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91.
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Sandford Shieh 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》1999,80(1):78-102
One of the two major parts of Dummett’s defense of intuitionism is the rejection of classical in favor of intuitionistic reasoning in mathematics, given that mathematical discourse is anti-realist. While there have been illuminating discussions of what Dummett’s argument for this might be, no consensus seems to have emerged about its overall form. In this paper I give an account of this form, starting by investigating a fundamental, but little discussed question: to what view of the relation between deductive principles and meaning is anti-realism committed? The result of this investigation is a constraint on meaning theoretic assessments of logical laws. Given this constraint, I show that, surprisingly, a consistent anti-realist critique of classical logic could not rely on the rejection of bivalence. Moreover, a consistent anti-realist defense of intuitionism must begin with a radical rejection of the very conception of logical consequence that underlies realist classical logic. It follows from these conclusions that anti-realist intuitionism seems committed to proceeding by proof theoretic means. 相似文献
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Shawn Floyd 《The Journal of religious ethics》2009,37(3):449-471
Contemporary philosophers often construe mercy as a supererogatory notion or a matter of punitive leniency. Yet it is false that no merciful actions are obligatory. Further, it is questionable whether mercy is really about punitive leniency, either exclusively or primarily. As an alternative to these accounts, I consider the view offered by St. Thomas Aquinas. He rejects the claim that we are never obligated to be merciful. Also, his view of mercy is not restricted to legal contexts. For him, mercy's scope is considerably broader, as it concerns a wide range of needs and hardships to which human beings are vulnerable. Such a view, I submit, affords a kind of normative depth lacking in many contemporary accounts. Unlike those views that construe mercy as either a supererogatory or legal concept, Aquinas's account illuminates mercy's obligatory nature and encourages us to make mercy a more salient fixture of our moral lives. 相似文献
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