Although it is currently popular to model human associative learning using connectionist networks, the mechanism by which their output activations are converted to probabilities of response has received relatively little attention. Several possible models of this decision process are considered here, including a simple ratio rule, a simple difference rule, their exponential versions, and a winner-take-all network. Two categorization experiments that attempt to dissociate these models are reported. Analogues of the experiments were presented to a single-layer, feed-forward, delta-rule network. Only the exponential ratio rule and the winner-take-all architecture, acting on the networks' output activations that corresponded to responses available on test, were capable of fully predicting the mean response results. In addition, unlike the exponential ratio rule, the winner-take-all model has the potential to predict latencies. Further studies will be required to determine whether latencies produced under more stringent conditions conform to the model's predictions. 相似文献
It was predicted that trained observers would detect deception more accurately than untrained observers. More specifically, it was predicted that the highest deception detection accuracy would be found among trained observers judging the veracity of low self-monitors and unrehearsed liars, whereas the lowest detection accuracy would be found among untrained observers judging the veracity of high self-monitors and rehearsed deceivers. It also was hypothesized that the discrepancy between observers‘actual ability to detect deception and their certainty in the accuracy of their judgments would be smaller for trained observers than for untrained observers. Observers trained to detect deception used six behavioral cues based on research by deTurck and Miller (1985): (a) message duration, (b) response latency, (c) adaptors, (d) pauses, (e) nonfluencies, and (f) hand gestures. Results confirmed both hypotheses. 相似文献
Suicide and homicide rates by age were analyzed for Canada and the United States, indicating that suicide is higher in Canada and that homicide is higher in the United States. Results indicated a positive association between homicide and suicide rates in the United States but these two rates of death were not significantly associated in Canada. Holinger (1987) had associated the relative size of the cohort to the rates of suicide and homicide in young people in the United States. The more current data in both countries did not support Holinger's results. Using the measure devised by Easterlin (1980) and Ahlburg and Schapiro (1984) –that is, the proportion of youths aged 15–24 relative to adults aged 25–64–the correlation between the size of the youth cohort and the suicide rate of youths aged 15–24 was negative. It is concluded that the two patterns in these two countries may be explained from a historical perspective. 相似文献
We examined whether four personality traits—trait aggression, trait industriousness, trait deceptiveness, and trait self-control—were differentially related to 11 narrow-bandwidth CWB facets: (a) property destruction, (b) inappropriate verbal actions, (c) inappropriate physical actions, (d) poor attendance, (e) poor quality work, (f) unsafe behavior, (g) theft and related behavior, (h) misuse of information, (i) misuse of time and resources, (j) alcohol use, and (k) drug use. Based on responses from 404 employed participants recruited using Mechanical Turk, we found that each narrow-bandwidth personality trait often yielded stronger relationships with overall CWB than with narrow-bandwidth CWB facets. 相似文献
What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of ‘ought’: ‘warranted oughts’. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective ‘oughts’. Sections 2–3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective ‘oughts’ with objective ‘wide-scope oughts’ operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted ‘ought’ and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted ‘oughts’. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.