Intrusive memories and rumination in patients with post-traumatic stress disorder: a phenomenological comparison

The aim of the study was to investigate the phenomenological differences between intrusive memories and rumination in PTSD. The study population consisted of 31 patients with PTSD referred for cognitive behavioural therapy to specialist services. A semi-structured interview was used to examine the characteristics of the most prominent intrusive memory and rumination. Intrusive memories were predominantly sensory experiences of short duration, whereas rumination was predominantly a thought process of longer duration. Shame was associated more with rumination than with intrusive memories. Anxiety, helplessness, numbness, and threat were greater at the time of the trauma than when experiencing the intrusive memory. In contrast, feelings like anger and sadness were greater when experiencing intrusive memories than at the time of the event. The distinction between intrusive memories and rumination is of clinical importance as intrusive memories usually decrease with imaginal reliving of the trauma, whereas rumination may require different therapeutic strategies, such as rumination-focused or mindfulness-based cognitive therapy.     

Two modes of sensorimotor integration in intention-based and stimulus-based actions

Human actions may be driven endogenously (to produce desired environmental effects) or exogenously (to accommodate to environmental demands). There is a large body of evidence indicating that these two kinds of action are controlled by different neural substrates. However, only little is known about what happens—in functional terms—on these different “routes to action”. Ideomotor approaches claim that actions are selected with respect to their perceptual consequences. We report experiments that support the validity of the ideomotor principle and that, at the same time, show that it is subject to a far-reaching constraint: It holds for endogenously driven actions only! Our results suggest that the activity of the two “routes to action” is based on different types of learning: The activity of the system guiding stimulus-based actions is accompanied by stimulus-response (sensorimotor) learning, whereas the activity of the system controlling intention-based actions results in action-effect (ideomotor) learning.     

The Theory of Planned Behavior Without Compatibility? Beyond Method Bias and Past Trivial Associations1

Overreliance on one measurement approach can challenge accurate statements about reality, as findings can represent by‐products of the compulsory measurement paradigm. Within the theory of planned behavior (TPB), the compatibility principle represents one such strictly imposed paradigm. Using 2 cross‐sectional surveys of 1,394 volunteers and involving structural equation models, we demonstrate that the widely employed practice of measuring TPB constructs is confounded with method‐implied bias. This means the theory cannot conclusively reveal origins of a behavior. Our results also suggest that on an aggregated level, when method bias is eliminated, its constructs are linked in hypothesized ways. Adopting a more general model—thus, adopting a more traitlike conceptualization of attitudes—has interesting implications for social psychology and its current trends.     

Identification of interindividual and intraindividual movement patterns in handball players of varying expertise levels

The authors examined the movement patterns of 5 left-handed handball players (ranging from beginner to national level) who threw a handball to different sections of a goal as if a goalkeeper were present. The authors used time-continuous, 3-dimensional kinematic data to assess interindividual movement patterns and considered participants' intraindividual differences relative to different targets. Cluster analysis yielded the highest assignment rates for level of expertise; a mean of 92% of trials was correctly assessed. The authors observed an interaction with expertise for the intraindividual movement patterns. Variability in the novice throwers was increased, whereas (a) advanced throwers experienced a period of stability, and (b) the expert thrower's variability was increased. The results indicate that random variability characterizes novice motor performance, whereas active functional variability may exemplify expert motor performance.     

The role of disgust in patients with hypochondriasis

Theoretically, disgust sensitivity and disgust proneness could play an important role in hypochondriasis, since disgust is a defensive emotion widely believed to protect the organism from illness. However, empirical evidence to support this hypothesis has so far been based only on nonclinical samples, so that the importance and specificity of disgust for hypochondriasis remains unclear. In the current study, 36 patients with hypochondriasis, 27 with an anxiety disorder, and 29 healthy controls completed several measures which included the assessment of disgust sensitivity (Scale for the Assessment of Disgust Sensitivity) and disgust proneness (Questionnaire for the Assessment of Disgust Proneness). We found that patients with hypochondriasis and those with an anxiety disorder had higher scores than those of the healthy controls for several measures of disgust proneness. Moreover, measures of hypochondriacal characteristics were associated with those of disgust proneness and disgust sensitivity. However, no differences were found between patients with hypochondriasis and those with anxiety disorders, with respect to disgust proneness and disgust sensitivity. Therefore, it can be assumed that disgust proneness and disgust sensitivity seem to be less specific than previously suggested for the development and maintenance of hypochondriasis.     

Differences in the Between‐Person and Within‐Person Structures of Affect Are a Matter of Degree

This study tested whether the structure of affect observed on the basis of between‐person (BP) differences is equivalent to the affect structures that organize the variability of affective states within persons (WP) over time. Further aims were to identify individual differences in the degree of divergence between the WP and BP structure and examine its association to dispositional and contextual variables (neuroticism, extraversion, well‐being and stress). In 100 daily sessions, 101 younger adults rated their mood on the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. Variability of five negative affect items across time was so low that they were excluded from the analyses. We thus worked with a modified negative affect subscale. WP affect structures diverged reliably from the BP structure, with individual differences in the degree of divergence. Differences in the WP structural characteristics and the degree of divergence could be predicted by well‐being and stress. We conclude that BP and WP structures of affect are not equivalent and that BP and WP variation should be considered as distinct phenomena. It would be wrong, for example, to conceive of positive and negative affect as independent at the WP level, as suggested by BP findings. Yet, individual differences in WP structural characteristics are related to stable BP differences, and the degree to which individuals' affect structures diverge from the BP structure can provide important insights into intraindividual functioning. Copyright © 2014 European Association of Personality Psychology     

How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality

In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any well‐defined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines framework‐internal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our first‐order scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not itself constrained by these (framework‐internal) standards. However, even if choosing a framework is a practical matter, we would nevertheless expect the process of framework selection to be subject to rational norms. But which norms might those be? And where do they come from? I begin by showing that these questions are crucial to the success of Carnap's entire philosophical project. I then offer a response on behalf of the Carnapian which guarantees the rationality of the process of framework selection, while remaining true to Carnap's firm commitment to tolerance.