"On models and vases: Body dissatisfaction and proneness to social comparison effects": Retraction of Trampe, Stapel, and Siero (2007)

Reports the retraction of "On models and vases: Body dissatisfaction and proneness to social comparison effects" by Debra Trampe, Diederik A. Stapel and Frans W. Siero (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2007[Jan], Vol 92[1], 106-118). This retraction follows the results of an investigation into the work of Diederik A. Stapel (further information on the investigation can be found here: https://www.commissielevelt.nl/). The Noort Committee has determined data supplied by Diederik A. Stapel to be fraudulent. His co-authors were unaware of his actions and were not involved in the collection of the fraudulent data. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2006-23056-009.) When and why do media-portrayed physically attractive women affect perceivers' self-evaluations? In 6 studies, the authors showed that whether such images affect self-evaluations depends jointly on target features and perceiver features. In Study 1, exposure to a physically attractive target, compared with exposure to an equally attractive model, lowered women's self-evaluations. Study 2 showed that body-dissatisfied women, to a greater extent than body-satisfied women, report that they compare their bodies with other women's bodies. In Study 3, body-dissatisfied women, but not body-satisfied women, were affected by both attractive models and nonmodels. Furthermore, in Study 4, it was body-dissatisfied women, rather than body-satisfied women, who evaluated themselves negatively after exposure to a thin (versus a fat) vase. The authors replicated this result in Study 5 by manipulating, instead of measuring, body dissatisfaction. Finally, Study 6 results suggested that body dissatisfaction increases proneness to social comparison effects because body dissatisfaction increases self-activation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Screening for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: an evaluation of two self-report scales among crime victims

The validity of the Impact of Events Scale (IES) and the Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Symptom Scale, Self-Report version (PSS-SR) was examined among crime victims. Both instruments performed well as screeners for PTSD. For the IES, sensitivity ranged between .93 and 1.00; for the PSS-SR, sensitivity ranged between .80 and .90. Specificity for the IES ranged between .78 and .84 and for the PSS-SR ranged between .84 and .88. Some individual items from the 2 scales performed just as well as the total scales. The authors conclude that either of these short self-report instruments or their individual items are suitable as screeners for PTSD, specifically in settings where mental health professionals are unavailable. Cross-validation of these results is necessary because of the small sample size in this study.     

An inversion effect modified by expertise in capuchin monkeys

The face inversion effect may be defined as the general impairment in recognition that occurs when faces are rotated 180°. This phenomenon seems particularly strong for faces as opposed to other objects and is often used as a marker of a specialized face-processing mechanism. Four brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were tested on their ability to discriminate several classes of facial and non-facial stimuli presented in both their upright and inverted orientations in an oddity task. Results revealed significantly better performance on upright than inverted presentations of capuchin and human face stimuli, but not on chimpanzee faces or automobiles. These data support previous studies in humans and other primates suggesting that the inversion effect occurs for stimuli for which subjects have developed an expertise.     

Activations of "motor" and other non-language structures during sentence comprehension

In this paper we report the results of an experiment in which subjects read syntactically unambiguous and ambiguous sentences which were disambiguated after several words to the less likely possibility. Understanding such sentences involves building an initial structure, inhibiting the non-preferred structure, detecting that later input is incompatible with the initial structure, and reactivating the alternative structure. The ambiguous sentences activated four areas more than the unambiguous sentences. These areas are the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), the right basal ganglia (BG), the right posterior dorsal cerebellum (CB) and the left median superior frontal gyrus (SFG). The left IFG is normally activated when syntactic processing complexity is increased and probably supports that function in the current study as well. We discuss four hypotheses concerning how these areas may support comprehension of syntactically ambiguous sentences. (1) The left IFG, right CB and BG could support articulatory rehearsal used to support the processing of ambiguous sentences. This seems unlikely since the activation pattern associated with articulatory rehearsal in other studies is not similar to that seen here. (2) The CB acts as an error detector in motor processing. Error detection is important for recognizing that the wrong sentence structure has been chosen initially. (3) The BG acts to select and sequence movements in the motor domain and in cognitive domains may serve to inhibit competing and completed plans which is not unlike inhibiting the initially non-preferred structure or "unchoosing" the initial choice when incompatible syntactic input is received. (4) The left median SFG is relevant for the evaluation of plausibility. Evaluating the plausibility of the two possibilities provides an important basis for choosing between them. The notion of the use of domain general cognitive processes to support a linguistic process is in line with recent suggestions that the a given area may subserve a specific cognitive task because it carries out an appropriate sort of computation rather than because it supports a specific cognitive domain.     

The Hubris Hypothesis: You Can Self-Enhance, But You'd Better Not Show It

We tested whether and why observers dislike individuals who convey self-superiority through blatant social comparison (the hubris hypothesis). Participants read self-superiority claims ("I am better than others"; Experiments 1-7), noncomparative positive claims ("I am good"; Experiments 1-2, 4), self-equality claims ("I am as good as others"; Experiments 3-4, 6), temporally comparative self-superiority claims ("I am better than I used to be"; Experiment 5), other-superiority claims ("S/he is better than others"; Experiment 6), and self-superiority claims accompanied by persistent disclaimers (Experiment 7). They judged the claim and the claimant (Experiments 1-7) and made inferences about the claimant's self-view and view of others (Experiments 4-7) as well as the claimant's probable view of them (Experiment 7). Self-superiority claims elicited unfavorable evaluations relative to all other claims. Evaluation unfavorability was accounted for by the perception that the claimant implied a negative view of others (Experiments 4-6) and particularly of the observer (Experiment 7). Supporting the hubris hypothesis, participants disliked individuals who communicated self-superiority beliefs in an explicitly comparative manner. Self-superiority beliefs may provoke undesirable interpersonal consequences when they are explicitly communicated to others but not when they are disguised as noncomparative positive self-claims or self-improvement claims.     

Type D personality and social relations in adults with diabetes: results from diabetes MILES – The Netherlands

Abstract

Objective: To examine whether individual differences in Type D personality (combination of negative affectivity (NA) and social inhibition (SI)) could explain heterogeneity in perceived social support and relationship adjustment (intimate partner relationship) among people living with diabetes.

Design: In the Diabetes MILES—The Netherlands survey, 621 adults with type 1 or type 2 diabetes (54% female, age: 56?±?14 years) completed measures of Type D personality (DS14), perceived social support and relationship adjustment. We used established DS14 cut-off scores to indicate Type D personality, high NA only, high SI only and reference groups.

Results: Participants from the Type D and NA only groups perceived lower levels of social support (Welch[3,259]?=?37.27, p?<?0.001), and relationship adjustment (Welch[3,191]?=?14.74; p?<?0.01) than those from the SI only and reference groups. Type D was associated with lower social support (lowest quartile; adjusted OR?=?8.73; 95%CI?=?5.05?～?15.09; p?<?0.001) and lower relationship adjustment (lowest quartile; adjusted OR?=?3.70; 95%CI?=?2.10?～?6.53; p?<?0.001). Type D was also associated with increased levels of loneliness.

Conclusion: Participants with Type D and participants with high NA only tend to experience less social support and less relationship adjustment. Type D personality was also associated with more loneliness. Experiencing lower social support and relationship adjustment may complicate coping and self-management in people with diabetes.     

Ethics culture and ethics climate in relation to employee engagement in a developing country setting

The study investigated the relationship between employees’ perceived workplace ethics culture and climate variables and their level of engagement. A non-probability sample (N?=?839; females?=?32%) was permanently employed in a railway organisation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The research constructs were measured using the Corporate Ethical Virtues (CEV) Scale, Ethical Climate Questionnaire (ECQ), and Utrecht Work Engagement Scale (UWES). A canonical analysis indicated that the participants’ perceived workplace ethics culture and workplace ethics climate were significantly and positively related to their level of engagement. Structural equation modelling indicated a moderate fit between the workplace ethics culture, workplace ethics climate and employee engagement canonical variate constructs. The findings provide evidence that individual's perception of work ethics culture and work ethics climate explain their level of work engagement.     

On the power of the test for cluster bias

Cluster bias refers to measurement bias with respect to the clustering variable in multilevel data. The absence of cluster bias implies absence of bias with respect to any cluster‐level (level 2) variable. The variables that possibly cause the bias do not have to be measured to test for cluster bias. Therefore, the test for cluster bias serves as a global test of measurement bias with respect to any level 2 variable. However, the validity of the global test depends on the Type I and Type II error rates of the test. We compare the performance of the test for cluster bias with the restricted factor analysis (RFA) test, which can be used if the variable that leads to measurement bias is measured. It appeared that the RFA test has considerably more power than the test for cluster bias. However, the false positive rates of the test for cluster bias were generally around the expected values, while the RFA test showed unacceptably high false positive rates in some conditions. We conclude that if no significant cluster bias is found, still significant bias with respect to a level 2 violator can be detected with an RFA model. Although the test for cluster bias is less powerful, an advantage of the test is that the cause of the bias does not need to be measured, or even known.