Work-family and family-work conflict: does intrinsic-extrinsic satisfaction mediate the prediction of general job satisfaction?

The objective of this study is to analyze the mediating role of intrinsic and extrinsic job satisfaction in the relationship between the 2 dimensions of work-family conflict-family interfering with work (FIW) and work interfering with family (WIF)-and general job satisfaction. Step-by-step hierarchical regression analyses were carried out on a sample of 151 men and women from a Spanish public organization. The results confirmed the mediating role of intrinsic job satisfaction in the case of FIW. This highlights the importance of taking into account the level of satisfaction with the intrinsic facets of one's job as a measure for understanding why FIW has a negative impact on general job satisfaction.     

Associations of social relationships with consultation for symptoms of depression: a community study of depression in older men and women in Québec

To assess associations between social relationships and consultation for symptoms of depression, data from a representative sample of 2,811 French-speaking community-dwelling older adults in Québec were used. Less than half of the older adults meeting DSM criteria for depression (N = 379; 47.1%) had sought consultation about their depression-relevant symptoms in the preceding 12 months. Having a cohabitant partner or having children were not associated with frequency of consultation for women. Men without a partner tended to consult more frequently than men with a cohabiting partner (OR = 2.5; 95% CI = 0.81, 7.88). None of the men without a confidant had consulted. Among the 67 men with a confidant, consultation was more frequent among those not cohabiting with a partner (70%) than among those with a cohabiting partner (46%). The influence of social relationships on consultation for depression differed in men and women in this population of depressed elderly people in Québec.     

Validation of the Revised Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ-R) in a sample of persons recovering from myocardial infarction--the Swedish version

When people's health is threatened, they generally develop illness perceptions to make sense of their illness. The Illness Perception Questionnaire (IPQ-R), developed by Moss-Morris et al (2002), has been widely used in many countries to measure such representations. However, since studies in this crucial research area are lacking in Sweden a Swedish version of IPQ-R was validated with a focus on the seven subscales: timeline acute/chronic, timeline cyclical, consequences, personal control, treatment control, illness coherence and emotional representations. Using confirmatory factor analysis, the aim of the present study was to validate the internal structure of the Swedish version in a sample of 202 persons (144 men and 58 women) who had been diagnosed with myocardial infarction four months earlier. Additionally, inter-correlations among the seven subscales and external concurrent validity were also investigated. The results of confirmatory factor analysis revealed that, in line with the English version of the IPQ-R, the specified seven-factor model had a satisfactory fit. One item was however not considered reliable and was therefore excluded from the instrument. The internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha coefficients) and the inter-factor correlations were relatively similar to those reported in the validation study of the original English IPQ-R. In tests of concurrent validity, the seven IPQ-R subscales were, as hypothesized, mainly associated with external variables. To conclude, the Swedish version of the IPQ-R's seven dimensions, with one item removed, (total 37 items) was found to be a reliable and valid measure of illness perception.     

Listening, not watching: situational familiarity and the ability to detect deception

In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the influence of situational familiarity with the judgmental context on the process of lie detection. They predicted that high familiarity with a situation leads to a more pronounced use of content cues when making judgments of veracity. Therefore, they expected higher classification accuracy of truths and lies under high familiarity. Under low situational familiarity, they expected that people achieve lower accuracy rates because they use more nonverbal cues for their veracity judgments. In all 4 experiments, participants with high situational familiarity achieved higher accuracy rates in classifying both truthful and deceptive messages than participants with low situational familiarity. Moreover, mediational analyses demonstrated that higher classification accuracy in the high-familiarity condition was associated with more use of verbal content cues and less use of nonverbal cues.     

Reinforcing saccadic amplitude variability

Saccadic endpoint variability is often viewed as the outcome of neural noise occurring during sensorimotor processing. However, part of this variability might result from operant learning. We tested this hypothesis by reinforcing dispersions of saccadic amplitude distributions, while maintaining constant their medians. In a first experiment we reinforced the least frequent saccadic amplitudes to increase variability, and then reinforced the central part of the amplitude distributions to reduce variability. The target was placed at a constant distance from the fovea after the saccade to maintain the postsaccadic visual signal constant and an auditory reinforcement was delivered depending on saccadic amplitude. The second experiment tested the effects of the contingency. We reinforced high levels of variability in 4 participants, whereas 4 other participants were assigned to a yoked control group. On average, saccadic amplitude standard deviations were doubled while the medians remained mostly unchanged in the experimental participants in both experiments, and variability returned to baseline level when low variability was reinforced. In the control group no consistent changes in amplitude distributions were observed. These results, showing that variability can be reinforced, challenge the idea of a stochastic neural noise. We instead propose that selection processes constrain saccadic amplitude distributions.     

Holding others responsible

Theorists have spent considerable time discussing the concept of responsibility. Their discussions, however, have generally focused on the question of who counts as responsible, and for what. But as Gary Watson has noted, “Responsibility is a triadic relationship: an individual (or group) is responsible to others for something” (Watson Agency and answerability: selected essays, 2004, p. 7). Thus, theorizing about responsibility ought to involve theorizing not just about the actor and her conduct, but also about those the actor is responsible to—and specifically about how these people hold the actor responsible for her conduct. In this paper, I give a topology of the terrain of holding others responsible. Over the course of the paper I disambiguate two very broad senses of holding responsible—regarding another as a responsible agent and holding another responsible for a particular piece of conduct. Next, I argue that the latter sense of holding responsible is a genus with two species—what I will call “holding responsible as deep moral appraisal” and “holding responsible as accountability.” Appreciating these distinctions, I argue, sheds considerable light on a number of questions concerning the scope and nature of our practices of holding others responsible. Finally, illuminating these distinct senses of holding responsible and highlighting their features reveals an awkwardness in the most carefully explicated and influential account of holding responsible, namely R. Jay Wallace’s account in Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.     

Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it

Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising.     

Inconsistency in the A-Theory

This paper presents a new argument against A-theories of time. A-theorists hold that there is an objective now (present moment) and an objective flow of time, the latter constituted by the movement of the objective now through time. A-theorists therefore want to draw different pictures of reality—showing the objective now in different positions—depending upon the time at which the picture is drawn. In this paper it is argued that the times at which the different pictures are drawn may be taken to be normal times or hypertimes. If they are normal times then the A-theory is inconsistent, or else collapses to the B-theory—and appealing to primitive tense operators will not help A-theorists avoid this conclusion. If the times are hypertimes then the A-theory is consistent, but deeply problematic none the less.