A Common Abstraction of MV-Algebras and Abelian l-groups

We investigate the class of strongly distributive pregroups, a common abstraction of MV-algebras and Abelian l-groups which was introduced by E.Casari. The main result of the paper is a representation theorem which yields both Chang's representation of MV-algebras and Clifford's representation of Abelian l-groups as immediate corollaries.     

The aggression test as a possible taxonomic tool in the Formica rufa group

The intra- and interspecific aggressive behavior of Formica polyctena, a species of the Formica rufa group, was analyzed and quantified both in the laboratory and in the field. This behavior was used as a potential taxonomic tool for gaining a better understanding of the phyletic relationships among the species within the group. No overt aggression was recorded toward members of the same species. To examine interspecific relationships, F. polyctena was first confronted with F. cunicularia, to ascertain its aggressiveness toward a distantly related species. All such encounters led immediately to overt and prolonged attacks with virtually no initial mutual inspection. This suggests that recognition of strangeness of the unrelated species is almost immediate in F. polyctena, as previously observed in F. lugubris and F. rufa toward the same antagonist. Subsequently, F. polyctena was contrasted with F. lugubris and F. rufa (also belonging to the F. rufa group) in order to compare these related species. Fierce attacks accompanied by all the elements of conflict behavior were observed in all encounters. Moreover, the degree of aggression in the field was higher than in laboratory-paired ants, possibly because of a territorial effect. These data and our previous and similar research indicate that the relationships between F. lugubris and F. rufa are closer than between these two species and F. polyctena. In considering different viewpoints on this problem, the validity of the aggression test is discussed and the opportunity to compare levels of aggressiveness among strictly sympatric samples of red wood ant species gathered from the same ecological environment are considered.     

Williamson on Counterpossibles

A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.     

Some Notes on Boolos’ Semantics: Genesis,Ontological Quests and Model-Theoretic Equivalence to Standard Semantics

The main aim of this work is to evaluate whether Boolos’ semantics for second-order languages is model-theoretically equivalent to standard model-theoretic semantics. Such an equivalence result is, actually, directly proved in the “Appendix”. I argue that Boolos’ intent in developing such a semantics is not to avoid set-theoretic notions in favor of pluralities. It is, rather, to prevent that predicates, in the sense of functions, refer to classes of classes. Boolos’ formal semantics differs from a semantics of pluralities for Boolos’ plural reading of second-order quantifiers, for the notion of plurality is much more general, not only of that set, but also of class. In fact, by showing that a plurality is equivalent to sub-sets of a power set, the notion of plurality comes to suffer a loss of generality. Despite of this equivalence result, I maintain that Boolos’ formal semantics does not committ (directly) second-order languages (theories) to second-order entities (and to set theory), contrary to standard semantics. Further, such an equivalence result provides a rationale for many criticisms to Boolos’ formal semantics, in particular those by Resnik and Parsons against its alleged ontological innocence and on its Platonistic presupposition. The key set-theoretic notion involved in the equivalence proof is that of many-valued function. But, first, I will provide a clarification of the philosophical context and theoretical grounds of the genesis of Boolos’ formal semantics.     

When does mimicry affect evaluative judgment?

We investigated the effect of subliminally presented happy or angry faces on evaluative judgments when the facial muscles of participants were free to mimic or blocked. We hypothesized and showed that subliminally presented happy expressions lead to more positive judgments of cartoons compared to angry expressions only when facial muscles were not blocked. These results reveal the influence of socially driven embodied processes on affective judgments and have also potential implications for phenomena such as emotional contagion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved).     

Computing Strong and Weak Permissions in Defeasible Logic

In this paper we propose an extension of Defeasible Logic to represent and compute different concepts of defeasible permission. In particular, we discuss some types of explicit permissive norms that work as exceptions to opposite obligations or encode permissive rights. Moreover, we show how strong permissions can be represented both with, and without introducing a new consequence relation for inferring conclusions from explicit permissive norms. Finally, we illustrate how a preference operator applicable to contrary-to-duty obligations can be combined with a new operator representing ordered sequences of strong permissions. The logical system is studied from a computational standpoint and is shown to have linear computational complexity.     

Sequential vs simultaneous encoding of spatial information: a comparison between the blind and the sighted

The aim of this research is to assess whether the crucial factor in determining the characteristics of blind people's spatial mental images is concerned with the visual impairment per se or the processing style that the dominant perceptual modalities used to acquire spatial information impose, i.e. simultaneous (vision) vs sequential (kinaesthesis). Participants were asked to learn six positions in a large parking area via movement alone (congenitally blind, adventitiously blind, blindfolded sighted) or with vision plus movement (simultaneous sighted, sequential sighted), and then to mentally scan between positions in the path. The crucial manipulation concerned the sequential sighted group. Their visual exploration was made sequential by putting visual obstacles within the pathway in such a way that they could not see simultaneously the positions along the pathway. The results revealed a significant time/distance linear relation in all tested groups. However, the linear component was lower in sequential sighted and blind participants, especially congenital. Sequential sighted and congenitally blind participants showed an almost overlapping performance. Differences between groups became evident when mentally scanning farther distances (more than 5m). This threshold effect could be revealing of processing limitations due to the need of integrating and updating spatial information. Overall, the results suggest that the characteristics of the processing style rather than the visual impairment per se affect blind people's spatial mental images.     

Delusional development in child autism at the onset of puberty: vicissitudes of psychic dimensionality between disintegration and development

Although the psychogenetic hypotheses on child autism have been superseded, psychoanalysis can still reflect on the relational exchange and its sensory aspects in concomitance with the mental development of these patients. Without making generalizations as regards the pathogenesis, but considering the specific features of each autistic child, it may be possible to achieve an integration of those islands of competence that make up these patients' limited personal heritage. Such integration may be reached through the analysis of representational, emotional and relational transformations. The first part of this article describes the case of an autistic child in treatment from the age of four on a four-times-weekly basis who, during puberty, developed severe formal thought disorders together with delusional and hallucinatory formations. The second part develops some post-Jungian theoretical contributions, such as the concept of self as nothingness and the idea of the unsaturated archetype, so as to evaluate the function of some a-priori concepts in support of the analyst's position. These concepts are considered in relation to Bion's model of transformation, and to the formulations on dimensional awareness, especially on the shift from a two-dimensionality to three-dimensionality view, as well as to the rhythm of the object's presence and absence.     

On inconsistent entities. A reply to Colyvan

In a recent article M. Colyvan has argued that Quinean forms of scientific realism are faced with an unexpected upshot. Realism concerning a given class of entities, along with this route to realism, can be vindicated by running an indispensability argument to the effect that the entities postulated by our best scientific theories exist. Colyvan observes that among our best scientific theories some are inconsistent, and so concludes that, by resorting to the very same argument, we may incur a commitment to inconsistent entities. Colyvan’s argument could be interpreted, and in part is presented, as a reductio of Quinean scientific realism; yet, Colyvan in the end manifests some willingness to bite the bullet, and provides some reasons why we shouldn’t feel too uncomfortable with those entities. In this paper we wish to indicate a way out to the scientific realist, by arguing that no indispensability argument of the kind suggested by Colyvan is actually available. To begin with, in order to run such an indispensability argument we should be justified in believing that an inconsistent theory is true; yet, in so far as the logic we accept is a consistent one it is arguable that our epistemic predicament could not be possibly one in which we are justified in so believing. Moreover, also if our logic admitted true contradictions, as Dialetheism does, it is arguable that Colyvan’s indispensability argument could not rest on a true premise. As we will try to show, dialetheists do not admit true contradictions for cheap: they do so just as a way out of paradox, namely whenever we are second-level ignorant as to the metaphysical possibility of evidence breaking the parity among two or more inconsistent claims; Colyvan’s examples, however, are not of this nature. So, even under the generous assumption that Dialetheism is true, we will conclude that Colyvan’s argument doesn’t achieve its surprising conclusion.     

The normativity of Lewis Conventions

David Lewis famously proposed to model conventions as solutions to coordination games, where equilibrium selection is driven by precedence, or the history of play. A characteristic feature of Lewis Conventions is that they are intrinsically non-normative. Some philosophers have argued that for this reason they miss a crucial aspect of our folk notion of convention. It is doubtful however that Lewis was merely analysing a folk concept. I illustrate how his theory can (and must) be assessed using empirical data, and argue that it does indeed miss an important aspect of real-world conventions.