Does Therapeutic Repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Cause Cognitive Enhancing Effects in Patients with Neuropsychiatric Conditions? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Randomised Controlled Trials

Repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) is increasingly used as a therapeutic intervention for neuropsychiatric illnesses and has demonstrated efficacy for treatment of major depression. However, an unresolved question is whether a course of rTMS treatment results in effects on cognitive functioning. In this systematic review and meta-analysis we aimed to quantitatively determine whether a course of rTMS has cognitive enhancing effects. We examined cognitive outcomes from randomised, sham-controlled studies conducted in patients with neuropsychiatric conditions where rTMS was administered to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) across repeated sessions, searched from PubMed/MEDLINE and other databases up until October 2015. Thirty studies met our inclusion criteria. Cognitive outcomes were pooled and examined across the following domains: Global cognitive function, executive function, attention, working memory, processing speed, visual memory, verbal memory and visuospatial ability. Active rTMS treatment was unassociated with generalised gains across the majority of domains of cognitive functioning examined. Secondary analyses revealed a moderate sized positive effect for improved working memory in a small number of studies in patients with schizophrenia (k = 3, g = 0.507, 95 % CI = [0.183–0.831], p < .01). Therapeutic rTMS when administered to the DLPFC in patients with neuropsychiatric conditions does not result in robust cognitive enhancing effects.     

Does Cooperation in the Laboratory Reflect the Operation of a Broad Trait?

The Dictator Game, a face valid measure of altruism, and the Trust Game, a face valid measure of trust and trustworthiness, are among the most widely used behavioural measures in human cooperation research. Researchers have observed considerable covariation among these and other economic games, leading them to assert that there exists a general human propensity to cooperate that varies in strength across individuals and manifests itself across a variety of social settings. To formalize this hypothesis, we created an S‐1 bifactor model using 276 participants' Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions. The general factor had significant, moderate associations with self‐reported and peer‐reported altruism, trust, and trustworthiness. Thus, the positive covariation among economic games is not reducible to the games' shared situational features. Two hundred participants returned for a second session. The general factor based on Dictator Game and Trust Game decisions from this session did not significantly predict self‐reported and peer‐reported cooperation, suggesting that experience with economic games causes them to measure different traits from those that are reflected in self‐assessments and peer‐assessments of cooperativeness. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Unconscious cognition isn't that smart: modulation of masked repetition priming effect in the word naming task

Masked repetition primes produce greater facilitation in naming in a block containing a high, rather than low proportion of repetition trials. [Bodner, G. E., & Masson, M. E. J. (2004). Beyond binary judgments: Prime-validity modulates masked repetition priming in the naming task. Memory & Cognition, 32, 1-11] suggested this phenomenon reflects a strategic shift in the use of masked prime as a function of its validity. We propose an alternative explanation based on the Adaptation to the statistics of the environment (ASE) framework, which suggests the proportion effect reflects adaptation of response-initiation processes to recent trial difficulty. Consistent with ASE's prediction, (1) stimuli that produce the proportion effect also produced an "asymmetric blocking effect", showing a smaller fall in response latencies of hard items than the rise of easy items when the two item types were intermixed relative to pure blocks comprised of only one item type, and (2) manipulation of prime validity was neither necessary nor sufficient to modulate the size of masked-priming effect.     

The rank hypothesis and lexical decision: a reply to Adelman and Brown (2008)

J. S. Adelman and G. D. A. Brown (2008) provided an extensive analysis of the form of word frequency and contextual diversity effects on lexical decision time. In this reply, the current authors suggest that their analysis provides a valuable tool for the evaluation of models of lexical access and that the results they report are broadly supportive of the rank hypothesis suggested by W. S. Murray and K. I. Forster (2004)--more supportive, in fact, than the originally reported data. However, Adelman and Brown's conclusion that the results of these analyses can be taken as evidence against rank (and thereby serial models of lexical access) and for instance models is rejected. It is shown that at least one instance model makes the wrong predictions and that Adelman and Brown's conclusions rest on the assumption that lexical decision time presents a pure measure of the time involved in lexical access. Results from eye tracking are reported, which also support a rank account, as do results from analyses that show that a log frequency account is clearly inadequate. Finally, it is demonstrated that, unlike other models, the rank account continues to make accurate predictions regarding the form of both reaction time and error rate effects.     

Kant,Boole and Peirce's Early Metaphysics

Charles Peirce is often credited for being among the first, perhaps even the first, to develop a scientific metaphysics of indeterminism. After rejecting the received view that Peirce developed his views from Darwin and Maxwell, I argue that Peirce's view results from his synthesis of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and George Boole's contributions to formal logic. Specifically, I claim that Kant's conception of the laws of logic as the basis for his architectonic, when combined with Boole's view of probability, yields Peirce's metaphysics of probabilistic laws. Indeterminism provides, therefore, an excellent illustration of how Peirce attempted to use logic to clarify metaphysical problems.Since everyone must have conceptions of things in general, it is most important that they should be carefully constructed. I shall enter into no criticism of the different methods of metaphysical research, but shall merely say that in the opinions of several great thinkers, the only successful mode yet lighted upon is that of adopting our logic as our metaphysics. (W1: 490, 1866)²     

Further evidence against the classical conditioning model of McCollough effects

McCollough effects (MEs) have been portrayed by Murch (1976) as classically conditioned responses which result from the pairing of color (unconditioned stimulus) with line orientation (conditioned stimulus). In the present experiment, we sought evidence that ME characteristics resembled those of undisputed conditioned responses. According to Rescorla (1968) and others, conditioned responses may not develop if the unconditioned stimulus is presented in the absence as well as in the presence of the conditioned stimulus. However, in our experiment, MEs induced by inspection sequences containing presentations of color alone in addition to color/ contour pairs were not weaker than controls. This discrepancy challenges the applicability of the conditioning model to MEs.     

Induced subject-relative movement: Persistence of apparent movement of a stationary point after removal of inducing stimulus

It was observed by chance that perceived movement of a stationary spot of light in a dark featureless field persists after its induced movement by a moving frame. When the frame was suddenly occluded, apparent movement of the spot persisted in the same direction as prior induced movement. The effect which is compelling and readily reported and referred to as induced subject-relative movement (ISRM) was confirmed and further investigated in four experiments. In the first, the informal observations of ISRM were confirmed using manual tracking to index perceived movement, and in the second, it was shown to occur only very slightly and briefly when the frame merely stopped. In the third experiment, ISRM was shown to occur following two different paths of induced movement, and in the fourth, not to occur following real movement of the spot, which was almost indistinguishable from its induced movement. It is suggested that the effect arises from the absence of a signal for cessation of perceived movement when the frame disappears.