An information processing system for the psychiatric emergency room

An information processing system for a psychiatric emergency room is described. Several studies are presented that show the utility of the system. In the first study, variables involved in diagnosis are explicated. The second study attempts to determine the characteristics that distinguish recidivists from nonrecidivists at an emergency room. The third study attempts to find patient variables related to success in short-term treatment programs. The final study is aimed at discovering whether there are psychopathological effects related to the use of inhalants. Together, these studies show the potential of a mental health information system for learning more about the nature of mental disorders and their treatment.     

Raising the IQ: The Ramey and Haskins study

The Ramey and Haskins intervention experiment succeeded in producing IQ gains at three years of age averaging about one standard deviation in young children who were selected for being at risk for subnormal intellectual development. The study is examined in terms of its consistency with other findings, the heritability of IQ, the g aspect of IQ, the simplex pattern of longitudinal interage mental test score correlations, mother-child IQ correlations, and criteria for establishing educationally and socially significant gains in intelligence defined as g rather than as a score on a particular test. Narrow transfer of training from cognitive intervention techniques to IQ test performance in early childhood, rather than enhancement of the g factor itself, is hypothesized as a cause of the typical fadeout of early IQ gains in later childhood.     

Age and cohort effects on personality factor scores across sexes and racial/ethnic groups

Substantial differences exist across ethnic groups and sexes in generational changes in status among groups residing in Hawaii. Despite these generational differences across groups, age differences in personality are remarkably consistent across sexes and racial/ethnic groups, and the few Sex x Age, Ethnicity x Age or Sex x Ethnicity x Age interactions account for little variance in scores. It is concluded that age/generational differences in personality factor scores in these populations result from age and not, to any major degree, from cohort effects.     

Respect: Response to shame in health care

Shame is a not uncommon experience of patients in health care settings. Religious assessments often confuse shame with guilt, and therefore respond in ways that may not be appropriate. Illustrated by a case study, this article distinguishes shame from guilt and examines systemic considerations. Then shame is explored in relation to traditional, negotiating, and individualistic belief paradigms, looking at epistemology, causality, response to shame, healing models, and tasks. It concludes with a discussion of the idea of respect as foundational for responding to people experiencing shame in health care.     

Research on the clinical usefulness of the Rorschach: 2. The assessment of cerebral dysfunction

A review of research on the use of the Rorschach in the assessment of cerebral dysfunction indicated that the Rorschachs of patients with cerebral dysfunction do not manifest any characteristic response in terms of percentages, ratios, or any unique response to any one of the stimulus determinants of the blots (color, shading, the stimulus for movement). The patient with cerebral dysfunction does manifest a unique style of thinking; responses tend to be concrete, perseverative, and stereotypic. This finding is similar to that found with schizophrenics where research, summarized by Frank in 1990, also indicated no uniquely 'objective' response style but reflected a unique cognitive style. These two reviews taken together suggest that the better way to use Rorschach data in clinical work is as an opportunity to assess patients' thinking as opposed to the Rorschach being used as a psychometric device, yielding 'numbers.'     

Polysemy and the acquisition of the cognitive internal state lexicon

Previous research (Hall, Scholnick, & Hughes, 1987) suggested that cognitive word meanings denote six increasingly abstract and complex cognitive processes. In this paper, we further investigated two interrelated aspects of this framework. A set of 36 conversations with children aged 4:5 to 5 provided the data. In Study 1, issues related to the optimal ordering of levels were examined by comparing the original sequence with a restructured model. In Study 2, the hypothesis that, in addition toknow, other polysemous cognitive internal state words would be hierarchically organized was tested. The findings lent support to the restructured model, but rejected the hypothesis that polysemous words within the domain were characterized by equivalent,hhierarchically organized levels. We conclude by proposing that cognitive internal state words were related by complementarity of levels rather than equivalence.The research on which this paper is based was supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York to William S. Hall. Data analysis was supported by the Computer Science Center at the University of Maryland, College Park.     

Imagery and meaning,the cognitive science connection

Taking the integrated viewpoints of causal theory of reference, cognitive science and the notion of correspondence principles from physics, this paper addresses the problems of creativity, the nature of visual imagery and the manner in which science progresses.     

Movement and focused attention: A failure to replicate

Our original goal was to explore the nature of the grouping-by-movement phenomenon reported by Driver and Baylis (1989). In their studies, distractors that moved in common with a centrally located target had a larger influence on focused-attention performance than did more proximate but stationary distractors. These results seemed particularly important since they suggested, contrary to the predictions of space-based models of attention, that attention could be allocated to noncontiguous regions of the visual field. Their results also suggested mandatory processing of stimuli with common motion. Unfortunately, we were unable to replicate this grouping-by-movement effect. In the conditions of Experiment 1 in which we replicated Driver and Baylis’s methodology, stationary distractors produced a larger response-compatibility effect than did the more distant distractors that moved in common with the target. In Experiment 2, we redundantly coded the centrally located target and the far distractors with common movement and color. However, the results were identical to those obtained in Experiment J. The stationary near distractors that appeared in a different color from the target and the far distractors produced the largest response-compatibility effect. In a final experiment, we attempted to compensate for the reduced acuity of the moving distractors by adjusting their size by a cortical magnification factor. However, even with this manipulation, we found a larger response-compatibility effect for the stationary near distractors than for the moving distant distractors. Our results suggest that subjects are capable of selectively processing a target item that moves in common with distractors.     

Functionalism and type-type identity theories

Conclusion Token-token identity theorists do not and need not deny that it may frequently be the same (kind of) brain state which on different occasions fills the functional rôle definitive of a given mental state. That is not at issue. What is at issue is whether functionally-oriented identity theorists should make two claims or three claims.The two claims they customarily make are, first, that each instance of a mental state is an instance of a brain state, and, secondly, that being in a mental state is having in one a state filling the relevant functional rôle. But to be in a mental state is to have that state in one. To be in pain is to have pain, to desire water is to have desire for water, and so on; just as to be poisoned is to have poison in you. (It is to have what is poison for you at the time, of course; and likewise for pain, desire and so on.)Our paper has been about a third sort of claim — relating particularly not to being in a mental state, nor to instances of that state, but to the mental state itself. We have argued that functionally-oriented identity theorists can and should make, in addition to the first two claims, the third type-type identity claim that mental states are brain states. Consequently a token brain state is a token of pain in a derivative sense. What makes it a token of pain is that it is a token of the type of brain state which realizes the pain-rôle for the organism at the time.