A. Zanardo, an axiomatization is given and its completeness proved via D. Gabbays irreflexivity lemma. Given this lemma the proof is more or less straight forward. At the end an alternative axiomatization is sketched in which Di Maios and Zanardos operator is replaced by a version of actually.     

Spatially-limited attention to vibrotactile stimulation

Weak vibrotactile signals were presented to human Os, in some instances to the index finger alone, in other instances to the middle finger alone, and in still other instances to the two fingers simultaneously. When the 0 knew in advance of a trial which finger(s) would be presented a signal, no spatial summation resulted, that is, the sensitivity of two fingers to two signals was no greater than the sensitivity of one finger to one signal. When the 0 was left uncertain about which finger(s) would be presented a signal on any given trial, a result having the appearance of spatial summation was obtained. Theappearance is misleading;the difference between two-finger and one-finger sensitivity in this case reflects, instead, a decrement in the performance of the single fingers. Both results are consistent with a single-channel model of attention.     

A new apparatus for the study of avoidance conditioning in fishes

An apparatus for the study of avoidance conditioning in fishes is described. The chamber is cylindrical in shape, with shocking electrodes placed above and below the animals, and response is defined as swimming a predetermined distance in either direction along a circumferential path. This apparatus has several advantages over the conventional shuttlebox: (1)There is little constraint on the direction of swimming; (2) the magnitude of response (swimming distance) required for avoidance can easily be varied over a wide range; and (3) variation in the effectiveness of shock with the position of the animal relative to the position of the electrodes is minimized. Some sample data obtained in a free-operant experiment with goldfish are presented.     

Informational and motivational components of social reinforcement

Thirty-six four-year-old children of each sex were tested in a two-choice marble dropping task. There were three Ss in each cell of a 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 factorial design. The factors investigated were: reinforcement condition (Contingent, Yoked, Nonreinforcement), sex, base preference level (strong vs weak), Base Rate Level (high vs low). The dependent variables were: base preference ratio, base rate, preference ratio change, rate change. The contingently reinforced Ss had significantly higher preference change scores than Ss in the other two reinforcement conditions but only at the high base preference level. The Ss in both the contingent and yoked groups had higher rate change scores than Ss in the nonreinforcement group. The results were interpreted as indicating social reinforcement may have two effects, one a cue function and the other an effect on S's motivational system. The results indicate that regression effects do not operate in the two-choice task and that crossing baseline levels of performance is an effective way to control baseline differences in analyses of change in the two-choice task.     

Linguistic meaning related differences in evoked potential topography: English, Swiss-German, and imagined

Functionally different neural populations for processing different categories of word meaníng are suggested by the topography of event-related EEG scale-field distributions. Noun and verb meanings of English and Swiss-German homophones produced differences in anterior-posterior topography during the first 300 to 350 msec of the response. Similar results were found for a degraded-speech stimulus when subjects imagined noun and verb meanings. Anterior—posterior scalp-field differences appeared both in an analysis of the positions of field maximal and minimal values; and in principal component analysis of ERPs.