Theoretical explanation and errors of measurement

Conclusion By using the concept of a uniformity, the Structuralists have given us a most useful means of representing approximations. In the second section of this paper, I have made use of this technique to show how we can deal with errors of measurement — imprecise explananda — in the context of theoretical explanation. As well as (I hope) providing further demonstration of the power of the Structuralist approach, this also serves to support the ontic conception of explanation by showing that it can help us resolve substantial problems in the theory of explanation.I would like to thank Professor C. U. Moulines for his kindness in reading an earlier draft of this paper, and in particular for suggesting to me to mention the points made in footnotes 12 and 13. I am also most grateful to this journal's referee for many helpful comments whereby the paper has been much improved.     

Stress Counseling Theory and Practice: A Cautionary Review

In this era of growing emphasis on professional and financial accountability, stress counseling remains vague and imprecise. This article grounds stress counseling in responsible clinical methodology through reexamining and organizing the durable empirical literature to help counselors develop credible and effective interventions. A flowchart schema incorporating primary stress coping modalities of environment, cognitions, emotions, and personal life philosophy is presented to systematize intervention efforts to maximize efficient stress counseling services.     

Theoretical explanation in physical science

An account of physical explanation derived from the instance view of scientific explanation is outlined, and it is shown that this account does not cover explanations by theories which contain theoretical functions. An alternative account, also derived from the instance view, is proposed on the basis of Sneed's account of theories. It is shown that this account does cover theoretical explanations. Finally, it is shown that this account can accommodate explananda that record errors of measurement.     

Moral responsibility and the ‘ignorant scientist’

The question whether a scientist can be responsible for an outcome of her work which she does not foresee, and so is ignorant of, is addressed. It is argued that ignorance can be a ground for the attribution of responsibility, on condition that there are general principles, rules or norms, that the subject should be aware of. It is maintained that there are such rules which inform the practice of science as a social institution.