Not all implicit measures of attitudes are created equal: Evidence from an embodiment perspective

We hypothesize that while evaluative priming involves proprioceptive cues, the IAT is representational due to its structural features and the specific algorithm upon which the IAT-effect rests. As predicted, evaluative priming is shown to rely on differential facial muscle activity while the IAT as a measurement instrument is not influenced by proprioceptive information. Evaluative priming does not yield differential responsiveness for congruent and incongruent trials when facial muscle activity is inhibited whereas the IAT-effect is shown to be impervious to such inhibition. Implications for the underlying mechanisms of implicit measures are discussed.     

Individual reactions to a multisensory immersive virtual environment: the impact of a wind farm on individuals

The aim of this study was to assess the impact of a wind farm on individuals by means of an audio-visual methodology that tried to simulate biologically plausible individual-environment interactions. To disentangle the effects of auditory and visual components on cognitive performances and subjective evaluations, unimodal (Audio or Video) and bimodal (Audio + Video) approaches were compared. Participants were assigned to three experimental conditions that reproduced a wind farm by means of an immersive virtual reality system: bimodal condition, reproducing scenarios with both acoustic and visual stimuli; unimodal visual condition, with only visual stimuli; unimodal auditory condition, with only auditory stimuli. While immersed in the virtual scenarios, participants performed tasks assessing verbal fluency, short-term verbal memory, backward counting, and distance estimations (egocentric: how far is the turbine from you?; allocentric: how far is the turbine from the target?). Afterwards, participants reported their degree of visual and noise annoyance. The results revealed that the presence of a visual scenario as compared to the only availability of auditory stimuli may exert a negative effect on resource-demanding cognitive tasks but a positive effect on perceived noise annoyance. This supports the idea that humans perceive the environment holistically and that auditory and visual features are processed in close interaction.     

Where are we coming from versus who we will become: The effect of priming different contents of European identity on cooperation

In two experiments, we investigated how priming European identity as common project versus common heritage affects participants' cooperation in a social dilemma; an additional aim was to explore the mediators involved in the process. In the first experiment, 82 students played a public good dilemma with a European bogus partner and then completed self‐report measures of identification with the European Union (EU), group‐based trust and collective interest. Results showed that priming a common project‐based but not a common heritage‐based European social identity fostered cooperative behaviour; this effect was mediated by two sequential mediators: the common project prime increased participants' strength of identification with EU (mediator 1) which, in turn, positively affected group‐based trust (mediator 2), fostering greater cooperation. Experiment 2 was conducted with a similar procedure on a sample of 124 students, using a different measure of trust and changing the order of mediators. Results supported those of previous experiment: Priming a project‐based EU identity content (compared to heritage‐based one) had significant direct and indirect effects on cooperation.     

Goal-completion processes affect the attentional blink

People are notably limited in processing information from the outside world. For instance, they frequently fail to identify the second of two targets presented in close succession (attentional blink, AB). Theories of the AB have mostly focused upon early stimuli processing. However, here we show that late, goal-completion processes play an important role. We report findings from a rapid serial visual presentation task with three targets (T1, T2, and T3). Participants set to achieve one single goal for T1 and T2 (reporting the sum of the two), and to detect T3, showed an AB effect upon T3 but not upon T2, while participants set to achieve separate goals for the three targets showed an AB effect upon both T2 and T3. This finding raises questions about the nature of AB, suggesting that theories of the AB must take into account processes involved in goal switching.     

No Justificatory Closure without Truth

It is well-known that versions of the lottery paradox and of the preface paradox show that the following three principles are jointly inconsistent: (Sufficiency) very probable propositions are justifiably believable; (Conjunction Closure) justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction; (No Contradictions) propositions known to be contradictory are not justifiably believable. This paper shows that there is a hybrid of the lottery and preface paradoxes that does not require Sufficiency to arise, but only Conjunction Closure and No Contradictions; and it argues that, given any plausible solution to this paradox, if one is not ready to deny Conjunction Closure (and analogous consistency principles), then one must endorse the thesis that justified believability is factive.     

Living on the edge: strategic and instructed slowing in the stop signal task

The stop signal task is widely adopted to assess motor inhibition performance in both clinical and non-clinical populations. Several recent studies explored the influence of strategic approaches to the task. In particular, response slowing seems to be a strategic approach commonly adopted to perform the task. In the present study, we compared a standard version with a strategic version of the task, in which participants were explicitly instructed to slow down responses. Results showed that the instructed slowing did not affect the main inhibition measure, thus confirming the robustness of the stop signal index. On the other hand, it apparently changed the nature of the task, as shown by the lack of correlation between the standard and the strategic versions. In addition, we found a specific influence of individual characteristics on slowing strategies. In the standard version, adherence to task instructions was positively correlated with compliant traits of personality. Despite instructions to maximize response speed, non-compliant participants preferred to adopt a slowing strategy in the standard version of the task, up to a speed level similar to the strategic version, where slowing was required by task instructions. Understanding the role of individual approach to the task seems to be crucial to properly identify how participants cope with task instructions.     

Intrapsychic and interpersonal guilt: a critical review of the recent literature

Various authors hold that some emotions (i.e., moral emotions) have the function of orienting people toward ethical actions. In addition to embarrassment, shame and pride, the moral emotion of guilt is believed to affect humans’ behavior when they carry out transgressions that violate social and cultural standards. Over the past century, many studies (including controversial ones) have been conducted on guilt. In this study, we analyzed and summarized mainly the most recent literature on this emotion. On one side, the destructiveness of guilt is emphasized. It inflicts punishment and pain on individuals for their errors and can lead to psychopathology (e.g., depression). On the other side, it is described as a “friendly” emotion that motivates behavior adapted to social and cultural rules. How can this asymmetry be explained? Different existing views on guilt are presented and discussed, together with recent proposals, supported by research data. Finally, we discussed some systematic models that try to incorporate these different views in a single framework that could facilitate future researches.     

The sound-hand

Through clinical vignettes taken from the analytic treatment of an autistic child, the paper explores Bion' s notion of selected fact in relation to the post-Jungian theoretical speculation on the emergent mind. The issue of the subjectivity of the analyst is considered and explored in this light. A review of some neuroscience research contributions to a possible understanding of dialogue, empathy and rhythm is briefly described, particularly in terms of its potential usefulness for the psychoanalytic mind when working with autistic children. In general, the notions of ‘temporal shapes’ (Alvarez) and ‘sound-object’ (Maiello) provide support for the theoretical and clinical explorations of the issue of rhythmic interactions. Rhythmic sounds are distinguished from stereotypical and meaningless sounds produced by the analysand, whether or not they are accompanied by body movements, and their function of activating representations and amplifications in the analyst's mind is explored in the stage of treatment when the child does not yet speak. The Jungian concept of amplification is considered and revisited in this context.     

How to Be a Friend of Absolute Goodness

This paper critically examines Richard Kraut’s attack on the notion of absolute value, and lays out some of the conceptual work required to defend such a notion. The view under attack claims that absolute goodness is a property that provides a reason to value what has it. Kraut’s overall challenge is that absolute goodness cannot play this role. Kraut’s own view is that goodness-for, instead, plays the reason-providing role. My targets are Kraut’s double-counting objection, and his ethical objection against absolute value. After explaining the double-counting objection, and discussing the idea of non-additive reasons, I examine and reject Kraut’s reasons for holding that nonadditivity can rescue relative value but not absolute value. I proceed then to explore a different reply to the double-counting objection by introducing a distinction between normative reasons for action and reasons that explain why a certain consideration is a reason for action. Such a distinction (hinted at by Kraut) would either help both Kraut and the friend of absolute value, or neither of them. I defend the distinction from the objection that it would make absolute value just a ‘shadow’. Finally, I reply to Kraut’s ethical objection that being motivated by absolute value is depersonalizing, on two grounds: 1) if thinking in terms of absolute value depersonalizes relationships, then we have absolute-value-given reasons not to think in those terms; 2) the distinction between normative and explanatory reasons explains why even a motivation centred on absolute value need not be depersonalizing.