Risk of crashing with a tram: Perceptions of pedestrians,cyclists, and motorists

IntroductionRoad users not abiding by the rule of tram priority has increased the number of crashes between trams and other road users. This study focuses on the perceptions of pedestrians, cyclists, and motorists regarding the risk of crashes with trams. The first aim was to examine how these road users assess the risk of tram crashes with themselves and with other road users of the same age and type. The second aim was to look into whether and to what extent road users’ comparative judgments about tram risk are realistic in terms of their self-reported behavior.MethodThe study sample included 973 road users (379 pedestrians, 146 cyclists, and 448 motorists). Three versions of a questionnaire were constructed to assess risk perceptions concerning interactions between these road users and trams, self-reported behavior, and knowledge of the tram-priority rules.ResultsThe results showed that all three types of road users perceived the risk of a crash between a tram and themselves to be very low (M = 1.53, SD = 0.88) and with other users to be higher (M = 2.28, SD = 1.06); they therefore expressed comparative optimism. The results also revealed realistic optimism among pedestrians and unrealistic optimism among young motorists.ConclusionThe present study shows that, as a whole, road users have little awareness of crash risks with trams. It may therefore be worthwhile to increase communication about the priority of trams, and to persuade road users not to violate this rule.     

Reinstatement, floating conclusions, and the credulity of Mental Model reasoning

Johnson-Laird and coworkers’ Mental Model theory of propositional reasoning is shown to be somewhere in between what logicians have defined as “credulous” and “skeptical” with respect to the conclusions it draws on default reasoning problems. It is then argued that in situations where skeptical reasoning has been shown to lead to problematic conclusions due to not being skeptical enough, the bolder Mental Model theory will likewise make counterintuitive predictions. This claim is supported by the consideration of two of those situations, namely problems involving reinstatement and floating conclusions. It is discussed how the recent “principle of pragmatic modulation” could be a first step in order to overcome the mild credulity of Mental Model reasoning.     

The update of semantic memories in amnestic mild cognitive impairment

It is still controversial to what extent neocortical consolidated memories are susceptible of change by processes of reconsolidation and transformation throughout experience, and whether the medial temporal lobes are necessary for this update of semantic consolidated memories, as they are for episodic remembering. We hypothesize that patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) who have deficits in episodic memory may also have difficulties in updating information on added new features of objects. Sixteen participants with aMCI and 20 healthy control participants performed a semantic word-to-picture task, in which they were asked to identify as belonging to a given semantic category NEW objects, that have incorporated novel features, as well as OLD items, semantically and visually SIMILAR items and UNRELATED items. Patients with aMCI made a greater percentage of errors than healthy controls. Participants globally made greater percentages of errors in difficult types of items, namely NEW and SIMILAR, as compared to easier ones, OLD and UNRELATED. Importantly, an item by diagnostic group interaction effect was observed, and post hoc analysis showed that patients with aMCI made a higher percentage of errors than controls in NEW items only. In conclusion, patients with aMCI had a particular difficulty in identifying the NEW items of the word-to-picture task as compared to the control participants, supporting the concept of a flexible and dynamic conceptual knowledge system, involving the update of semantic memories and the integration of new attributes in a constant transformation process, which is impaired in these patients.     

Turkish Adolescents’ Interpretations of Psychological and Behavioral Control: Relation with Adjustment Problems and Moderating Factors

Journal of Child and Family Studies - Few studies have focused on adolescents’ interpretations of parental control in a non-Western context. This study examines the intervening role of...     

Bystander responses to bias-based bullying and retaliation: Is retaliation perceived as more acceptable than bias-based bullying?

The current study examined intergroup-related and social-cognitive correlates of bystanders' acceptability judgements and their responses to bias-based bullying of immigrant peers and to possible retaliation for the bullying. Participants included 179 immigrant-origin and non-immigrant-origin youth (M_age = 13.23; SD = 1.55; 79 immigrant-origin youth). Participants' bystander judgements and responses to bullying and retaliation were examined via a hypothetical scenario. Further, participants' intergroup attitudes towards immigrants and their social-cognitive skills were evaluated. ANOVA results showed that immigrant-origin youth judged bullying as less acceptable and retaliation as more acceptable compared to non-immigrant-origin youth, documenting that group membership is related to adolescents' judgements. A similar pattern was observed in active bystander responses. Hierarchical regression analyses revealed that immigration background, intergroup process in the context of immigration, and social-cognitive skills predict bystander responses to bullying and retaliation. This study provides important implications for anti-bullying intervention programmes to overcome the negative consequences of retaliation in the escalation of aggressive behaviours.