Is the moral domain unique? A social influence perspective for the study of moral cognition

The nature of the cognitive processes that give rise to moral judgment and behavior has been a central question of psychology for decades. In this paper, we suggest that an often ignored yet fruitful stream of research for informing current debates on the nature of moral cognition is social influence. We introduce what we call the “social‐moderation‐of‐process” perspective, a methodological framework for leveraging insights from social influence research to inform debates in moral psychology over the mechanisms underlying moral cognition and the moral domains in which those mechanisms operate. We demonstrate the utility of the social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective by providing a detailed example of how research on social influence in behavioral ethics can be utilized to test a research question related to a debate between two prominent theories in moral psychology. We then detail how researchers across the field of moral psychology can utilize our social‐moderation‐of‐process perspective.     

Adults’ implicit associations to infant positive and negative acoustic cues: Moderation by empathy and gender

In this study a novel auditory version of the Single Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT-A) was developed to investigate (a) the valence of adults’ associations to infant cries and laughs, (b) moderation of implicit associations by gender and empathy, and (c) the robustness of implicit associations controlling for auditory sensitivity. Eighty adults (50% females) were administered two SC-IAT-As, the Empathy Quotient, and the Weinstein Noise Sensitivity Scale. Adults showed positive implicit associations to infant laugh and negative ones to infant cry; only the implicit associations with the infant laugh were negatively related to empathy scores, and no gender differences were observed. Finally, implicit associations to infant cry were affected by noise sensitivity. The SC-IAT-A is useful to evaluate the valence of implicit reactions to infant auditory cues and could provide fresh insights into understanding processes that regulate the quality of adult–infant relationships.     

Blind ethics: Closing one's eyes polarizes moral judgments and discourages dishonest behavior

Four experiments demonstrate that closing one’s eyes affects ethical judgment and behavior because it induces people to mentally simulate events more extensively. People who considered situations with their eyes closed rather than open judged immoral behaviors as more unethical and moral behaviors as more ethical. In addition, considering potential decisions with closed eyes decreased stated intentions to behave ethically and actual self-interested behavior. This relationship was mediated by the more extensive mental simulation that occurred with eyes closed rather than open, which, in turn, intensified emotional reactions to the ethical situation. We discuss the implications of these findings for moral psychology and ethical decision making.     

Keeping the illusion of control under control: Ceilings, floors, and imperfect calibration

Prior research has claimed that people exaggerate probabilities of success by overestimating personal control in situations that are heavily or completely chance-determined. We examine whether such overestimation of control persists in situations where people do have control. Our results suggest a simple model that accounts for prior findings on illusory control as well as for situations where actual control is high: People make imperfect estimates of their level of control. By focusing on situations marked by low control, prior research has created the illusion that people generally overestimate their level of control. Across three studies, we show that when they have a great deal of control, people under-estimate it. Implications for research on perceived control and co-variation assessment are discussed.     

Bringing ethics into focus: How regulatory focus and risk preferences influence (Un)ethical behavior

In four laboratory studies, we find that regulatory focus induced by situational cues (such as the framing of an unrelated task) or primed influences people’s likelihood to cross ethical boundaries. A promotion focus leads individuals to be more likely to act unethically than a prevention focus (Studies 1, 2, and 3). These higher levels of dishonesty are explained by the influence of a person’s induced regulatory focus on his or her behavior toward risk. A promotion focus leads to risk-seeking behaviors, while a prevention focus leads to risk avoidance (Study 3). Through higher levels of dishonesty, promotion focus also results in higher levels of virtuous behavior (Studies 2 and 3), thus providing evidence for compensatory ethics. Our results also demonstrate that the framing of ethics (e.g., through an organization’s ethics code) influences individuals’ ethical behavior and does so differently depending on an individual’s induced regulatory focus (Study 4).     

Modelling aspects of face processing in early infancy

The aim of this work is to understand how face processing develops from birth to 4 months by modelling some face processing abilities of infants between these ages. The neural model reproduces experimental data regarding both visual preferences at birth and right hemisphere behaviour in 4‐month‐old infants. The model shows that two basic properties may be sufficient to simulate face preference at birth: (a) tuning selectivity of visual neurons for spatial frequencies and (b) limited vision (CSF) of newborns. Three additional properties are sufficient to match experimental data on face processing at 4 months: (c) plasticity of lateral connections as modelled by Bayesian networks, (d) amplification of eye importance and (e) mother bias induced by the high probability of seeing mother’s face. These conditions suggest that the neural substratum for face processing could be, at birth, the retina‐V1/V2‐colliculus system, and at 4 months, the activation of the RH face‐Fusiform area, with configural representations stored in lateral connections.     

Can a nonspecific bias toward top-heavy patterns explain newborns' face preference?

This study examined newborns' face preference using images of natural and scrambled faces in which the location of the inner features was distorted. The results demonstrate that newborns' face preference is not confined to schematic configurations, but can be obtained also with veridical faces. Moreover, this phenomenon is not produced by a specific bias toward the face geometry, but derives from a domain-general bias toward configurations with more elements in the upper than in the lower half (i.e., top-heavy patterns). These results suggest that it may be unnecessary to assume the existence of a prewired tendency to orient toward the face geometry, and support the idea that faces do not possess a special status in newborns' visual world.     

"A moment's monument": the central vision of Italian sculptor Medardo Rosso (1858-1928)

One of the basic limitations on visual perception is that it is impossible, in any given moment, to see the world sharply and full of colors beyond the central area of the visual field. This fact was popularized and brought to the attention of artists in the nineteenth century. To accurately represent the 'impression', or vision of a single glance, an artistic work should contain only a central area in focus surrounded by a progressively greater blur. The work of the Italian sculptor Medardo Rosso (1858-1928) may be the first artistic representation of differences in central and peripheral acuity. Despite using the medium of sculpture, typically three-dimensional, Rosso conceived of his art as two-dimensional because in a given moment it is possible to view a scene from only one viewpoint. The analysis of Rosso's photographs of his own sculptures emphasizes the areas of detail and relative blur, allowing a reconstruction of his point de vue unique--where the observer should stand when viewing that specific sculpture. We argue that the role of central and peripheral vision in subjective perception is critical to understanding the work of Rosso, aptly defined by critics as monument d'un instant.