Children's kinematic false memories

ABSTRACT

Individuals misrecognise as seen the never-presented natural continuation of an action. These false memories derive from the running of kinematic mental models of the actions seen, which rest on motor inferences from implicit knowledge. We verified an implied prediction: kinematic false memories should be detectable even in children. The participants in our experiments first observed photos in which actors were about to perform actions on objects. At recognition they were presented with the original photos, plus (a) distractors representing the unseen natural continuation of the original actions, (b) distractors representing the beginning of other actions on the same objects and (c) distractors representing completed different actions on the same objects. In contrast to the original studies in which participants expressed their confidence in recognition, in our experiments the participants catgorirzed the action as seen or not seen. After replicating the original results with the dichotomous recognition task (Experiment 1), we detected spontaneous false memories also in children (Experiment 2).     

Functional representation of 3d space in endogenous attention shifts

The aim of this study was to explore whether the attentional system, as far as an endogenous orienting is concerned, allocates resources along the sagittal plane and whether such a process is affected by, and is likely to be based on, different functional representations of 3D space in the brain. Several models make a main action-based distinction between representations of peripersonal space and of those extrapersonal space. Accordingly, if attention has to move from one representation to another, it should be possible to observe a decrease in performance during such a transition. To test this hypothesis three experiments were run in which participants performed a cued detection task. Cue stimuli were informative and were centrally located around the fixation point. Target stimuli were displayed at four different depth planes. In the first experiment, assuming that the border between the peripersonal space and the extrapersonal space was at 1 m from the observer, half the target stimuli were located in the peripersonal space and half in the extrapersonal space. The fixation point was located at 1 m from the observer. In the second experiment, the fixation point was moved at 2 m from the observer in order to rule out the possible effects of ocular motor programming. In the third experiment, in order to rule out effects related to the spatial layout of target stimuli (i.e., centre of mass effect) two target stimuli were located in the peripersonal space and six in the extrapersonal space. In all the experiments, besides a validity effect, we observed greater reaction times when attention shift was across spatial representations than when it was within the same representation. The implications for action-oriented models of attention are discussed.     

Temporality and metaplasticity. Facing extension and incorporation through material engagement theory

In our everyday life, we have the genuine feeling that when something we use works very well, we forget that we are doing something that is mediated by something else. It happens when we read through our glasses, or when we drive home, or when we play guitar. In all those cases, it can be said that the device becomes an extension of our body, or that we have incorporated it. In this paper I want to discuss the extension/incorporation dichotomy as presented in contemporary cognitive sciences. I will present the state of the art in the debate in order to promote a methodological shift, namely to adopt two concept borrowed from Material Engagement Theory (MET) developed by Lambros Malafouris (2013). By advocating the concepts of temporality and metaplasticity, I will argue for two different but related things: 1) extension and incorporation don’t have to be conceived only spatially, but temporally. This shift leads to two distinctive implications: first, the sooner two entities establish a prosthetic contact, the higher the chances to reach incorporation; second, extension temporally precedes incorporation; the former being an early-staged phenomenon of – a condition of possibility for – the latter. 2) Such a temporal perspective is at the base of metaplasticity, which describes, in the context of MET, the constant, co-constitutive loop between humans and things: metaplasticity deflates the privileged role traditionally attributed to the subject in the making of phenomenal experience. Finally, I will discuss extension and incorporation in media theory, relying on the concept of radical mediation.