The temporal dynamics of the perceptual consequences of action-effect prediction

An essential aspect of voluntary action control is the ability to predict the perceptual effects of our actions. Although the influence of action-effect prediction on humans’ behavior and perception is unequivocal, it remains unclear when action-effect prediction is generated by the brain. The present study investigates the dynamics of action effect anticipation by tracing the time course of its perceptual consequences. Participants completed an acquisition phase during which specific actions (left and right key-presses) were associated with specific visual effects (upward and downward dots motion). In the test phase they performed a 2 AFC identification task in which they were required to indicate whether the dots moved upward or downward. To isolate any effects of action-effect prediction on perception, participants were presented with congruent and incongruent dot motion in which the association participants learned in the previous acquisition phase was respected and violated, respectively. Crucially, to assess the temporal dynamics of action prediction, congruent and incongruent stimuli were presented at different intervals before or after action execution. We observed higher sensitivity (d′) to motion discrimination in congruent vs. incongruent trials only when stimuli were presented from about 220 ms before the action to 280 ms after the action. The temporal dynamics of our effect suggest that action-effect prediction modulates perception at later stages of motor preparation.     

Neuronal correlates of three attentional strategies during affective picture processing: an fMRI study

This functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study directly compared the neurocircuitry involved in three different attentional strategies during affective picture processing. We exposed 40 participants (20 men, 20 women) to images depicting dental treatment, as well as neutral scenes. They were asked to do one of three tasks while watching the same pictures: directing their attention toward a foreground object within the picture (distraction), classifying whether the image showed dental treatment, or deciding whether the scene elicited fear of pain (introspection). The participants performed the distraction and classification task with high accuracy and rated only 11 % of the dental treatment pictures as pain relevant. Introspection was associated with increased activation of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), relative to the two other conditions. Since the dental, relative to the neutral, pictures elicited enhanced DMPFC activation across all conditions, this underlines the role of this brain region for the assignment, as well as self-reference, of affective meaning. Moreover, self-reported dental anxiety was positively correlated with activation of a pain modulatory network (DMPFC, basal ganglia) when the participants focused on the pain relevance of the dental treatment cues. For future studies, it seems promising to study a high-anxious group or even patients afflicted with dental phobia.     

Summation versus suppression in metacontrast masking: On the potential pitfalls of using metacontrast masking to assess perceptual–motor dissociation

A briefly flashed target stimulus can become “invisible” when immediately followed by a mask—a phenomenon known as backward masking, which constitutes a major tool in the cognitive sciences. One form of backward masking is termed metacontrast masking. It is generally assumed that in metacontrast masking, the mask suppresses activity on which the conscious perception of the target relies. This assumption biases conclusions when masking is used as a tool—for example, to study the independence between perceptual detection and motor reaction. This is because other models can account for reduced perceptual performance without requiring suppression mechanisms. In this study, we used signal detection theory to test the suppression model against an alternative view of metacontrast masking, referred to as the summation model. This model claims that target- and mask-related activations fuse and that the difficulty in detecting the target results from the difficulty to discriminate this fused response from the response produced by the mask alone. Our data support this alternative view. This study is not a thorough investigation of metacontrast masking. Instead, we wanted to point out that when a different model is used to account for the reduced perceptual performance in metacontrast masking, there is no need to postulate a dissociation between perceptual and motor responses to account for the data. Metacontrast masking, as implemented in the Fehrer–Raab situation, therefore is not a valid method to assess perceptual–motor dissociations.     

Selective Exposure and News Media Brands: Implicit and Explicit Attitudes as Predictors of News Choice

ABSTRACT

Media consumers often lack the motivation, time, or cognitive capacity to select content in a deliberate way; instead, they opt for mental shortcuts. Brands are important in this regard because they simplify decision making. In the present study we investigated whether attitudes toward news media brands predict news choice. It is important that we conceptualized attitudes on two different levels: Although explicit attitudes are defined as overtly expressed, more or less deliberate evaluations, implicit attitudes are defined as automatically activated, gut-level evaluations. The supplementary use of implicit attitudes is consistent with current theorizing highlighting that deeply held and sometimes even unconscious evaluations influence media choice. Using a web-based study, we found that implicit and explicit attitudes toward television brands predicted choice. Each attitude construct predicted variance beyond that predicted by the other. We discuss implications by emphasizing the role of automatic, gut-level decision making in current high-choice media environments.     

Redundancy and reduction: Speakers manage syntactic information density

A principle of efficient language production based on information theoretic considerations is proposed: Uniform Information Density predicts that language production is affected by a preference to distribute information uniformly across the linguistic signal. This prediction is tested against data from syntactic reduction. A single multilevel logit model analysis of naturally distributed data from a corpus of spontaneous speech is used to assess the effect of information density on complementizer that-mentioning, while simultaneously evaluating the predictions of several influential alternative accounts: availability, ambiguity avoidance, and dependency processing accounts. Information density emerges as an important predictor of speakers’ preferences during production. As information is defined in terms of probabilities, it follows that production is probability-sensitive, in that speakers’ preferences are affected by the contextual probability of syntactic structures. The merits of a corpus-based approach to the study of language production are discussed as well.     

Regret and Behavior: Comment on Zeelenberg and Pieters

Zeelenberg and Pieter's (2007) regret regulation theory 1.0 offers a synthesis that brings together concepts spanning numerous literatures. We have no substantive disagreement with their theory, but instead offer 3 observations to further aid regret researchers studying consumer decision making. First, the overall arch of any regret theory must be situated within an understanding of behavior regulation. Second, the distinction between regrets of action versus inaction is best understood in terms of motivational implications, particularly with regard to Higgin's (1998) distinction between promotion and prevention focus. Third, the opportunity principle offers a particularly clear means of summarizing the regulatory consequences of the regret experience. Regret is an emotion pivotal for decision making, and its cognitive underpinning has and continues to be elucidated in research focusing on counterfactual thinking.     

Consequence and Normative Guidance

Logic, the tradition has it, is normative for reasoning. But is that really so? And if so, in what sense is logic normative for reasoning? As Gilbert Harman has reminded us, devising a logic and devising a theory of reasoning are two separate enterprises. Hence, logic's normative authority cannot reside in the fact that principles of logic just are norms of reasoning. Once we cease to identify the two, we are left with a gap. To bridge the gap one would need to produce what John MacFarlane has appropriately called a bridge principle, i.e. a general principle articulating a substantive and systematic link between logical entailment and norms of reasoning. This is Harman's skeptical challenge. In this paper I argue that Harman's skeptical challenge can be met. I show how candidate bridge principles can be systematically generated and evaluated against a set of well‐motivated desiderata. Moreover, I argue that bridge principles advanced by MacFarlane himself and others, for all their merit, fail to address the problem originally set forth by Harman and so do not meet the skeptical challenge. Finally, I develop a bridge principle that meets Harman's requirements as well as being substantive.     

The Pessimistic Meta-induction: Obsolete Through Scientific Progress?

Recently, Fahrbach and Park have argued that the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) about scientific theories is unsound. They claim that this very argument does not properly take into account scientific progress, particularly during the twentieth century. They also propose amended arguments in favour of scientific realism, which are supposed to properly reflect the history of science. I try to show that what I call the argument from scientific progress cannot explain satisfactorily why the current (best) theories should have reached a degree of success that excludes their future refutations and allows the inference to their truth. I further argue that this line of argumentation dismisses the burden of proof in a rather unfair manner by using a delaying tactic to postpone the question about the validity of the PMI in the future.