Modulation of stress consequences by hippocampal monoaminergic, glutamatergic and nitrergic neurotransmitter systems

Several findings relate the hippocampal formation to the behavioural consequences of stress. It contains a high concentration of corticoid receptors and undergoes plastic modifications, including decreased neurogenesis and cellular remodelling, following stress exposure. Various major neurotransmitter systems in the hippocampus are involved in these effects. Serotonin (5-HT) seems to exert a protective role in the hippocampus and attenuates the behavioural consequences of stress by activating 5-HT1A receptors in this structure. These effects may mediate the therapeutic actions of several antidepressants. The role of noradrenaline is less clear and possibly depends on the specific hippocampal region (dorsal vs. ventral). The deleterious modifications induced in the hippocampus by stress might involve a decrease in neurotrophic factors such as brain derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) following glutamate N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor activation. In addition to glutamate, nitric oxide (NO) could also be related to these effects. Systemic and intra-hippocampal administration of nitric oxide synthase (NOS) inhibitors attenuates stress-induced behavioural consequences. The challenge for the future will be to integrate results related to these different neurotransmitter systems in a unifying theory about the role of the hippocampus in mood regulation, depressive disorder and antidepressant effects.     

Social comparison and perceived breach of psychological contract: their effects on burnout in a multigroup analysis

This study focuses on the mediator role of social comparison in the relationship between perceived breach of psychological contract and burnout. A previous model showing the hypothesized effects of perceived breach on burnout, both direct and mediated, is proposed. The final model reached an optimal fit to the data and was confirmed through multigroup analysis using a sample of Spanish teachers (N = 401) belonging to preprimary, primary, and secondary schools. Multigroup analyses showed that the model fit all groups adequately.     

Sacrifices,Aspirations and Morality: Williams Reconsidered

When a person gives up an end of crucial importance to her in order to promote a moral aim, we regard her as having made a moral sacrifice. The paper analyzes these sacrifices in light of some of Bernard Williams’ objections to Kantian and Utilitarian accounts of them. Williams argues that an implausible consequence of these theories is that that we are expected to sacrifice projects that make our lives worth living and contribute to our integrity. Williams’ arguments about integrity and meaning are shown to be unconvincing when the content of projects is left open. However, a look at his later arguments suggests a reason to be concerned about defensible ethical projects as understood through what he refers to as “the morality system”. The problem for theories of this type turns out to be not merely conflicts between ethical projects and moral demands but making sense of some of the ethically relevant features of these projects. Accommodations to moral theories that leave room for ethical projects may be insufficient to explain such features, for example in cases where agents demand more of themselves than the theories require. Making the theories more demanding is also problematic. Williams’ view about the role ethics plays in our conception of the life we want to lead provides a better account of these cases.

Disorders in planning and strategy application in frontal lobe lesion patients

The aim of this study was to investigate deficits in planning ability using an adapted version of the Modified Six Elements Test, from the Behavioral Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome—BADS [Wilson, B. A., Alderman, N., Burgess, P. W., Emslie, H., & Evans, J. J. (1996). Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome (BADS). Bury St Edmunds, U.K.: Thames Valley Test Company. Trans. Ricardo O Souza, Sergio L Schmidt. Rio de Janeiro: Cognição]. Subjects were left- and right-frontal lobe lesion patients. Other measures of executive dysfunctions used were verbal fluency, the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, and the Trail Making Test. These other instruments were sensitive to detect executive deficits in the left frontal lobe lesion group, except the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which showed impairment only for the frontal lobe lesion group as a whole. The Modified Six Elements Test detected planning disorders in left frontal lobe lesion patients. The deficit of these patients was due to a greater likelihood to break the rules of the task, that is, in plan-following processes, rather than in planning the strategic approach to solve it.     

Is it Morally Wrong to Defend Unjust Causes as a Lawyer?

The question I address in this article is whether it is morally wrong for a lawyer to represent a client whose purpose is immoral or unjust. My answer to this question is that it is wrong, prima facie. This conclusion holds, even accepting certain traditional principles of lawyer's professional ethics, such as the right of defence and the so‐called principle of ‘adversarial’ litigation. Both the adversarial system and the right of defence are sufficient to support or justify the right of potential clients (and citizens in general) to defend their interests in the judicial system and to do so with the technical assistance of a lawyer. This right includes a right to pursue unjust or immoral purposes (within the law). However, having a right to do X does not mean that it is morally permissible to do X. We can have a right to do something morally wrong. This being so, the fundamental moral reason for a lawyer not to accept representation for a client with an immoral purpose is that it is, prima facie, morally wrong to help someone do something wrong.     

Does the type of judgement required modulate cue competition?

According to the comparator process hypothesis (Matute, Arcediano, & Miller, 1996), cue competition in the learning of between-events relationships arises if the judgement required involves a comparison between the probability of the outcome given the target cue and the probability of the outcome given the competing cue. Alternatively, other associative accounts (the Rescorla-Wagner model: Rescorla &Wagner, 1972) conceive cue competition as a learning deficit affecting the target cue-outcome association. Consequently, the comparator process hypothesis predicts that cue competition occurs in inference judgements but not in contiguity ones, for only the first type of judgement implicitly involves such a comparison. On the other hand, the Rescorla-Wagner model predicts cue competition in both inference and contiguity judgements, because it establishes no relevant role for the type of judgement in producing cue competition. In Experiments 1 and 2 we manipulated the relative validity of cues and the type of question (inference vs. contiguity) in a predictive learning task. In both experiments we found a cue competition effect, but no interaction between the relative validity of cues and the type of question, suggesting that the Rescorla-Wagner theory suffices to explain cue competition.