Rhetorics of Health Citizenship: Exploring Vernacular Critiques of Government’s Role in Supporting Healthy Living

This article explores how older adults negotiate and partially counter normative expectations of “health citizenship” that stress individual responsibility for maintaining health and preventing health problems. Based on interviews with 55 participants in Canada and the U.K. about what healthy living means to them in their everyday lives, we examine how the dominant discourse of personal responsibility in participants’ responses is counterpointed by a more muted, yet significant, alternative critical perspective on the relative roles and responsibilities of government and citizens in making healthy living possible. Drawing on Hauser’s (1999) concept of vernacular rhetoric along with recent theories of environmental citizenship, we analyze how participants exercise their civic-political judgment by using a logic of dissociation to argue that what government says about the importance of healthy living is incompatible with what government does to support citizens’ abilities to eat healthily and live actively. By deploying this technique of argumentation to address structural-political-economic dimensions of healthy living, participants enact, in modest ways, an alternative, critical-collective mode of health citizenship that complicates and, at least partially, disrupts neoliberal constructions of the individually responsible, “good” health citizen.     

The just world hypothesis as an argumentative resource in debates about unemployment benefits

The concept of the “just world” is established as a key explanation for how people make sense of inequality so that those deemed to score high in belief in a just world are more likely to hold prejudicial beliefs and to blame people in poverty for their situations. However, this is an inadequate explanation for such complicated and controversial issues. To better understand talk about the just world and the controversial issue of the distribution of unemployment benefits (an issue of inequality), a discursive psychological approach to the just world is used. Therefore, a discourse analysis focusses on 2 feature length British televised discussions about benefit claimants called “The Big Benefit Row: Live” (Channel 5 3/2/2014) and “Benefits Britain: the Debate” (Channel 4 17/2/2014). The analysis demonstrates that people draw on both just and unjust world arguments simultaneously and also topicalise what counts as just so as to support their positions on unemployment benefits, rather than in the consistent way that just world theory would predict. It is therefore argued that the just world should be recast as a cultural value that facilitates arguments about benefits, rather than an internally held belief.     

Outliers and Influential Observations in Exponential Random Graph Models

We discuss measuring and detecting influential observations and outliers in the context of exponential family random graph (ERG) models for social networks. We focus on the level of the nodes of the network and consider those nodes whose removal would result in changes to the model as extreme or “central” with respect to the structural features that “matter”. We construe removal in terms of two case-deletion strategies: the tie-variables of an actor are assumed to be unobserved, or the node is removed resulting in the induced subgraph. We define the difference in inferred model resulting from case deletion from the perspective of information theory and difference in estimates, in both the natural and mean-value parameterisation, representing varying degrees of approximation. We arrive at several measures of influence and propose the use of two that do not require refitting of the model and lend themselves to routine application in the ERGM fitting procedure. MCMC p values are obtained for testing how extreme each node is with respect to the network structure. The influence measures are applied to two well-known data sets to illustrate the information they provide. From a network perspective, the proposed statistics offer an indication of which actors are most distinctive in the network structure, in terms of not abiding by the structural norms present across other actors.     

Cognitive functioning in delusions: a longitudinal analysis

BACKGROUND: This study explored the longitudinal course of the relationship between delusions and different aspects of cognitive functioning. METHODS: Deluded patients were compared to psychiatric and non-clinical controls on three tasks: negative priming, a probabilistic judgement task (the 'beads' task), and the pragmatic inference task (PIT). All groups were tested at two time points, once when actively symptomatic, and once when in remission. RESULTS: Deluded individuals exhibited a 'jump-to-conclusions' (JTC) reasoning bias: i.e., they made decisions on the basis of limited evidence and were more likely to revise their estimates when faced with disconfirmatory evidence. This JTC bias remained stable over time, although probability judgments seemed to normalise in remission. No deficits in cognitive inhibition were found on negative priming. The deluded group displayed an excessive self-focus on the PIT at both time points, but did not show a depressive attributional style. Only a small sub-sample, characterised by the "bad-me" type of paranoia [Trower & Chadwick, 1995 Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 2, 263-278.], demonstrated depressive schemas when symptomatic, but no longer did so when remitted. Few relationships were found between tasks, suggesting that different areas of functioning are relatively independent. The only measures associated with delusion symptom scores were from the 'beads' task. CONCLUSIONS: Overall these findings suggest that the JTC bias is a stable factor associated with delusional thinking, while the depressive attributional style characteristic of a small sub-sample of paranoid patients fluctuates with delusional course.     

Delusions and decision-making style: use of the Need for Closure Scale

Clinicians and researchers have suggested that rapidity in belief formation, due to having a high 'need for closure' (NFC), may contribute to the acceptance of delusional explanations. The aim of the study is to determine whether NFC has such a direct link with delusions. A secondary aim is to examine if NFC is related to the delusion-associated reasoning process of 'jumping to conclusions'. One hundred and eighty-seven patients with psychosis, recruited for a treatment trial of psychological therapy (the PRP trial), completed the Need for Closure Scale (NFCS), symptom measures, and probabilistic reasoning tasks. The NFCS was considered in terms of its two dimensions: a desire for simple structure and a preference for quick, decisive answers. The individuals with psychosis reported being poor at making quick, decisive answers but required a greater need for simple structure. NFC was associated with levels of anxiety and depression. There were weak links between NFC and both positive and negative symptoms of psychosis, but these were explained by differences in affect. NFCS scores were unrelated to jumping to conclusions. Contrary to the argument that NFC is directly linked to delusions, individuals with delusions actually perceive themselves as indecisive. There was no evidence that NFC-at least as assessed by the NFCS-could be a proximal cause of delusions. Any potential effect on psychotic symptom presentation is indirect, mediated through affect. The use of the NFCS on its own in the study of psychotic symptoms cannot be recommended.     

Need for closure and anxiety in delusions: a longitudinal investigation in early psychosis

This study investigated the role of need for closure (NFC) and anxiety in delusions. The Need For Closure Scale (NFCS) and measures of trait and state anxiety were administered to an early psychosis group with current delusions, a clinical (generalised anxiety disorder--GAD) control group and a non-clinical control group. The battery of questionnaires was repeated at follow-up one year later. The NFCS did not meet criteria for a unidimensional scale and two sub-scales were removed from all further analyses. At baseline the deluded and GAD groups scored significantly higher on the reduced NFCS (NFCS-R) than the control group. Trait anxiety was related to NFCS-R in the GAD and non-clinical control groups, but not in the deluded group. At follow-up all groups scored significantly lower on the NFCS-R, perhaps suggesting a practice effect, although the two clinical groups continued to have higher scores than the non-clinical control group. The recovered and non-recovered deluded groups did not differ on the NFCS-R one year later, unlike in the GAD group where recovered participants had significantly lower scores than the non-recovered. Change scores on the NFCS-R and trait anxiety were correlated at trend level in the GAD and non-clinical control groups, but not in the deluded group. These findings suggest that whilst NFC and trait anxiety are related in non-psychotic groups, NFC may be implicated in the formation of delusions, independently of anxiety, in psychotic individuals.     

The reciprocation of unfavorable evaluations of performance in a two-person inspection task

The extent to which subjects reciprocate unfavorable evaluations of performance was investigated in a dyadic inspection situation. The members of twelve male subject pairings alternated in their roles as ‘inspector’ and ‘operator’ on a discrimination task. As operators, the subjects were led to believe that their inspectors had evaluated their performance favorably or unfavorably on the basis of either a subjective judgment or an objective matching evaluation criterion. Results showed that those operators who reciprocated most were those whose discriminations were rejected by means of the judgment criterion. This result is in line with the attribution hypothesis that a person is held more responsible for an act having an unfavorable outcome for others when that act is perceived as voluntary and intended than when it is perceived as compulsory or externally determined.