Brain functional connectivity correlates of coping styles

Coping abilities represent the individual set of mental and behavioral strategies adopted when facing stress or traumatic experiences. Coping styles related to avoidance have been linked to a disposition to develop psychiatric disorders such as PTSD, anxiety, and major depression, whereas problem-oriented coping skills have been positively correlated with well-being and high quality of life. Even though coping styles constitute an important determinant of resilience and can impact many aspects of everyday living, no study has investigated their brain functional connectivity underpinnings in humans. Here we analyzed both psychometric scores of coping and resting-state fMRI data from 102 healthy adult participants. Controlling for personality and problem-solving abilities, we identified significant links between the propensity to adopt different coping styles and the functional connectivity profiles of regions belonging to the default mode (DMN) and anterior salience (AS) networks—namely, the anterior cingulate cortex, left frontopolar cortex, and left angular gyrus. Also, a reduced negative correlation between AS and DMN nodes explained variability in one specific coping style, related to avoiding problems while focusing on the emotional component of the stressor at hand, instead of relying on cognitive resources. These results might be integrated with current neurophysiological models of resilience and individual responses to stress, in order to understand the propensity to develop clinical conditions (e.g., PTSD) and predict the outcomes of psychotherapeutic interventions.     

Does the character-based dimension of stories impact narrative processing? An event-related potentials (ERPs) study

Cognitive Processing - This event-related potentials (ERPs) study investigated online processes of integration of information relating to characters in narrative comprehension. The final sample...     

The indirect effect of cognitive reserve on the relationship between age and cognition in pathological ageing: A cross-sectional retrospective study in an unselected and consecutively enrolled sample

Cognitive reserve (CR) allows individuals to maintain cognitive functionality even in the presence of pathologies. The compensation hypothesis suggests that CR plays an indirect role between age and cognitive decline, contrasting the negative effect of ageing on cognition. We test this hypothesis in an unselected and consecutively enrolled sample of memory clinic attendees (n = 134) who completed the CR Index questionnaire and three neuropsychological tests assessing global cognition (MMSE, FAB, CDT). Participants were divided into two groups based on standard diagnostic criteria (DSM-5): those who were cognitively impaired (n = 92) and those who were preserved (n = 42). A principal component analysis was used to extract a composite measure of global cognitive functioning from the three neuropsychological tests, and mediation analysis was used to examine the relationship between CR, age and global cognitive functioning in the two groups. Results revealed that: (i) age had a significant direct negative effect on the global cognitive score in both groups; (ii) the three socio-behavioural proxies of CR together suppress the direct negative relationship between age and global cognitive score in cognitively impaired patients but not in cognitively preserved participants. This study confirms the association between CR, age and cognition and allows us to validate its role in a population with cognitive impairment and extend findings to a low-to-middle educated population. These results hold important implications for public health and wellness promotion, emphasising the beneficial role of maintaining healthy and active physical, cognitive and social lifestyles.     

The role of kinematic mental simulation in creating false memories

Our investigation focuses on memory for scenes depicted in photos. According to the mental model theory, the observation of a static scene depicted in a photo which portrays an actor near to perform an action can trigger a kinematic mental simulation of that action unfolding in time. The deriving prediction is that such a kinematic mental model supports the creation of a false memory of the actor performing an advanced phase of the action. We test this prediction in three experiments in which participants are presented with static scenes of actions, and after three days they perform a recognition task in which they assess recognition of old and novel static scenes depicting actions. The results confirm that false memories occur for actions that represent the unfolding over time of the static action initially observed. Our theoretical framework can accommodate also several previous findings in the literature on false memories.     

Small-sample characterization of stochastic approximation staircases in forced-choice adaptive threshold estimation

Despite the widespread use of up-down staircases in adaptive threshold estimation, their efficiency and usability in forced-choice experiments has been recently debated. In this study, simulation techniques were used to determine the small-sample convergence properties of stochastic approximation (SA) staircases as a function of several experimental parameters. We found that satisfying some general requirements (use of the accelerated SA algorithm, clear suprathreshold initial stimulus intensity, large initial step size) the convergence was accurate independently of the spread of the underlying psychometric function. SA staircases were also reliable for targeting percent-correct levels far from the midpoint of the psychometric function and performed better than classical up-down staircases with fixed step size. These results prompt the utilization of SA staircases in practical forced-choice estimation of sensory thresholds.     

Off the beaten track: Freud,sound and music.Statement of a problem and some historico‐critical notes1

The authors note that the element of sound and music has no place in the model of mental functioning bequeathed to us by Freud, which is dominated by the visual and the representational. They consider the reasons for this exclusion and its consequences, and ask whether the simple biographical explanation offered by Freud himself is acceptable. This contribution reconstructs the historical and cultural background to that exclusion, cites some relevant emblematic passages, and discusses Freud’s position on music and on the aesthetic experience in general. Particular attention is devoted to the relationship between Freud and Lipps, which is important both for the originality of Lipps’s thinking in the turn‐of‐the‐century debate and for his ideas on the musical aspects of the foundations of psychic life, at which Freud ‘stopped’, as he himself wrote. Moreover, the shade of Lipps accompanied Freud throughout his scientific career from 1898 to 1938. Like all foundations, that of psychoanalysis was shaped by a system of inclusions and exclusions. The exclusion of the element of sound and music is understandable in view of the cultural background to the development of the concepts of the representational unconscious and infantile sexuality. While the consequences have been far reaching, the knowledge accumulated since that exclusion enables us to resume, albeit on a different basis, the composition of the ‘unfinished symphony’ of the relationship between psychoanalysis and music.     

A modified mark test for own-body recognition in pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina)

Classic mirror self-recognition mark tests involve familiarizing the subject with its mirror image, surreptitiously applying a mark on the subject’s eyebrow, nose, or ear, and measuring self-directed behaviors toward the mark. For many non-human primate species, however, direct gaze at the face constitutes an aggressive and threatening signal. It is therefore possible that monkeys fail the mark test because they do not closely inspect their faces in a mirror and hence they have no expectations about their physical appearance. In the current study, we prevented two pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) from seeing their own faces in a mirror, and we adopted a modified version of the classic mark test in which monkeys were marked on the chest, a body region to which they normally have direct visual access but that in the current study was visible only via a mirror. Neither monkey tried to touch the mark on its chest, possibly due to a failure to understand the mirror as a reflective surface. To further the monkeys’ understanding of the mirror image, we trained them to reach for food using the mirror as the only source of information. After both monkeys had learned mirror-mediated reaching, we replicated the mark test. In this latter phase of the study, only one monkey scratched the red dye on the chest once. The results are consistent with other findings suggesting that monkeys are not capable of passing a mark test and imply that face and body recognition rely on the same cognitive abilities.     

Am I guilty or not? Deontological guilt,uncertainty, and checking behavior

Literature suggests that checking behaviors are aimed at reducing feelings of uncertainty both in clinical samples with obsessive‐compulsive disorder and in general population. Previous studies also showed that deontological guilt is an emotion often associated with obsessive‐compulsive disorder. Thus, the aim of the current study was to investigate the differences in checking behaviors in the condition of high versus low uncertainty, by exploring the moderating role of deontological versus altruistic guilt. Participants were 108 undergraduate Italian university students who took part in a visual search task designed to elicit checking behavior. Ahead of the visual task, participants were administered one scenario in order to manipulate either deontological or altruistic guilt. The results showed that in the condition of uncertainty, compared with the condition of certainty, participants spent more time in checking behaviors and that such a difference was more consistent when participants experienced deontological rather than altruistic guilt. Limitations and further directions are discussed.