The Problem of Enhanced Control

I defend (metaphysical) ground against recent, unanswered objections aiming to dismiss it from serious philosophical inquiry. Interest in ground stems from its role in the venerable metaphysical project of identifying which facts hold in virtue of others. Recent work on ground focuses on regimenting it. But many reject ground itself, seeing regimentation as yet another misguided attempt to regiment a bad idea (like phlogiston or astrology). I defend ground directly against objections that it is confused, incoherent, or fruitless. This vindicates the very attempt to regiment ground. It also refocuses our attention on the genuine open questions about ground and away from the distracting, unpersuasive reasons for dismissing them.     

The testing effect in free recall is associated with enhanced organizational processes

In two experiments with categorized lists, we asked whether the testing effect in free recall is related to enhancements in organizational processing. During a first phase in Experiment 1, subjects studied one list over eight consecutive trials, they studied another list six times while taking two interspersed recall tests, and they learned a third list in four alternating study and test trials. On a test 2 days later, recall was directly related to the number of tests and inversely related to the number of study trials. In addition, increased testing enhanced both the number of categories accessed and the number of items recalled from within those categories. One measure of organization also increased with the number of tests. In a second experiment, different groups of subjects studied a list either once or twice before a final criterial test, or they studied the list once and took an initial recall test before the final test. Prior testing again enhanced recall, relative to studying on the final test a day later, and also improved category clustering. The results suggest that the benefit of testing in free recall learning arises because testing creates retrieval schemas that guide recall.     

Debriefing and accountability in deceptive research

Debriefing is a standard ethical requirement for human research involving the use of deception. Little systematic attention, however, has been devoted to explaining the ethical significance of debriefing and the specific ethical functions that it serves. In this article, we develop an account of debriefing as a tool of moral accountability for the prima facie wrong of deception. Specifically, we contend that debriefing should include a responsibility to promote transparency by explaining the deception and its rationale, to provide an apology to subjects for infringing the principle of respect for persons, and to offer subjects an opportunity to withdraw their data. We also present recommendations concerning the discussion of deception in scientific articles reporting the results of research using deception.     

A plea for pragmatism in clinical research ethics

Pragmatism is a distinctive approach to clinical research ethics that can guide bioethicists and members of institutional review boards (IRBs) as they struggle to balance the competing values of promoting medical research and protecting human subjects participating in it. After defining our understanding of pragmatism in the setting of clinical research ethics, we show how a pragmatic approach can provide guidance not only for the day-to-day functioning of the IRB, but also for evaluation of policy standards, such as the one that addresses acceptable risks for healthy children in clinical research trials. We also show how pragmatic considerations might influence the debate about the use of deception in clinical research. Finally, we show how a pragmatic approach, by regarding the promotion of human research and the protection of human subjects as equally important values, helps to break down the false dichotomy between science and ethics in clinical research.     

An apology for Socratic bioethics

Bioethics is a hybrid discipline. As a theoretical enterprise it stands for untrammeled inquiry and argument. Yet it aims to influence medical practice and policy. In this article we explore tensions between these two dimensions of bioethics and examine the merits and perils of a "Socratic" approach to bioethics that challenges "the conventional wisdom."     

3-Year-Olds’ Perseveration on the DCCS Explained: A Meta-Analysis

The Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS) task is a widely used measure of preschoolers’ executive function. We combined data for 3,290 3-year-olds from 37 unique studies reporting 130 experimental conditions. Using raw pass/fail counts, we computed the pass rates and chi-squared value for each against chance (50/50) performance. We grouped data according to DCCS variants and computed the standard pass rate and chi-squared and phi for each variant relative to standard. For all standard versions, the mean pass rate was 36%. We compared all other variants to the standard and found robust improvements in performance for manipulations that involved spatial separation of the conflicting dimensions, use of distraction between pre and post-switch, elimination of all conflict, and extra practice. We also found that negative priming offers a better explanation for 3-year-olds’ perseveration than attentional inertia. The results support a theoretical model of 3-year-olds’ performance based on inhibitory control.     

The fair transaction model of informed consent: an alternative to autonomous authorization

The doctrine of informed consent in bioethics has relied on the view that consent is valid when it represents a patient or research subject's autonomous authorization. In this article we challenge this reigning conception of the validity of informed consent in clinical research, focusing in particular on the problem of the therapeutic misconception. We argue that the autonomous authorization model of informed consent suffers from four defects: (1) it fails to do justice to the relevance of risk-benefit considerations in shaping the criteria for the validity of consent, (2) it compromises the interests of subjects by preventing them from consenting to research participation with less than substantial understanding when doing so would likely be consistent with their preferences and beneficial to them or at least be unlikely to cause them harm, (3) it jeopardizes the interests of investigators by denying them fair notice regarding when the consent of research subjects can be considered valid and thus make it permissible for them to be enrolled in research, and (4) it threatens the reasonable limits on the responsibility of investigators to assure the adequacy of subjects' understanding of what research participation involves. In place of the autonomous authorization model, we present and defend a fair transaction model of informed consent, which better reflects the values served by consent.     

Catching the mind in flight: using behavioral indices to detect mindless reading in real time

Although mind wandering during reading is extremely common, researchers have only recently begun to study how it relates to reading behavior. In the present study, we used a word-by-word reading paradigm to investigate whether it could be possible to predict in real time whether a participant would report mind wandering when probed. By taking advantage of the finding that reaction times to individual words vary based on reports of mind wandering (with participants being less affected by length, number of syllables, and familiarity, and also showing an overall speed-up, during mindless reading), we were able to develop an algorithm that could successfully predict in real time whether a participant would report being on versus off task. In addition, for participants run without thought probes, there was a significant negative correlation between the number of predicted mind-wandering episodes and reading comprehension. Together, these findings offer a key advance toward the development of pedagogical tools for minimizing the negative impact of mindless reading, and they provide a new covert measure that could be used to study mind wandering without requiring participants to report on their mental states.