Resurrecting Logical Probability

The logical interpretation of probability, or ``objective Bayesianism'– the theory that (some) probabilitiesare strictly logical degrees of partial implication – is defended.The main argument against it is that it requires the assignment ofprior probabilities, and that any attempt to determine them by symmetryvia a ``principle of insufficient reason' inevitably leads to paradox.Three replies are advanced: that priors are imprecise or of little weight, sothat disagreement about them does not matter, within limits; thatit is possible to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable priorson logical grounds; and that in real cases disagreement about priorscan usually be explained by differences in the background information.It is argued also that proponents of alternative conceptions ofprobability, such as frequentists, Bayesians and Popperians, areunable to avoid committing themselves to the basic principles oflogical probability.     

A software agent model of consciousness.

Baars (1988, 1997) has proposed a psychological theory of consciousness, called global workspace theory. The present study describes a software agent implementation of that theory, called "Conscious" Mattie (CMattie). CMattie operates in a clerical domain from within a UNIX operating system, sending messages and interpreting messages in natural language that organize seminars at a university. CMattie fleshes out global workspace theory with a detailed computational model that integrates contemporary architectures in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Baars (1997) lists the psychological "facts that any complete theory of consciousness must explain" in his appendix to In the Theater of Consciousness; global workspace theory was designed to explain these "facts." The present article discusses how the design of CMattie accounts for these facts and thereby the extent to which it implements global workspace theory.     

It's a Museum,But Not as We Know It: Issues for Local Residents Accessing the Museum of Old and New Art

The Museum of Old and New Art (MONA), in Australia's island state of Tasmania, bears all the hallmarks of the new museology and a flagship museum. Located in a largely working class area, there are expectations of visitors from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, particularly local residents. However most visitors are tourists, middle-class, and highly educated. In this article, the authors ask, “What are the issues affecting accessibility to MONA for local residents?” In asking this, they aim to better understand local engagement with MONA and shed light on potential socio-cultural transformation. Using a survey, interviews, and focus groups with local residents, the authors found that accessibility at MONA is defined along familiar socioeconomic lines, though there are indications of change that warrant further investigation. The expense of food and beverage, concern about children's behavior, and the explicit nature of some art all impact on accessibility, particularly for those with less cultural capital.     

Bratman on identity over time and identification at a time

According to reductionists about agency, an agent’s bringing something about is reducible to states and events (such as desires and beliefs) involving the agent bringing something about. Many have worried that reductionism cannot accommodate robust forms of agency, such as self-determination. One common reductionist answer to this worry (which I call “identification reductionism”) contends that self-determining agents are identified with certain states and events, and so these states and events causing a decision counts as the agent’s self-determining the decision. In this paper, I discuss Michael Bratman’s well-known identification reductionist theory and his general strategy of grounding an agent’s identification at a time in the agent’s identity over time. I develop two constraints that an adequate identification reductionist theory must satisfy, argue that Bratman’s theory cannot satisfy both, and show that his general strategy for grounding an agent’s identification at a time in the agent’s identity over time is without merit.     

Explaining the discrepancy between intentions and actions: the case of hypothetical bias in contingent valuation

An experiment was designed to account for intention-behavior discrepancies by applying the theory of planned behavior to contingent valuation. College students (N = 160) voted in hypothetical and real payment referenda to contribute $8 to a scholarship fund. Overestimates of willingness to pay in the hypothetical referendum could not be attributed to moderately favorable latent dispositions. Instead, this hypothetical bias was explained by activation of more favorable beliefs and attitudes in the context of a hypothetical rather than a real referendum. A corrective entreaty was found to eliminate this bias by bringing beliefs, attitudes, and intentions in line with those in the real payment situation. As a result, the theory of planned behavior produced more accurate prediction of real payment when participants were exposed to the corrective entreaty.     

Sham surgery: An ethical analysis

Surgical clinical trials have seldom used a "sham" or placebo surgical procedure as a control, owing to ethical concerns. Recently, several ethical commentators have argued that sham surgery is either inherently or presumptively unethical. In this article I contend that these arguments are mistaken, and that there are no sound ethical reasons for an absolute prohibition of sham surgery in clinical trials. Reflecting on three cases of sham surgery, especially on the recently reported results of a sham-controlled trial of arthroscopic surgery for arthritis of the knee, I present an ethical analysis that focuses on the methodological rationale for use of sham surgery, risk-benefit assessment, and informed consent.     

Constraints on children's color term acquisition

Kowalski and Zimiles (2006) and O'Hanlon and Roberson (2006) address an age-old question: Why do children find it difficult to learn color terms? Here these articles are reflected on, providing a focused examination of the issues central to this question. First, the criteria by which children are said to find color naming difficult are considered. Although the age of color term acquisition is decreasing, and color naming might not be more difficult than other abstract attributes, several stages of difficulty are identified. Second, it is argued that there are potentially multiple constraints (e.g., conceptual, attentional, and linguistic) for these multiple stages of difficulty with color term acquisition. Third, it is argued that the validity and reliability of techniques for identifying constraints need to be considered and that converging evidence for the constraints should be provided. Finally, a series of new questions that need to be asked to provide a well-rounded explanation of the difficulties children face when learning color terms is outlined.     

Becoming syntactic

Psycholinguistic research has shown that the influence of abstract syntactic knowledge on performance is shaped by particular sentences that have been experienced. To explore this idea, the authors applied a connectionist model of sentence production to the development and use of abstract syntax. The model makes use of (a) error-based learning to acquire and adapt sequencing mechanisms and (b) meaning-form mappings to derive syntactic representations. The model is able to account for most of what is known about structural priming in adult speakers, as well as key findings in preferential looking and elicited production studies of language acquisition. The model suggests how abstract knowledge and concrete experience are balanced in the development and use of syntax.