What Neuropsychology Tells us About Human Tool Use? The Four Constraints Theory (4CT): Mechanics,Space, Time,and Effort

Our understanding of human tool use comes mainly from neuropsychology, particularly from patients with apraxia or action disorganization syndrome. However, there is no integrative, theoretical framework explaining what these neuropsychological syndromes tell us about the cognitive/neural bases of human tool use. The goal of the present article is to fill this gap, by providing a theoretical framework for the study of human tool use: The Four Constraints Theory (4CT). This theory rests on two basic assumptions. First, everyday tool use activities can be formalized as multiple problem situations consisted of four distinct constraints (mechanics, space, time, and effort). Second, each of these constraints can be solved by the means of a specific process (technical reasoning, semantic reasoning, working memory, and simulation-based decision-making, respectively). Besides presenting neuropsychological evidence for 4CT, this article shall address epistemological, theoretical and methodological issues I will attempt to resolve. This article will discuss how 4CT diverges from current cognitive models about several widespread hypotheses (e.g., notion of routine, direct and automatic activation of tool knowledge, simulation-based tool knowledge).     

The Causal Structure of Utility Conditionals

The psychology of reasoning is increasingly considering agents' values and preferences, achieving greater integration with judgment and decision making, social cognition, and moral reasoning. Some of this research investigates utility conditionals, ‘‘if p then q’’ statements where the realization of p or q or both is valued by some agents. Various approaches to utility conditionals share the assumption that reasoners make inferences from utility conditionals based on the comparison between the utility of p and the expected utility of q. This article introduces a new parameter in this analysis, the underlying causal structure of the conditional. Four experiments showed that causal structure moderated utility‐informed conditional reasoning. These inferences were strongly invited when the underlying structure of the conditional was causal, and significantly less so when the underlying structure of the conditional was diagnostic. This asymmetry was only observed for conditionals in which the utility of q was clear, and disappeared when the utility of q was unclear. Thus, an adequate account of utility‐informed inferences conditional reasoning requires three components: utility, probability, and causal structure.     

Characterization of Al/n-ZnO/p-Si/Al structure with low-cost solution-grown ZnO layer

We report the fabrication of Al/n-ZnO/p-Si/Al diode structures with a flower-like ZnO layer. The average grain size, microstrain and dislocation density in the ZnO layer were determined as 25?nm, 1.55?×?10^?3 and 3.23?×?10¹³?cm^?2, respectively. From absorption spectra, the optical band gap was found to be ～3.17?eV. A red shift was attributed to non-stoichiometry arising from Zn⁺² ions substituting for oxygen vacancies. The ideality factor was determined as 1.55. The barrier height was calculated as 0.71?eV from I–V characteristics and 0.73?eV using the Norde plots.     

Are archetypes transmitted or emergent? A response to Christian Roesler

In this paper the author argues that Jung's concept of archetype should not be reduced to an univocal definition. Jung himself proposed many definitions of this concept, some of them being partially or totally contradictory to others. A univocal and logical way of thinking can lead us to refute and reject part of those definitions, but a complex way of thinking, as proposed by Edgar Morin or Roy Bhaskar for example, can allow us to consider that those apparent contradictions in Jung's definitions of archetype reflect the complexity of the psychic reality. The main argument of the author is that Jung was missing the epistemological concept of emergence (which appeared in science at the time of his death) and that he tried to express it with the epistemological concepts of his time.     

“My Attitude Made Me Do It”: Considering the Agency of Attitudes

In proposing a next step in loosening the restriction of action to humans, this paper explores what we call the agency of attitudes and especially the ethical and practical questions that such recognition should entail. In line with Actor-Network Theory, we suggest that attitudes, passions and emotions can be seen to have agency in a similar vein as tangible agents (e.g., technological devices, texts, machines). We illustrate this suggestion using an example of socialization towards pain experienced during sports. Finally, we propose that the awareness of attitude’s agency extends rather than reduces the ownership of choice of people, as it facilitates making “true decisions.”