What Neuropsychology Tells us About Human Tool Use? The Four Constraints Theory (4CT): Mechanics,Space, Time,and Effort

Our understanding of human tool use comes mainly from neuropsychology, particularly from patients with apraxia or action disorganization syndrome. However, there is no integrative, theoretical framework explaining what these neuropsychological syndromes tell us about the cognitive/neural bases of human tool use. The goal of the present article is to fill this gap, by providing a theoretical framework for the study of human tool use: The Four Constraints Theory (4CT). This theory rests on two basic assumptions. First, everyday tool use activities can be formalized as multiple problem situations consisted of four distinct constraints (mechanics, space, time, and effort). Second, each of these constraints can be solved by the means of a specific process (technical reasoning, semantic reasoning, working memory, and simulation-based decision-making, respectively). Besides presenting neuropsychological evidence for 4CT, this article shall address epistemological, theoretical and methodological issues I will attempt to resolve. This article will discuss how 4CT diverges from current cognitive models about several widespread hypotheses (e.g., notion of routine, direct and automatic activation of tool knowledge, simulation-based tool knowledge).     

The Causal Structure of Utility Conditionals

The psychology of reasoning is increasingly considering agents' values and preferences, achieving greater integration with judgment and decision making, social cognition, and moral reasoning. Some of this research investigates utility conditionals, ‘‘if p then q’’ statements where the realization of p or q or both is valued by some agents. Various approaches to utility conditionals share the assumption that reasoners make inferences from utility conditionals based on the comparison between the utility of p and the expected utility of q. This article introduces a new parameter in this analysis, the underlying causal structure of the conditional. Four experiments showed that causal structure moderated utility‐informed conditional reasoning. These inferences were strongly invited when the underlying structure of the conditional was causal, and significantly less so when the underlying structure of the conditional was diagnostic. This asymmetry was only observed for conditionals in which the utility of q was clear, and disappeared when the utility of q was unclear. Thus, an adequate account of utility‐informed inferences conditional reasoning requires three components: utility, probability, and causal structure.     

Are archetypes transmitted or emergent? A response to Christian Roesler

In this paper the author argues that Jung's concept of archetype should not be reduced to an univocal definition. Jung himself proposed many definitions of this concept, some of them being partially or totally contradictory to others. A univocal and logical way of thinking can lead us to refute and reject part of those definitions, but a complex way of thinking, as proposed by Edgar Morin or Roy Bhaskar for example, can allow us to consider that those apparent contradictions in Jung's definitions of archetype reflect the complexity of the psychic reality. The main argument of the author is that Jung was missing the epistemological concept of emergence (which appeared in science at the time of his death) and that he tried to express it with the epistemological concepts of his time.     

“My Attitude Made Me Do It”: Considering the Agency of Attitudes

In proposing a next step in loosening the restriction of action to humans, this paper explores what we call the agency of attitudes and especially the ethical and practical questions that such recognition should entail. In line with Actor-Network Theory, we suggest that attitudes, passions and emotions can be seen to have agency in a similar vein as tangible agents (e.g., technological devices, texts, machines). We illustrate this suggestion using an example of socialization towards pain experienced during sports. Finally, we propose that the awareness of attitude’s agency extends rather than reduces the ownership of choice of people, as it facilitates making “true decisions.”     

Gouvernance et éthique cliniques : deux outils complémentaires pour une meilleure coordination des soins et des traitements

“Governance”, “ethics” and “clinical” three words for a same goal: protect the human health. “Corporate governance” must be associated with the new theory of the firm, for which the theory of asymmetric information provides the foundations. Indeed problems of information represent a fundamental change in the prevailing paradigm within economics; they are central to understanding political economy. “Clinical governance”, promoted by the UK government, constitutes an overarching mechanism designed to improve clinical quality in the National Health Service. To the medical establishment, it is a means to improve the quality of medical practice through clinical guidelines. To make a significant impact on the improvement of healthcare quality, the principles of clinical governance must produce synergy by involving professionals in the modernization of the organization. To obtain excellence in heath care, collective actions and shared decision making were essential. In this context, Clinical ethics consultations could provide a structured approach to decision making that could assist heath professional to resolve conflicts or ethical problems that arise in the care of particular patients.     

A test of parafoveal‐on‐foveal effects with pairs of orthographically related words

One of the main controversies in the field of eye movements in reading concerns the question of whether the processing of two adjacent words in reading occurs in sequence, or in parallel. To distinguish between these views, the present experiment tested the presence of parafoveal‐on‐foveal effects with pairs of orthographically related words (or neighbours that differed by a single letter) in a controlled but reading‐like situation. Results revealed that fixation times on a foveal target word were shorter when the target was accompanied by an orthographically similar parafoveal word than when the parafoveal word was dissimilar. Furthermore, the size of the effect tended to vary with both the relative frequency of target and parafoveal words, and the position of the critical letter. These results were interpreted in the framework of a pure parallel processing hypothesis, where the processing of adjacent words is only limited by visual acuity, and the respective lexical properties of the foveal and parafoveal words.     

The Characters of Madness in the Talking Cure

Madness, as a character, is presented as such by Erasmus of Rotterdam in his The Praise of Folly: “It is I, Folly, who speaks.” When it appears in the middle of psychoanalysis, the usual instruments of exploration must be modified. This implies bringing into play an initial representation of events that have never been inscribed either in the life history or in the Unconscious, which may be repressed or forgotten later on. The purpose of this process is to put time in motion again. In this framework, the analogy between the action of theatre and the action of analysis leads me to describe the effects on the analyst when this somewhat unseemly character enters the scene, compelling the therapist to recognize the share he takes in its evocation.     

Social support from evaluative familiar persons – a buffer against stress? Preliminary evidence of neuroendocrine and psychological responses

ABSTRACT

Background and Objectives: Social support may have a stress-buffering effect when an individual is or could be negatively judged by others, but paradoxically may also exacerbate stress. The aim of our study was to examine these findings when social support was provided by a positive or negative evaluative audience composed of familiar and close others (teachers).

Design and Methods: 84 men were confronted with the Trier Social Stress Test for Groups through a 3 (negative, positive, no-audience) x?2 (familiar, unfamiliar) experimental design with four measurement points of cortisol levels and state anxiety. We also tested whether closeness with the committee members predicted these variables for the participants in the familiar conditions.

Results: Using both a frequentist and a Bayesian approach, familiarity and social support did not have stress-buffering effects (or merely anecdotal effects) on cortisol levels but buffered self-reported anxiety only for the participants faced with a supportive audience composed of familiar persons. Closeness with the experimenters was not a significant predictor of the stress responses.

Conclusions: Because these results are preliminary evidence, further investigations into the relations between support provider and recipient during evaluative tasks would be worthwhile to better explain opposing findings found in this growing literature.